{"description":"Documents matching 'licensee subject foreign adversary annual'","count":75,"total_pages":4,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=licensee+subject+foreign+adversary+annual&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) addresses the risks of foreign adversary control of Commission-granted licenses and authorizations by adopting rules requiring a broad range of holders of such licenses, authorizations, or approvals to attest whether they are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and, if so, to disclose additional information about such foreign adversary control. Among other things, the Commission defines categories of licenses and authorizations that are subject to the rules, and establishes a streamlined process by which license and authorization holders should file their foreign adversary control attestations and disclosures.","document_number":"2026-06992","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/10/2026-06992/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-10/pdf/2026-06992.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06992.pdf?1775738718","publication_date":"2026-04-10","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"preexisting definitions of an individual or entity “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” “foreign adversary,” and “foreign adversary country” to govern the scope of individuals and entities which are subject to our Foreign Adversary Control rules. In this \n Report and Order, \n we use the term “Foreign Adversary Control” to refer to the term “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary” as defined by the Commission. We then define three categories of licenses"},{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to protect the Nation's communications networks against foreign adversary threats by proposing to expand foreign ownership disclosure requirements for covered Commission-issued licenses and authorizations. The proposed certification and information collection requirements would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically, the Commission proposes to apply new certification and disclosure requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, as the Commission currently does. Furthermore, the Commission proposes to go beyond foreign ownership to also cover all regulated entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.","document_number":"2025-11360","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/20/2025-11360/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-20/pdf/2025-11360.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11360.pdf?1750250720","publication_date":"2025-06-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"b. identify which foreign adversary the Regulatee is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of; \n c. describe the nature of the foreign adversary ownership, control, jurisdiction, or direction to which the Regulatee is subject; and \n d. certify to the truth and accuracy all information. \n \n (2) No Reportable Foreign Adversary Control. \n A Regulatee that affirmatively certifies it is not directly or indirectly owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary must certify to the"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"identified as foreign adversaries in 15 CFR 791.4, and countries controlled by a foreign adversary (including foreign non-government persons) identified in 15 CFR 791.4. For example, we will apply any reference to “a government organization of a foreign adversary country” to include the Maduro Regime. Further, we will apply the term “foreign adversary country” to include Venezuela as a country controlled by a foreign adversary identified in 15 CFR 791.4. \n \n \n 21. \n Owned By, Controlled By, or Subject to the Jurisdiction or Direction of a Foreign Adversary"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"the criteria to file a Foreign Adversary Annual Report and an SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report (as both a licensee under § 1.70003(a) or (b) and an SLTE owner and operator) should file both reports every year. If both reports should be required, what timing or reporting deadlines should we consider? Should such entity be permitted to seek a waiver of a requirement to file the SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report if it incorporates necessary information about its SLTE ownership and location in the Foreign Adversary Annual Report? Should the Commission"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) announces that the Office of Management and Budget has approved new information collection requirements under OMB Control Numbers 3060-1156 and 3060-0944, as adopted by the Commission's Report and Order, FCC 25-49.","document_number":"2026-13765","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/08/2026-13765/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-08/pdf/2026-13765.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13765.pdf?1783428313","publication_date":"2026-07-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"adopted foreign adversary definitions to protect the security of submarine cables by presumptively precluding the grant of applications filed by an applicant owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and/or identified on the Commission's Covered List, among others. There is also a presumption that denial of an application is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country or add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country. Importantly, licensees are"},{"title":"Information Collections Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission","type":"Notice","abstract":"As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on the following information collections. Comments are requested concerning: whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical utility; the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimate; ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on the respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and ways to further reduce the information collection burden on small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. The FCC may not conduct or sponsor a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. No person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information subject to the PRA that does not display a valid OMB control number.","document_number":"2026-02545","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/10/2026-02545/information-collections-being-reviewed-by-the-federal-communications-commission","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-10/pdf/2026-02545.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-02545.pdf?1770644709","publication_date":"2026-02-10","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"The Commission adopted foreign adversary definitions to protect the security of submarine cables by presumptively precluding the grant of applications filed by an applicant owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and/or identified on the Commission's Covered List, among others; adopting a presumption that denial of an application is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country or add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country; and \n \n prohibiting"},{"title":"Space Modernization for the 21st Century","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or we) proposes to overhaul and modernize the Commission's space and earth station licensing process to help \"ensure that new space-based industries, space exploration capabilities, and cutting-edge defense systems are pioneered in America rather than by our adversaries.\" In particular, the NPRM proposes to develop a \"licensing assembly line\" designed so applications can be routed along different paths and segmented for review based on specific aspects of a request. This new process would set the stage for ongoing efficiency gains and would provide greater predictability and flexibility for applicants. In this way, we expect--like actual assembly lines--that the space review processes can be dramatically accelerated while improving the quality of the Commission's space licensing work.","document_number":"2025-22019","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/05/2025-22019/space-modernization-for-the-21st-century","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-05/pdf/2025-22019.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-22019.pdf?1764855918","publication_date":"2025-12-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and if so, to submit any additional information on foreign adversary control including identities, citizenships, and descriptions of any held control. The \n Foreign Adversary NPRM \n proposes to require foreign adversary certification and reporting for satellite networks, specifically seeking comment on whether to modify FCC Form 312—Main Form, along with other categories of satellite licensing, to include a certification on an applicant's foreign adversary ownership. We propose to align our final rules in"},{"title":"Information Collections Being Submitted for Review and Approval to Office of Management and Budget","type":"Notice","abstract":"As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) invites the general public and other Federal Agencies to take this opportunity to comment on the following information collection. Pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, the FCC seeks specific comment on ho3060- w it can further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.","document_number":"2026-07358","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/16/2026-07358/information-collections-being-submitted-for-review-and-approval-to-office-of-management-and-budget","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-16/pdf/2026-07358.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07358.pdf?1776257112","publication_date":"2026-04-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"adopted foreign adversary definitions to protect the security of submarine cables by presumptively precluding the grant of applications filed by an applicant owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and/or identified on the Commission's Covered List, among others; adopting a presumption that denial of an application is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country or add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country; and prohibiting licensees from"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"information for submarine cable systems that: (1) have a licensee that is directly or indirectly wholly or partially owned by a government of, or other entities with a place of organization in, a “foreign adversary” country, as defined in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4; (2) have a licensee with a place of organization in a “foreign adversary” country; or (3) land in a “foreign adversary” country. \n \n The Commission also sought comment on whether it should prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into arrangements for Indefeasible"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.","document_number":"2025-03718","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/13/2025-03718/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-13/pdf/2025-03718.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03718.pdf?1741783507","publication_date":"2025-03-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"by a government of, or other entities with a place of organization in, a “foreign adversary” country, as defined in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4; (2) have a licensee with a place of organization in a “foreign adversary” country; or (3) land in a “foreign adversary” country.\n 43 \n \n \n \n \n 43 \n 15 CFR 7.4 (stating “[t]he Secretary has determined that the following foreign governments or foreign non-government persons have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security"},{"title":"Protecting the Nation's Communications Systems From Cybersecurity Threats","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (\"Commission\" or \"FCC\") announces that it has reconsidered and rescinded a prior Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, neither of which had been published in the Federal Register. The Declaratory Ruling misconstrued the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was based in part on the Declaratory Ruling's flawed legal analysis and proposed ineffective cybersecurity requirements. This Order follows the FCC's engagement with providers to help strengthen their cybersecurity posture.","document_number":"2025-22830","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/15/2025-22830/protecting-the-nations-communications-systems-from-cybersecurity-threats","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-15/pdf/2025-22830.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-22830.pdf?1765547125","publication_date":"2025-12-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"implement and update cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans; adopted rules to ensure that foreign adversary controlled-test labs are not participating in the FCC's equipment authorization program; and are proposing to extend our equipment security rules to a larger class of foreign adversary-controlled devices. In each instance, we promoted requirements for which we have clear legal authority that target specific adversaries and threats while developing and considering a record that allows us to weigh the costs and benefits of further"},{"title":"Modernizing Security Requirements","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency, consistent with Executive Order 14300, \"Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\" The proposed revisions are intended to reduce regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained at NRC-licensed facilities.","document_number":"2026-12989","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/26/2026-12989/modernizing-security-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-26/pdf/2026-12989.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-12989.pdf?1782391523","publication_date":"2026-06-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"performance data annually reported to the NRC by licensees and other entities.\n \n The licensee employee workforce has consistently tested positive at much lower rates on pre-access and random drug and alcohol testing than the contractor/vendor workforce. The data show two to three times higher positive rates for contractor/vendors than licensee employees. In addition, FFD program performance data has consistently demonstrated that the licensee employee worker population has very low subversion rates. \n \n The existing 50 percent annual random testing"},{"title":"Integrated Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations that govern the land disposal of low-level radioactive waste to expand regulatory coverage to include certain transuranic wastes. The rule also introduces a new risk-informed framework for low-level waste disposal in which sites can develop waste acceptance criteria based on site-specific characteristics rather than using prescriptive limits. The proposed rule would allow for a graded approach: facilities that do not plan to accept significant quantities of long-lived radionuclides or Greater-Than-Class C waste will only need to meet a streamlined set of requirements, while those managing these waste streams must conduct technical assessments to ensure long- term safety. The proposed rule would also introduce new options for disposal of higher concentrations of waste, providing new alternatives for safe low-level waste management. These innovations support public health and environmental protection, as well as safe disposal of low- level radioactive waste, encourage operational efficiency, and offer greater flexibility for both current and future disposal facilities. In addition, the NRC is issuing draft implementing guidance for public comment.","document_number":"2026-13302","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/01/2026-13302/integrated-low-level-radioactive-waste-disposal","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-01/pdf/2026-13302.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13302.pdf?1782823519","publication_date":"2026-07-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"vii of this proposed rule.\n \n For new licensees and existing licensees that do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 61.1(b), the NRC is proposing that licensees perform a site-specific inadvertent intrusion assessment with a 5 mSv/yr (500 mrem/yr) dose limit. Existing licensees that meet the criteria in § 61.1(b) would have the option to use the existing technical analysis requirements, which are retained in § 61.13(f). \n \n For the licensees that perform a site-specific intruder assessment (\n i.e., \n licensees that do not meet the criteria for § 61"},{"title":"Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors","type":"Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations by adding a risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive regulatory framework for commercial nuclear plants in response to the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA). The current application and licensing requirements were primarily developed to address license requests concerning light water- cooled reactors and operational requirements for those types of reactors. This final rule responds to NEIMA by creating an alternative, technology-inclusive regulatory framework to accommodate licensing of future commercial nuclear plants, including advanced reactor designs that may not employ light-water technology.","document_number":"2026-06048","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/30/2026-06048/risk-informed-technology-inclusive-regulatory-framework-for-advanced-reactors","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-30/pdf/2026-06048.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06048.pdf?1774615514","publication_date":"2026-03-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"enable the drug testing of urine, oral fluid, and hair specimens. \n Section 26.606(a)(1) requires each licensee and other entity to provide a written FFD policy statement to individuals subject to the FFD program before the individuals are subjected to any FFD program drug and alcohol test. This is a protection measure afforded to individuals subject to the FFD program to help ensure that they know what is expected of them before being subject to the FFD program and potential consequences should they violate the FFD policy or procedures. This requirement"},{"title":"Competitive Bidding Rules for Auction of AWS-3 Licenses","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts final rules that update the eligibility criteria for designated entity bidding credits in auctions for licenses in the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and 2155-2180 MHz (AWS-3) bands. The Commission also updates its general competitive bidding rules for categorizing an entity as a small business concern.","document_number":"2025-14725","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/04/2025-14725/competitive-bidding-rules-for-auction-of-aws-3-licenses","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-04/pdf/2025-14725.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14725.pdf?1754052315","publication_date":"2025-08-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"and Order \n and any other changes that may be effectuated prior to the auction. For example, the Commission is considering a proposal to require auction applicants to make certain certifications as to whether they are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. If such a rule were to be adopted and made effective prior to the deadline for submitting an application to participate in Auction 113, the new requirement could apply to Auction 113 applicants. The Commission has repeatedly found that application"},{"title":"Definition of “Engaged in the Business” as a Dealer in Firearms","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice (\"Department\") is amending Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (\"ATF\") regulations to implement the provisions of the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act that broaden the definition of when a person is considered \"engaged in the business\" (\"EIB\") as a dealer in firearms other than a gunsmith or pawnbroker. This final rule incorporates the BSCA's definitions of \"predominantly earn a profit\" (\"PEP\") and \"terrorism,\" and amends the regulatory definitions of \"principal objective of livelihood and profit\" and \"engaged in the business\" to ensure each conforms with the BSCA's statutory changes and can be relied upon by the public. The rule also clarifies what it means for a person to be \"engaged in the business\" of dealing in firearms and to have the intent to \"predominantly earn a profit\" from the sale or disposition of firearms. In addition, it clarifies the term \"dealer\" and defines the term \"responsible person.\" These clarifications and definitions assist persons in understanding when they are required to have a license to deal in firearms. Consistent with the Gun Control Act (\"GCA\") and existing regulations, the rule also defines the term \"personal collection\" to clarify when persons are not \"engaged in the business\" because they make only occasional sales to enhance a personal collection or for a hobby, or if the firearms they sell are all or part of a personal collection. This rule further addresses the procedures that former licensees, and responsible persons acting on behalf of such licensees, must follow when they liquidate business inventory upon revocation or other termination of their license. Finally, the rule clarifies that a licensee transferring a firearm to another licensee must do so by following the verification and recordkeeping procedures in the regulations, rather than by using a Firearms Transaction Record, ATF Form 4473.","document_number":"2024-07838","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/04/19/2024-07838/definition-of-engaged-in-the-business-as-a-dealer-in-firearms","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-04-19/pdf/2024-07838.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-07838.pdf?1713444333","publication_date":"2024-04-19","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives","name":"Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Bureau","id":19,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/alcohol-tobacco-firearms-and-explosives-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/19","parent_id":268,"slug":"alcohol-tobacco-firearms-and-explosives-bureau"}],"excerpts":"intended for use by licensees when transferring firearms to other licensees or by a sole proprietor transferring to their personal collection or otherwise as a personal firearm.\n \n \n \n 109 \n \n See \n ATF, \n FFL Newsletter: Federal Firearms Licensee Information Service \n 7 (Mar. 2006), \n https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/newsletter/federal-firearms-licensees-newsletter-march-2006/download \n (“A dealer who purchases a firearm from another licensee should advise the transferor licensee of his or her licensed status so the transferor licensee's records may"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice proposes a rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-24582","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/29/2024-24582/provisions-pertaining-to-preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-29/pdf/2024-24582.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24582.pdf?1729628118","publication_date":"2024-10-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"data transactions with foreign persons, to conduct due diligence on the employment practices of those foreign persons to determine whether the foreign persons' employees qualify as covered persons. For instance, as illustrated by Examples 37 and 38 in the ANPRM, which are incorporated into the proposed rule, it would not be a prohibited transaction for a U.S. person to enter into a vendor agreement to have bulk U.S. sensitive personal data processed or stored by a foreign person that is not a covered person, even if that foreign person then employs"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to strengthen requirements and oversight relating to telecommunications certification bodies and measurement facilities to help ensure the integrity of these entities for purposes of the equipment authorization, to better protect national security, and to advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain.","document_number":"2024-14491","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/05/2024-14491/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-07-05/pdf/2024-14491.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-14491.pdf?1720010716","publication_date":"2024-07-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Department of Commerce maintains a list of “foreign adversary” countries that identifies any foreign government or foreign non-government person that the Secretary of Commerce has determined to have engaged in a “long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security interest of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.” The Department of Commerce's list of foreign adversaries currently includes several foreign governments and foreign non-government persons, including China (including"},{"title":"Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Reactors With Comparable Risk Profiles","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to establish a risk-informed and performance- based regulatory framework for rapid licensing of new microreactors and other reactors with comparable risk profiles and for high-volume deployment of these reactors. The proposed rule would provide a flexible set of licensing pathways, reduce regulatory burden, and ensure that safety and security requirements remain commensurate with the potential hazards posed by these facilities.","document_number":"2026-08550","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/01/2026-08550/licensing-requirements-for-microreactors-and-other-reactors-with-comparable-risk-profiles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-01/pdf/2026-08550.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08550.pdf?1777553125","publication_date":"2026-05-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"procedures,” would require licensees and other entities to implement and maintain an FFD policy and procedures for their FFD programs. Proposed § 26.906(a)(1) would require each licensee and other entity to provide a written FFD policy statement to individuals subject to the FFD program before the individuals are subjected to any FFD program drug and alcohol test. This would be a protection measure afforded to individuals subject to the FFD program to help ensure that they know what is expected of them before being subject to the FFD program and potential"},{"title":"Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice is issuing a final rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-31486","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-31486.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31486.pdf?1735911918","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"Americans as part of its campaign of transnational repression.” \n 39 \n \n The Committee's bipartisan recommendations included taking “steps to prevent foreign adversaries from collecting or acquiring U.S. genomic and other sensitive health data.” \n 40 \n \n The 2024 National Counterintelligence Strategy made protecting Americans against foreign intelligence targeting and collection a key goal given foreign adversaries' “broader focus on data as a strategic resource” and the counterintelligence value it provides.\n 41 \n \n The November 2024 Report to Congress"}]}