{"description":"Documents matching 'security concern could every approved compliance'","count":10000,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+concern+could+every+approved+compliance&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Extension of Compliance Dates for Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies for U.S. Treasury Securities and Application of the Broker-Dealer Customer Protection Rule With Respect to U.S. Treasury Securities","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission (\"Commission\" or \"SEC\") is extending the compliance date for the amendments to the rules applicable to covered clearing agencies for U.S. Treasury securities (\"U.S. Treasury securities CCAs\"), which require that such covered clearing agencies have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to require that every direct participant of the covered clearing agency submit for clearance and settlement all eligible secondary market transactions in U.S. Treasury securities to which it is a counterparty and to identify and monitor its direct participants' submission of transactions for clearing, including how the U.S. Treasury securities CCA would address a failure to submit transactions, that were adopted on December 13, 2023. Specifically, the Commission is extending the compliance dates by one year, from December 31, 2025, to December 31, 2026, for eligible cash market transactions, and from June 30, 2026, to June 30, 2027, for eligible repo transactions.","document_number":"2025-03351","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/04/2025-03351/extension-of-compliance-dates-for-standards-for-covered-clearing-agencies-for-us-treasury-securities","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-04/pdf/2025-03351.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03351.pdf?1741009507","publication_date":"2025-03-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"ACTION: \n Final rule; extension of compliance date. \n \n \n \n SUMMARY: \n The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or “SEC”) is extending the compliance date for the amendments to the rules applicable to covered clearing agencies for U.S. Treasury securities (“U.S. Treasury securities CCAs”), which require that such covered clearing agencies have written policies and procedures reasonably designed to require that every direct participant of the covered clearing agency submit for clearance and settlement all eligible secondary market transactions"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule sets forth the regulations that implement Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, \"Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,\" which declares a national emergency to address the threat to the United States posed by countries of concern that seek to develop and exploit sensitive technologies or products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. The final rule requires United States persons to provide notification to the U.S. Department of the Treasury regarding certain transactions involving persons of a country of concern that are engaged in activities involving certain national security technologies and products that may contribute to the threat to the national security of the United States; and prohibits United States persons from engaging in certain other transactions involving persons of a country of concern that are engaged in activities involving certain other national security technologies and products that pose a particularly acute national security threat to the United States.","document_number":"2024-25422","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/15/2024-25422/provisions-pertaining-to-us-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-15/pdf/2024-25422.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-25422.pdf?1730996188","publication_date":"2024-11-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY","name":"Treasury Department","id":497,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/497","parent_id":null,"slug":"treasury-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of Investment Security","name":"Investment Security Office","id":603,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/investment-security-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/603","parent_id":497,"slug":"investment-security-office"}],"excerpts":"significant national security risks, such as the development of more sophisticated weapons systems, breaking of cryptographic codes, and other applications that could provide a country of concern with military advantages. The potential military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled applications of these technologies and products pose risks to U.S. national security, particularly when developed in or by a country of concern in which the government seeks to (1) direct entities to obtain technologies to achieve national security objectives and (2)"},{"title":"Extension of Compliance Date for Disclosure of Order Execution Information","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission (\"Commission\") is extending the compliance date for the amendments to the rules requiring the disclosure of order executions in national market system (\"NMS\") stocks from December 14, 2025, to August 1, 2026.","document_number":"2025-19316","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19316/extension-of-compliance-date-for-disclosure-of-order-execution-information","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-02/pdf/2025-19316.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19316.pdf?1759322725","publication_date":"2025-10-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"come into compliance by the initial December 14, 2025, compliance date. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that an extension of the compliance date is needed in order to ensure an orderly implementation of the Rule 605 Amendments. Given the time constraints, a notice and comment period could not reasonably be completed before the December 14, 2025, compliance date. Further, given the operational challenges and associated costs firms would face in to meet the December compliance date, providing immediate certainty that the compliance date is"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts measures to strengthen national security and encourage reciprocity in testing and certification. The FCC creates a fast-track priority review process for devices subject to Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs. Also, updates post-market surveillance and enforcement procedures, and establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. Lastly, directs development of a consolidated list of prohibited entities to streamline applicant screening and aligns ownership reporting timelines for publicly traded companies with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.","document_number":"2026-09822","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/15/2026-09822/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-15/pdf/2026-09822.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09822.pdf?1778762728","publication_date":"2026-05-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"FCC-recognized testing and certification, including foreign-based staff, to assess trustworthiness, impartiality and compliance with Commission rules.\n \n \n Further, this document directs revisions to post-market surveillance procedures, strengthens enforcement mechanisms, and establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. To streamline compliance, the Commission directs the creation of a consolidated human-readable and, to the extent feasible given limited resources"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"This proposed rule sets forth regulations that would implement Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, \"Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,\" which declares a national emergency to address the threat to the United States posed by countries of concern, which seek to develop and exploit sensitive technologies or products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. The proposed rule would require United States persons to provide notification to the U.S. Department of the Treasury regarding certain transactions involving persons of a country of concern who are engaged in activities involving certain national security technologies and products that may contribute to the threat to the national security of the United States; and prohibit United States persons from engaging in certain other transactions involving persons of a country of concern who are engaged in activities involving certain other national security technologies and products that pose a particularly acute national security threat to the United States. This notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) seeks public comment on various topics related to the implementation of Executive Order 14105. In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), a summary of this rule may be found at https:// www.regulations.gov.","document_number":"2024-13923","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/05/2024-13923/provisions-pertaining-to-us-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-07-05/pdf/2024-13923.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-13923.pdf?1720010713","publication_date":"2024-07-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY","name":"Treasury Department","id":497,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/497","parent_id":null,"slug":"treasury-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of Investment Security","name":"Investment Security Office","id":603,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/investment-security-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/603","parent_id":497,"slug":"investment-security-office"}],"excerpts":"significant national security risks, such as the development of more sophisticated weapons systems, breaking of cryptographic codes, and other applications that could provide a country of concern with military advantages. The potential military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled applications of these technologies and products pose risks to U.S. national security, particularly when developed in or by a country of concern in which the government seeks to (1) direct entities to obtain technologies to achieve national security objectives; and"},{"title":"Modernizing Security Requirements","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency, consistent with Executive Order 14300, \"Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\" The proposed revisions are intended to reduce regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained at NRC-licensed facilities.","document_number":"2026-12989","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/26/2026-12989/modernizing-security-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-26/pdf/2026-12989.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-12989.pdf?1782391523","publication_date":"2026-06-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"reactor technologies and designs. A technology-inclusive approach to security requirements would provide greater flexibility in both the design and implementation of physical protection programs. Licensees and applicants using this approach could integrate security considerations into the safety design process, enabling the effective implementation of security measures through the use of both design-based and engineered security features. This approach could enable safety and security functions to work collaboratively in the implementation of the physical"},{"title":"Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice is issuing a final rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-31486","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-31486.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31486.pdf?1735911918","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data that could give countries of concern or covered persons access to such data and present an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. The rule (1) identifies certain classes of highly sensitive transactions with countries of concern or covered persons that the rule prohibits in their entirety (“prohibited transactions”) and (2) identifies other classes of transactions that would be prohibited except to the extent they comply with predefined security requirements (“restricted transactions”) to mitigate"},{"title":"Proposal of Special Measure Regarding MBaer Merchant Bank AG as a Financial Institution Operating Outside of the United States of Primary Money Laundering Concern","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"FinCEN is issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, pursuant to section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, that finds MBaer Merchant Bank AG (MBaer), a financial institution based in Switzerland, to be of primary money laundering concern, and proposes imposing a special measure to: (1) prohibit U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for, or on behalf of, MBaer; (2) require U.S. financial institutions to take reasonable steps not to process a transaction for the correspondent account in the United States of a foreign banking institution if such a transaction involves MBaer; and (3) require U.S. financial institutions to apply special due diligence to their foreign correspondent accounts that is reasonably designed to guard against their use to process transactions involving MBaer.","document_number":"2026-04033","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/02/2026-04033/proposal-of-special-measure-regarding-mbaer-merchant-bank-ag-as-a-financial-institution-operating","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-02/pdf/2026-04033.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-04033.pdf?1772199914","publication_date":"2026-03-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY","name":"Treasury Department","id":497,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/497","parent_id":null,"slug":"treasury-department"},{"raw_name":"Financial Crimes Enforcement Network","name":"Financial Crimes Enforcement Network","id":194,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/financial-crimes-enforcement-network","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/194","parent_id":497,"slug":"financial-crimes-enforcement-network"}],"excerpts":"financial institution is not involved.\n \n \n \n 56 \n FINMA, “Categorisation of banks and securities firms,” \n https://www.finma.ch/en/supervision/banks-and-securities-firms/categorisation/ \n (last accessed Jan. 26, 2026); FINMA, “Authorised banks and securities firms,” \n https://www.finma.ch/en/~/media/finma/dokumente/bewilligungstraeger/pdf/beh.pdf?la=en \n (last accessed Jan. 26, 2026).\n \n \n D. The Effect of the Proposed Action on United States National Security and Foreign Policy \n As described above, evidence available to FinCEN demonstrates that"},{"title":"HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS or \"Department\") is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit comment on its proposal to modify the Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information (\"Security Rule\") under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act). The proposed modifications would revise existing standards to better protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information (ePHI). The proposals in this NPRM would increase the cybersecurity for ePHI by revising the Security Rule to address: changes in the environment in which health care is provided; significant increases in breaches and cyberattacks; common deficiencies the Office for Civil Rights has observed in investigations into Security Rule compliance by covered entities and their business associates (collectively, \"regulated entities\"); other cybersecurity guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes; and court decisions that affect enforcement of the Security Rule.","document_number":"2024-30983","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-06/pdf/2024-30983.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30983.pdf?1735334119","publication_date":"2025-01-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES","name":"Health and Human Services Department","id":221,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-and-human-services-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/221","parent_id":null,"slug":"health-and-human-services-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"Memorandum on National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, National Security Memorandum/NSM-22, The White House (Apr. 30, 2024), \n https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/ \n (“Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice proposes a rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-24582","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/29/2024-24582/provisions-pertaining-to-preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-29/pdf/2024-24582.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24582.pdf?1729628118","publication_date":"2024-10-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"Categories and to Countries of Concern \n iii. Estimates of U.S. Exports of Genomic, Biometric, and Location Data \n iv. Estimates of U.S. Exports of Genomic, Biometric, and Location Data to the Six Countries of Concern \n v. Total Estimated Value of Lost and Forgone Transactions \n vi. Alternative Methodology for Estimating the Value of Lost and Forgone Transactions \n b. Security Costs \n i. Similar Security Standards and Frameworks \n ii. Current Industry Compliance Level \n iii. Costs of Compliance \n c. Costs Associated With Compliance Program: Due Diligence"},{"title":"Concept Release on Consolidated Audit Trail and Other Audit Trails and Data Sources","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission (the \"Commission\") is publishing this concept release to solicit comments in support of a comprehensive review of the Consolidated Audit Trail and other audit trails and related data sources currently used in the regulation of U.S. securities markets, including comments regarding the funding mechanisms for these audit trails and/or related data sources. There have been several developments since the Commission last evaluated the scope and sufficiency of these audit trails and related data sources. These developments have prompted the Commission to consider whether changes should be made to the rules and regulations governing existing audit trails and related data sources to better respond to and reflect current market conditions; demonstrated regulatory needs; civil liberty, privacy, and confidentiality concerns; cost-efficient technology solutions; and cybersecurity considerations.","document_number":"2026-07651","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/20/2026-07651/concept-release-on-consolidated-audit-trail-and-other-audit-trails-and-data-sources","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-20/pdf/2026-07651.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07651.pdf?1776429917","publication_date":"2026-04-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"provide regulators with SIP Data.\n 39 \n \n \n \n \n 32 \n An “NMS Security” means “any security or class of securities for which transaction reports are collected, processed, and made available pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan, or an effective national market system plan for reporting transactions in Listed Options.” An “OTC Equity Security” means “any equity security, other than an NMS Security, subject to prompt last sale reporting rules of a registered national securities association and reported to one of such association's equity"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) aims to further its actions in strengthening prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment and to clarify the rules and enforcement of such. The Commission seeks additional comment on modular transmitters and component parts in relation to covered equipment. The Commission addresses the partial court remand of the decision in its November 2022 EA Security R&O by proposing a definition of \"critical infrastructure\" as used on the Covered List and seeking comment on the implementation of that definition. The Commission also seeks comment on whether any modification to an authorized device by an entity identified on the Covered List should require a new application for certification. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on clarifying the scope of activities that constitute marketing of equipment and on measures to strengthen enforcement of marketing prohibitions.","document_number":"2025-21928","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/04/2025-21928/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-04/pdf/2025-21928.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21928.pdf?1764769515","publication_date":"2025-12-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.” 2019 NDAA section 889(f)(3)(B). In March 2021, consistent with the statutory language of NDAA section 889(f)(3)(B), the Commission included this same language on its Covered List.\n \n \n Equipment Authorization Security R&O. \n In the EA Security R&O and FNPRM, the Commission adopted several rules to prohibit authorization of covered equipment. The Commission provided that it would not approve any application"},{"title":"Frequency of Renewal Cycle for Indirect Air Carrier Security Programs","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is modifying its regulations to reduce the frequency of renewal applications by indirect air carriers (IACs). Rather than requiring these entities to submit an application to renew their security program each year, TSA now requires renewal once every 3 years. This modification reduces the burden of compliance without a negative impact on security.","document_number":"2024-02495","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/02/08/2024-02495/frequency-of-renewal-cycle-for-indirect-air-carrier-security-programs","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-02-08/pdf/2024-02495.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-02495.pdf?1707313516","publication_date":"2024-02-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Transportation Security Administration","name":"Transportation Security Administration","id":494,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-security-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/494","parent_id":227,"slug":"transportation-security-administration"}],"excerpts":"ACTION: \n Final rule. \n \n \n SUMMARY: \n The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is modifying its regulations to reduce the frequency of renewal applications by indirect air carriers (IACs). Rather than requiring these entities to submit an application to renew their security program each year, TSA now requires renewal once every 3 years. This modification reduces the burden of compliance without a negative impact on security. \n \n \n DATES: \n This rule is effective March 11, 2024. \n \n \n FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: \n \n Angel Rodriguez"},{"title":"Interpretation of Foreign Entity of Concern","type":"Rule","abstract":"On December 4, 2023, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) published in the Federal Register for public comment a proposed interpretive rule on DOE's interpretation of the statutory definition of \"foreign entity of concern\" (FEOC) in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, also known as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), which applies to multiple programs related to the battery supply chain. This statutory definition provides that, among other criteria, a foreign entity is a FEOC if it is \"owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a government of a foreign country that is a covered nation.\" In this final interpretive rule, DOE responds to public comments, clarifying the term \"foreign entity of concern\" by providing interpretations of the following key terms: \"government of a foreign country;\" \"foreign entity;\" \"subject to the jurisdiction;\" and \"owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction.\"","document_number":"2024-08913","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/06/2024-08913/interpretation-of-foreign-entity-of-concern","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-05-06/pdf/2024-08913.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-08913.pdf?1714740315","publication_date":"2024-05-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"}],"excerpts":"generally expressed support for the issuance of guidance, welcoming additional clarity on the definition of the term “foreign entity of concern.” Many comments raised specific concerns about the feasibility of compliance without bright-line administrable standards to govern which entities qualify as FEOCs. Many other submissions raised specific concerns about rules that too narrowly construe the term FEOC, raising concerns about manipulation of the battery supply chain by covered nations. Other submissions were more general in nature and did not provide"},{"title":"Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research","type":"Presidential Document","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-08266","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/08/2025-08266/improving-the-safety-and-security-of-biological-research","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-05-08/pdf/2025-08266.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-08266.pdf?1746630916","publication_date":"2025-05-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT","name":"Executive Office of the President","id":538,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/executive-office-of-the-president","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/538","parent_id":null,"slug":"executive-office-of-the-president"}],"excerpts":"foreign entities in countries of concern (\n e.g., \n China) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6627(c), or in other countries where there is not adequate oversight to ensure that the countries are compliant with United States oversight standards and policies; and\n \n (ii) end Federal funding of other life-science research that is occurring in countries of concern or foreign countries where there is not adequate oversight to ensure that the countries are compliant with United States oversight standards and policies and that could reasonably pose a threat to public"},{"title":"Enhanced Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS)","type":"Rule","abstract":"To address ongoing aviation security threats, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is amending its regulations pertaining to the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) program to require the transmission of additional data elements. The ACAS program enhances the security of flights carrying cargo into the United States by requiring the transmission of certain air cargo data and performing targeted risk assessments based on the transmitted data prior to an aircraft's departure for the United States. These risk assessments identify and prevent high-risk air cargo from being loaded onto an aircraft that could pose a risk to an aircraft during flight.","document_number":"2025-20606","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/21/2025-20606/enhanced-air-cargo-advance-screening-acas","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-21/pdf/2025-20606.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-20606.pdf?1763646322","publication_date":"2025-11-21","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"U.S. Customs and Border Protection","name":"U.S. Customs and Border Protection","id":501,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/u-s-customs-and-border-protection","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/501","parent_id":227,"slug":"u-s-customs-and-border-protection"}],"excerpts":"to the security programs are considered Sensitive Security Information (SSI),\n 9 \n \n and are made available to carriers as necessary. Alternatively, carriers may request TSA approval to follow National Cargo Security Program (NCSP) recognition procedures in lieu of TSA security program requirements.\n 10 \n \n When the security environment or operational factors necessitate the modification of a security program, TSA or an air carrier may initiate a security program amendment.\n 11 \n \n TSA also has the regulatory authority to issue Security Directives"},{"title":"Certificates of Compliance","type":"Rule","abstract":"In consultation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (Commission or CPSC) issues this final rule (the Final Rule) to revise the agency's regulation for Certificates of Compliance (certificates). The Final Rule aligns CPSC's current certificates rule with other CPSC rules on testing and certification, and implements, for importation of products and substances regulated by CPSC, electronic filing of certificates (eFiling) with CBP.","document_number":"2024-30826","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-30826/certificates-of-compliance","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-30826.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30826.pdf?1736257516","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION","name":"Consumer Product Safety Commission","id":84,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/consumer-product-safety-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/84","parent_id":null,"slug":"consumer-product-safety-commission"}],"excerpts":"the certificate, but another \n \n specified entity could prepare the certificate, which could either be (1) an entity that by mutual agreement is responsible for preparing the certificate, or (2) in the absence of agreement, a hierarchy of entities within the proposed definition of “importer.” Commenters state that in this case, if the IOR does not have the requisite knowledge to prepare the certificate, another specified entity with direct knowledge of the facts underlying the certificate could be responsible for its preparation.\n \n The NCBFAA (122)"},{"title":"Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Depository Trust Company; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; and National Securities Clearing Corporation; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, as Modified by Amendments No. 1, Relating to a Participant System Disruption","type":"Notice","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-20384","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/20/2025-20384/self-regulatory-organizations-the-depository-trust-company-fixed-income-clearing-corporation-and","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-20/pdf/2025-20384.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-20384.pdf?1763559917","publication_date":"2025-11-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”), Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (“FICC”) and National Securities Clearing Corporation (“NSCC,” and together with DTC and FICC, the “Clearing Agencies,” or “Clearing Agency” when referring to one of the three Clearing Agencies) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) the proposed rule changes SR-DTC-2025-003, SR-FICC-2025-006, and SR-NSCC-2025-003 pursuant to Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) \n 1 \n \n and Rule 19b-4 \n 2 \n \n thereunder. The proposed"},{"title":"USCIS Immigration Fees and Related Procedures Required by H.R.1 Reconciliation Bill","type":"Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues this interim final rule (IFR) to codify certain immigration fees and other provisions required by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (H.R.1). This IFR amends U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations to codify: the asylum and annual asylum fees, including the consequences of non-payment of these fees; the new Form I-94 fee requirement; the validity period for certain types of employment authorization; and the retention of the Form I-589 filing fee for every application.","document_number":"2026-08333","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/29/2026-08333/uscis-immigration-fees-and-related-procedures-required-by-hr1-reconciliation-bill","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-29/pdf/2026-08333.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08333.pdf?1777380320","publication_date":"2026-04-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"}],"excerpts":"S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issues this interim final rule (IFR) to codify certain immigration fees and other provisions required by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (H.R.1). This IFR amends U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations to codify: the asylum and annual asylum fees, including the consequences of non-payment of these fees; the new Form I-94 fee requirement; the validity period for certain types of employment authorization; and the retention of the Form I-589 filing fee for every application. \n \n \n DATES:"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"significant national security concerns when artificial intelligence technologies involve foreign adversaries. We seek comment on any national security concerns regarding use of artificial intelligence in submarine cable systems. What are the national security impacts and potential threats posed by incorporating artificial intelligence owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction or jurisdiction of foreign adversaries? Given that submarine cables are critical infrastructure, should we refer assessment of any national security concerns regarding the"}]}