{"description":"Documents matching 'security america communications networks equipment'","count":3745,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+america+communications+networks+equipment&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) aims to further its actions in strengthening prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment and to clarify the rules and enforcement of such. The Commission seeks additional comment on modular transmitters and component parts in relation to covered equipment. The Commission addresses the partial court remand of the decision in its November 2022 EA Security R&O by proposing a definition of \"critical infrastructure\" as used on the Covered List and seeking comment on the implementation of that definition. The Commission also seeks comment on whether any modification to an authorized device by an entity identified on the Covered List should require a new application for certification. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on clarifying the scope of activities that constitute marketing of equipment and on measures to strengthen enforcement of marketing prohibitions.","document_number":"2025-21928","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/04/2025-21928/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-04/pdf/2025-21928.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21928.pdf?1764769515","publication_date":"2025-12-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"efforts to protect the security of America's communications networks and equipment supply chains, the Commission adopted the Equipment Authorization Security Report and Order, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 21-232 and EA Docket 21-233 (2022) (EA Security R&O and FNPRM). In that item, the Commission adopted rules as part of its equipment authorization program to prohibit authorization of communications equipment that has been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States"},{"title":"Seeking Comment on Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) seek comment on proposing to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. Through Public Notice, acting pursuant to Sec. 2.939 of the Federal Communications Commission's rules, PSHSB and OET propose to apply such prohibitions to communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier.","document_number":"2026-06653","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/06/2026-06653/seeking-comment-on-prohibiting-importation-and-marketing-of-previously-authorized-covered","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-06/pdf/2026-06653.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06653.pdf?1775220317","publication_date":"2026-04-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"considered covered equipment “likely remain marketable in the United States” and “may present continuing national security threats.” \n 4 \n \n \n \n \n 3 \n \n EA Security 2d R&O, \n FCC 25-71, para. 40.\n \n \n \n \n 4 \n \n Id. \n \n \n \n The Commission's initial, 2021 additions to the Covered List were pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress in Section 2(c) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act).\n 5 \n \n This directive constitutes a specific determination that such equipment poses an “unacceptable"},{"title":"Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. Through Public Notice, acting pursuant to Sec. 2.939 of the Federal Communications Commission's rules, PSHSB and OET apply such prohibitions to communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier.","document_number":"2026-13518","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/06/2026-13518/prohibiting-importation-and-marketing-of-previously-authorized-covered-communications-equipment","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-06/pdf/2026-13518.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13518.pdf?1782996313","publication_date":"2026-07-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.” Under the approach the Commission adopted in the \n EA Security R&O \n (88 FR 7592), new equipment authorization applications for covered equipment produced by entities subject to use-based restrictions (\n i.e., \n equipment that is covered when “used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes”) are generally prohibited until"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) clarifies that rules prohibiting authorization of covered equipment include modular transmitters and adopts a prohibition on authorization of devices that include modular transmitters that are covered equipment. The Commission also adopts a procedure to limit previously granted authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of such equipment. It further discusses the broad scope of the prohibition on authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List by clarifying the term \"produced by\" as used in the Commission's rules concerning covered equipment and clarifying the prohibition on modification to previously authorized covered equipment.","document_number":"2025-21001","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/25/2025-21001/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-25/pdf/2025-21001.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21001.pdf?1763991936","publication_date":"2025-11-25","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"protect the security of America's communications networks and equipment supply chains, the Commission adopted the Equipment Authorization Security Report and Order, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 21-232 and EA Docket 21-233 (EA Security R&O and FNPRM). In that item, the Commission adopted rules as part of its equipment authorization program to prohibit authorization of communications equipment that has been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety"},{"title":"Resilient Networks; Concerning Disruptions to Communications","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) modernizes the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) to reduce reporting burdens on stakeholders and ensure that the information being collected is useful for disaster response. Our modernization allows manual filers to submit a single, dynamic form instead of multiple worksheets, and enables them to use a \"one-click\" option to easily indicate there is no change from the previous day's report. Further, unnecessary fields and worksheets will be eliminated to ensure that DIRS is collecting the information that is most important for emergency response. This modernization also eliminates the requirement for service providers to file a DIRS final report within 24 hours of DIRS' deactivation, and exempts non-facilities-based providers from DIRS reporting. This document also recognizes the emergence of public safety voice and broadband networks and the critical connectivity they provide to public safety stakeholders by requiring providers of these services to submit DIRS reports on the status of their public safety network infrastructure. Finally, we augment providers' ability to voluntarily submit geospatial information on infrastructure affected by disasters. Together, these changes provide public safety officials with the additional information they need, while also making it easier for service providers to satisfy their reporting obligations.","document_number":"2026-13155","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/30/2026-13155/resilient-networks-concerning-disruptions-to-communications","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-30/pdf/2026-13155.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13155.pdf?1782737115","publication_date":"2026-06-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"information about the status of the same communications equipment from both the facilities-based provider that owns and operates that equipment and from non-facilities-based providers that rely upon that equipment to offer service introduces a risk of double counting that threatens the quality of DIRS data. It will promote our ability to quickly and reliably produce aggregated information about the status of communications equipment during disasters to receive one authoritative report about each relevant communications facility in a DIRS activation area"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Pub. L. 116-124, 134 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609)) mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) publish and maintain a list of communications equipment and services (i.e., the Covered List) that have been determined by agencies with national security responsibilities to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. In this document, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposes to exclude entities identified on the \"Covered List\" from providing domestic interstate telecommunications services pursuant to blanket authority under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 214). The NPRM also seeks comment on other potential exclusions from blanket authority under section 214 and other related measures.","document_number":"2026-09190","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/08/2026-09190/protecting-against-national-security-threats-in-domestic-telecommunications-service","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-08/pdf/2026-09190.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09190.pdf?1778157919","publication_date":"2026-05-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Proposed rule. \n \n \n SUMMARY: \n \n The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Pub. L. 116-124, 134 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609)) mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) publish and maintain a list of communications equipment and services (\n i.e., \n the Covered List) that have been determined by agencies with national security responsibilities to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. In this document, the"},{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to protect the Nation's communications networks against foreign adversary threats by proposing to expand foreign ownership disclosure requirements for covered Commission-issued licenses and authorizations. The proposed certification and information collection requirements would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically, the Commission proposes to apply new certification and disclosure requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, as the Commission currently does. Furthermore, the Commission proposes to go beyond foreign ownership to also cover all regulated entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.","document_number":"2025-11360","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/20/2025-11360/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-20/pdf/2025-11360.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11360.pdf?1750250720","publication_date":"2025-06-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"entities. \n \n Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing. \n This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing radio and television broadcast and wireless communications equipment. Examples of products made by these establishments are: transmitting and receiving antennas, cable television equipment, GPS equipment, pagers, cellular phones, mobile communications equipment, and radio and television studio and broadcasting equipment. The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts measures to strengthen national security and encourage reciprocity in testing and certification. The FCC creates a fast-track priority review process for devices subject to Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs. Also, updates post-market surveillance and enforcement procedures, and establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. Lastly, directs development of a consolidated list of prohibited entities to streamline applicant screening and aligns ownership reporting timelines for publicly traded companies with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.","document_number":"2026-09822","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/15/2026-09822/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-15/pdf/2026-09822.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09822.pdf?1778762728","publication_date":"2026-05-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"testing ecosystem, safeguard U.S. communications networks, and uphold the integrity of the equipment authorization process. \n Second EA Integrity Order \n \n In this \n Second EA Integrity R&O, \n the Commission focuses on strengthening the integrity of its equipment authorization program by addressing national security risks and revising the Commission's equipment authorization rules to incentivize applicants to use domestic testing. Specifically, the Commission creates a fast-track priority review process for equipment that is subject to the PAG system"},{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) addresses the risks of foreign adversary control of Commission-granted licenses and authorizations by adopting rules requiring a broad range of holders of such licenses, authorizations, or approvals to attest whether they are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, and, if so, to disclose additional information about such foreign adversary control. Among other things, the Commission defines categories of licenses and authorizations that are subject to the rules, and establishes a streamlined process by which license and authorization holders should file their foreign adversary control attestations and disclosures.","document_number":"2026-06992","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/10/2026-06992/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-10/pdf/2026-06992.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06992.pdf?1775738718","publication_date":"2026-04-10","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"that, while there is a need to protect national security where entities are “engaged in commerce by providing networks, services or equipment to the American public, where there is the possibility of sensitive information being surreptitiously accessed.” As ARRL notes, “[a]mateur radio licensees not only do not sell or provide any communications service, network, or equipment to the public, but in fact they are prohibited from doing so by both international and domestic law.” The risk to national security of Foreign Adversary Control over these licenses"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) issues a Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to cease recognition of test labs, Testing Certification Bodies (TCBs), and laboratory accreditation bodies in non-MRA or trade agreement participants (i.e., non-Reciprocal Territories). The Commission also seeks comment on modernizing data analytics capabilities, and explores additional measures to protect intellectual property and national security.","document_number":"2026-09821","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/15/2026-09821/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-15/pdf/2026-09821.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09821.pdf?1778762727","publication_date":"2026-05-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"reviewing equipment authorizations applications for prohibited entities can do so more effectively and efficiently? The Commission welcomes all comments and proposals. \n Ordering Clauses \n \n It is ordered, \n pursuant to the authority found in sections 1, 4(i), 229, 301, 302, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 229, 301, 302a, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503, section 105 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 1004; the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) proposes and seeks comment on further measures to safeguard the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program. The Commission seeks comment on whether to extend recently adopted prohibitions to include entities subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary or alternatively apply a presumption-of-prohibition to a larger class of entities. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment on expanding the group of prohibited entities to include several additional lists from federal agencies or statutes and ways it can facilitate and encourage more equipment authorization testing to occur at test labs within the United States or allied countries. Lastly, the Commission encourages further comment on post-market surveillance procedures to ensure compliance to prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment.","document_number":"2025-13308","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/16/2025-13308/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-07-16/pdf/2025-13308.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-13308.pdf?1752583514","publication_date":"2025-07-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"test labs and thereby the security of the U.S. equipment supply chain.\n \n Ordering Clauses \n \n Accordingly, \n it is ordered, \n pursuant to the authority found in sections 1, 4(i), 229, 301, 302, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 229, 301, 302a, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503, section 105 of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 1004; the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609; and the Secure Equipment Act of 2021, Public Law"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"advanced communications service or a supplier of communications equipment or service” under the Secure Networks Act. If Congress and NTIA determined that entities subject to foreign adversaries' ownership or control are not to be trusted to provide or supply communications equipment or services, the Commission does not believe they should be trusted to participate in the equipment authorization program, which tests and reviews communications equipment. \n \n The FCC's proposal to address participation by foreign adversaries in the equipment authorization"},{"title":"Reducing Barriers to Network Improvements and Service Changes","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that seeks comment on deregulatory options to encourage providers to build, maintain, and upgrade their networks such that all consumers and businesses can benefit from technological strides in the communications marketplace, while safeguarding consumers' access to critical emergency services such as 911. These actions propose to reduce regulatory barriers that prevent much-needed investment in and deployment of broadband and thus hinder the transition to all-IP networks offering a plethora of advanced communications services, and seek comment on ways to further fast-track the delivery of services to consumers through modernized networks while protecting public safety.","document_number":"2025-16540","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/28/2025-16540/reducing-barriers-to-network-improvements-and-service-changes","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-28/pdf/2025-16540.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-16540.pdf?1756298736","publication_date":"2025-08-28","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"of the Adequate Replacement Test to ensure that “the replacement service will perform as effectively as the legacy voice service.” While the Commission acknowledged that, “[f]or most data communications, a packet-switched network (\n i.e., \n an IP network) is more efficient than a circuit-switched network (\n i.e., \n a TDM network) because a packet-switched network does not dedicate capacity for the duration of a particular call or session,” it also cited a 2013 source that suggested that “ `real-time applications proceed far more smoothly in a circuit-switched"},{"title":"Reducing Barriers to Network Improvements and Service Changes","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) adopted a Report and Order that reduces regulatory barriers and costs that hinder the transition from outdated legacy networks and services to next-generation, Internet Protocol (IP)-based infrastructure. The actions taken in the Report and Order combine common sense reforms with core consumer protections that bring the regulatory environment in line with today's communications marketplace while retaining and adopting safeguards to protect public safety and ensure 911 continuity. The Report and Order also concludes that if state or local requirements conflict with the service discontinuance framework adopted in the Report and Order, such requirements negate valid federal regulatory objectives and are subject to preemption.","document_number":"2026-07622","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/20/2026-07622/reducing-barriers-to-network-improvements-and-service-changes","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-20/pdf/2026-07622.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07622.pdf?1776429913","publication_date":"2026-04-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"incumbent LECs to file network change disclosures with the Commission and whether publishing notices of network changes on carriers' websites provides reasonable public notice of network changes, commenters suggest the lack of objections submitted in response to Commission network change Public Notices indicates that filing network change disclosures has become a purely administrative task that does not provide any value. Interconnected telephone exchange service providers may still raise concerns regarding short-term network changes and copper retirements"},{"title":"Unleashing American Drone Dominance","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) seeks comment on additional means by which the Commission can continue to fulfill its public interest mandate and achieve American drone dominance. The Commission's Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology seek input on an array of reforms the Commission might take to unleash American drone dominance, including: alleviating unnecessary regulatory burdens; ensuring that American drone manufacturers and users have sufficient spectrum for drone testing and operations; facilitating and encouraging American firms' investment in drone capabilities, infrastructure development, and innovative and advanced capabilities; ensuring regulatory clarity and technical access for United States- based manufacturers and trusted suppliers; coordinating more effectively with other federal agencies; streamlining the Commission's experimental licensing rules; and establishing additional dedicated drone innovation zones or testbeds in partnership with other entities.","document_number":"2026-07381","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/16/2026-07381/unleashing-american-drone-dominance","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-16/pdf/2026-07381.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07381.pdf?1776257115","publication_date":"2026-04-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":" \n SUMMARY: \n In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) seeks comment on additional means by which the Commission can continue to fulfill its public interest mandate and achieve American drone dominance. The Commission's Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology seek input on an array of reforms the Commission might take to unleash American drone dominance, including: alleviating unnecessary regulatory burdens; ensuring that American drone manufacturers and users have sufficient"},{"title":"Numbering Policies for Modern Communications","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes rules regarding direct access to numbers by providers of interconnected Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) services. The Commission takes this action in furtherance of Congress' directive in the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act to examine ways to reduce access to telephone numbers by potential perpetrators of illegal robocalls. These proposals aim to safeguard U.S. numbering resources and consumers, protect national security interests, promote public safety, and ensure compliance with other important Commission rules.","document_number":"2026-02858","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/12/2026-02858/numbering-policies-for-modern-communications","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-12/pdf/2026-02858.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-02858.pdf?1770817516","publication_date":"2026-02-12","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"214 authority (or that of its affiliate or subsidiary) was denied or revoked on national security grounds. The Commission recently reiterated, “communications equipment and services on the FCC's Covered List have been determined to pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and its citizens.” We also request comment on the potential benefits of such a restriction for both reducing illegal robocalls and security of the nation's networks. Additionally, we seek comment on the harms or unintended impacts of such a restriction"},{"title":"Protecting the Nation's Communications Systems From Cybersecurity Threats","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (\"Commission\" or \"FCC\") announces that it has reconsidered and rescinded a prior Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, neither of which had been published in the Federal Register. The Declaratory Ruling misconstrued the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was based in part on the Declaratory Ruling's flawed legal analysis and proposed ineffective cybersecurity requirements. This Order follows the FCC's engagement with providers to help strengthen their cybersecurity posture.","document_number":"2025-22830","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/15/2025-22830/protecting-the-nations-communications-systems-from-cybersecurity-threats","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-15/pdf/2025-22830.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-22830.pdf?1765547125","publication_date":"2025-12-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"compromise networks, rather than zero-day (\n i.e., \n previously undisclosed) vulnerabilities.\n \n Congress created the Commission, among other reasons, “for the purpose of the national defense . . . .” The Commission's commitment to improving the security of the nation's communications networks remains steadfast, as demonstrated by coordinated efforts and rulemakings to protect the security of our nation's communications networks and infrastructure from potential security threats. \n A. Recent Commission Action To Protect the Nation's Communications Systems"},{"title":"Reforming Legacy Rules for an All-IP Future; Accelerating Network Modernization","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to accelerate network modernization by proposing to reform regulations that have hindered the transition to all-internet Protocol (IP) networks. Building upon the Commission's longstanding efforts to reform the legacy intercarrier compensation (ICC) framework, the Commission proposes to move remaining ICC charges to a bill-and-keep framework and detariff them, and invites comment on this proposal. To enable carriers to recover costs from their end users, the Commission proposes to eliminate ex ante pricing regulation and tariffing of end-user charges, also referred to as Telephone Access Charges (TACs). Following the transition of ICC charges to bill-and-keep, the Commission seeks comment on phasing out Connect America Fund Intercarrier Compensation (CAF ICC) support. The NPRM also seeks comment on removing remaining regulatory obligations--including tariffing and outdated account information exchange requirements--for interstate and international long-distance services, given the longstanding competitiveness of these markets. In addition, the Commission seeks comment on the elimination of regulations that will no longer be necessary in a post-Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) environment and invites input on a transitional framework to ensure regulatory and market stability during the shift to an all-IP marketplace. Finally, the Commission encourages commenters to identify ways to promote technological modernization while enhancing long-term efficiency, competition, and service quality for consumers. In all these reforms, the Commission intends to proceed thoughtfully, mindful of the complex issues, transition timelines, and paramount connectivity goals.","document_number":"2026-05727","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/24/2026-05727/reforming-legacy-rules-for-an-all-ip-future-accelerating-network-modernization","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-24/pdf/2026-05727.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-05727.pdf?1774269916","publication_date":"2026-03-24","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"quality. Once all communications are transitioned from the PSTN to all-IP networks, do carriers or state commissions believe there is a need to define the network edge? Should such a definition apply to networks still using TDM facilities after the proposed transition to bill-and-keep is completed if some networks have not completely transitioned to all-IP networks by then? Would this definition continue to be necessary so long as TDM facilities are in use? Should the Commission set a definite sunset date for when the network edge definition would"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Actions Regarding National Security. \n The Commission has recognized that national security is built on both protecting the nation's communications infrastructure from foreign adversary threats and promoting the prosperity and robustness of the communications sector. The Commission in its recent rulemaking proceedings and actions is continuing its ongoing efforts to secure and protect communications networks from foreign adversaries, while recognizing that investment in U.S. communications networks bolsters national security. In December 2024, the Commission"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, and §§ 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission's rules, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (“covered” equipment and services). \n See \n Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Public Law 116-124, 133"}]}