{"description":"Documents matching 'security foreign-policy threats arise when'","count":383,"total_pages":20,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+foreign-policy+threats+arise+when&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Pub. L. 116-124, 134 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609)) mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) publish and maintain a list of communications equipment and services (i.e., the Covered List) that have been determined by agencies with national security responsibilities to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. In this document, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposes to exclude entities identified on the \"Covered List\" from providing domestic interstate telecommunications services pursuant to blanket authority under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 214). The NPRM also seeks comment on other potential exclusions from blanket authority under section 214 and other related measures.","document_number":"2026-09190","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/08/2026-09190/protecting-against-national-security-threats-in-domestic-telecommunications-service","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-08/pdf/2026-09190.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09190.pdf?1778157919","publication_date":"2026-05-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"national security environment, as demonstrated by the Commission's recent actions and establishment of the Covered List. While we recognize the continuing importance of robust market entry, we must also consider Congress's directive that the Commission promote “the national defense.” In the \n Foreign Participation Order, \n the Commission stated that it considers “national security” and “foreign policy” concerns when granting authorizations to provide international service under section 214 of the Act. Indeed, promotion of national security is an integral"},{"title":"Request for Comment on Security Requirements for Restricted Transactions Under Executive Order 14117","type":"Notice","abstract":"CISA seeks public input on the development of security requirements for restricted transactions as directed by Executive Order (E.O.) 14117, \"Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern.\" E.O. 14117 addresses national-security and foreign-policy threats that arise when countries of concern and covered persons can access bulk U.S. sensitive personal data or government-related data. The proposed CISA security requirements for restricted transactions would apply to classes of restricted transactions identified in regulations issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ).","document_number":"2024-24709","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/29/2024-24709/request-for-comment-on-security-requirements-for-restricted-transactions-under-executive-order-14117","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-29/pdf/2024-24709.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24709.pdf?1729628118","publication_date":"2024-10-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"}],"excerpts":"\n Federal Register \n for public comment. Through this notice, CISA announces the proposed security requirements applicable to the classes of restricted transactions defined in DOJ's \n \n NPRM and requests public comment on the content of the security requirements.\n \n B. Purpose and Structure of Proposed Security Requirements \n \n The primary goal of the proposed security requirements is to address national-security and foreign-policy threats that arise when countries of concern \n 3 \n \n and covered persons access bulk U.S. sensitive personal data or"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"licensee on national security and economic security grounds or solely based on a history of noncompliance, or otherwise provide a clear standard such as specific national security threats posed by changed circumstances or noncompliance with the terms of a license or Commission rules. We cannot effectively discharge our duty to protect national security by limiting our revocation and termination process to a prescribed list of circumstances, as we cannot predict with certainty what circumstances might threaten national security in the future. However"},{"title":"Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats","type":"Presidential Document","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-10669","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/10/2025-10669/restricting-the-entry-of-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-10/pdf/2025-10669.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-10669.pdf?1749482113","publication_date":"2025-06-10","agencies":[{"raw_name":"EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT","name":"Executive Office of the President","id":538,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/executive-office-of-the-president","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/538","parent_id":null,"slug":"executive-office-of-the-president"}],"excerpts":"Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats \n \n A Proclamation \n During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld. In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated that it is the policy of the United States to protect"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.","document_number":"2025-03718","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/13/2025-03718/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-13/pdf/2025-03718.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03718.pdf?1741783507","publication_date":"2025-03-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"FOIA.\n \n \n 6. Regulatory Compliance Certifications \n \n 85. Given concerns about ensuring the security and integrity of this critical infrastructure, the Commission proposes new certifications to protect against national security, law enforcement, and other risks. The Commission tentatively \n \n concludes that such requirements would help mitigate national security, economic security, law enforcement, and other concerns associated with threats to the security of submarine cable infrastructure. The Commission also expects that requiring applicants to"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule sets forth the regulations that implement Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, \"Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,\" which declares a national emergency to address the threat to the United States posed by countries of concern that seek to develop and exploit sensitive technologies or products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. The final rule requires United States persons to provide notification to the U.S. Department of the Treasury regarding certain transactions involving persons of a country of concern that are engaged in activities involving certain national security technologies and products that may contribute to the threat to the national security of the United States; and prohibits United States persons from engaging in certain other transactions involving persons of a country of concern that are engaged in activities involving certain other national security technologies and products that pose a particularly acute national security threat to the United States.","document_number":"2024-25422","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/15/2024-25422/provisions-pertaining-to-us-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-15/pdf/2024-25422.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-25422.pdf?1730996188","publication_date":"2024-11-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY","name":"Treasury Department","id":497,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/497","parent_id":null,"slug":"treasury-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of Investment Security","name":"Investment Security Office","id":603,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/investment-security-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/603","parent_id":497,"slug":"investment-security-office"}],"excerpts":"Traded Security; Derivative; Equity Compensation \n \n Section 850.501(a)(1)(i) of the Proposed Rule defined as an \n excepted transaction \n an investment into a “publicly traded security,” with “security” as defined in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. As noted in the Proposed Rule, this included a security traded on a non-U.S. exchange, or a security traded “over-the-counter,” in addition to a security traded on a U.S. exchange. The Treasury Department assessed that a \n U.S. person' \n s purchase of securities traded"},{"title":"Notice of Availability of Security Requirements for Restricted Transactions Under Executive Order 14117","type":"Notice","abstract":"CISA is announcing publication of finalized security requirements for restricted transactions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14117, \"Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern.\" In October 2024, CISA published proposed security requirements for restricted transactions which would apply to classes of restricted transactions identified in regulations issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). CISA solicited comment on those proposed security requirements and considered that public feedback when developing the final security requirements. This notice also provides CISA's responses to the public comments received.","document_number":"2024-31479","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31479/notice-of-availability-of-security-requirements-for-restricted-transactions-under-executive-order","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-31479.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31479.pdf?1735911917","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"}],"excerpts":"subjected to new security requirements without receiving requisite procedural protections for implementing the change, as required by law. \n III. Description of Final Security Requirements \n \n The security requirements are intended to address national-security and foreign-policy threats that arise when countries of concern \n 37 \n \n and covered persons access U.S. government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data that may be implicated by the categories of restricted transactions. Additional background on the purpose for these security requirements"},{"title":"Security Bars and Processing; Confirmation of Effective Date; Partial Withdrawal","type":"Rule","abstract":"In December 2020, DHS and DOJ (collectively, \"the Departments\") issued a final rule that clarified when an alien who poses a public health risk is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal and revised their credible fear screening regulations. After multiple delays, the rule is scheduled to take effect on December 31, 2025. However, since December 2020, the Departments have further amended their regulations, complicating the codification of the 2020 rule. In this final rule, the Departments are withdrawing certain amendments from the 2020 rule while leaving unaltered the rule's substantive public health-related provisions, which will become effective as scheduled.","document_number":"2025-23970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/30/2025-23970/security-bars-and-processing-confirmation-of-effective-date-partial-withdrawal","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-30/pdf/2025-23970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-23970.pdf?1767015915","publication_date":"2025-12-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"},{"raw_name":"Executive Office for Immigration Review","name":"Executive Office for Immigration Review","id":149,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/executive-office-for-immigration-review","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/149","parent_id":268,"slug":"executive-office-for-immigration-review"}],"excerpts":"In December 2020, the Departments published the final rule titled “Security Bars and Processing,” 85 FR 84160 (Dec. 23, 2020) (“Security Bars Final Rule”), to clarify that the statutory “danger to the security of the United States” bars to eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal encompass certain emergency public health concerns. Additionally, the Security Bars Final Rule introduced procedural changes relating to credible fear processing for certain aliens. The Security Bars Final Rule was slated to become effective on January 22, 2021;"},{"title":"Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the Security of the United States","type":"Presidential Document","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-23570","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/19/2025-23570/restricting-and-limiting-the-entry-of-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-security-of-the-united-states","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-19/pdf/2025-23570.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-23570.pdf?1766074511","publication_date":"2025-12-19","agencies":[{"raw_name":"EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT","name":"Executive Office of the President","id":538,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/executive-office-of-the-president","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/538","parent_id":null,"slug":"executive-office-of-the-president"}],"excerpts":"Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the Security of the United States \n \n A Proclamation \n During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of certain foreign nationals into the United States to prevent national security and public safety threats from reaching our borders. The Supreme Court upheld these restrictions. I reinstated these successful policies in Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), and Proclamation 10949 of June 4, 2025"},{"title":"Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion","type":"Rule","abstract":"With this interim final rule, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) revises the Export Administration Regulations' (EAR) controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs) and adds a new control on artificial intelligence (AI) model weights for certain advanced closed-weight dual-use AI models. In conjunction with the expansion of these controls, which BIS has determined are necessary to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, BIS is adding new license exceptions and updating the Data Center Validated End User authorization to facilitate the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of advanced computing (ICs) to end users in destinations that do not raise national security or foreign policy concerns. Together, these changes will cultivate secure ecosystems for the responsible diffusion and use of AI and advanced computing ICs.","document_number":"2025-00636","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-15/pdf/2025-00636.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00636.pdf?1736775933","publication_date":"2025-01-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"streamlined process subject to security conditions. BIS's work in this area is consistent with U.S. foreign policy to support global development. \n \n Over the past year, BIS has engaged with national security and foreign policy experts from across the U.S. Government—including interagency export control partners in the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, as well as the Intelligence Community—to study whether and how additional controls on advanced AI technologies would advance U.S. national security and foreign policy. As explained below, they"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States” as determined by an End-User Review Committee consisting of various federal national security agencies. The BIS Entity List in part seeks to ensure that sensitive technologies do not fall into the hands of known threats. The Commission concludes that these entities, which federal agencies found to, at the very least, “pose a significant risk” of activities threatening American national security or foreign policy interests, present the same concerns with"},{"title":"Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Coast Guard is updating its maritime security regulations by establishing minimum cybersecurity requirements for U.S.-flagged vessels, Outer Continental Shelf facilities, and facilities subject to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 regulations. This final rule addresses current and emerging cybersecurity threats in the marine transportation system by adding minimum cybersecurity requirements to help detect risks and respond to and recover from cybersecurity incidents. These include requirements to develop and maintain a Cybersecurity Plan, designate a Cybersecurity Officer, and take various measures to maintain cybersecurity within the marine transportation system. The Coast Guard is also seeking comments on a potential delay for the implementation periods for U.S.-flagged vessels.","document_number":"2025-00708","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/17/2025-00708/cybersecurity-in-the-marine-transportation-system","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-17/pdf/2025-00708.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00708.pdf?1736802922","publication_date":"2025-01-17","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Coast Guard","name":"Coast Guard","id":53,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/coast-guard","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/53","parent_id":227,"slug":"coast-guard"}],"excerpts":"-flagged vessels required to have a security plan under 33 CFR part 104 (Maritime Security: Vessels), facilities required to have a security plan under 33 CFR part 105 (Maritime Security: Facilities), and OCS facilities required to have a security plan under 33 CFR part 106 (Marine Security: Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities). \n B. Legislation, Regulations, and Policy \n \n In the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA),\n 8 \n \n Congress provided a framework for the Secretary of Homeland Security (“Secretary”), acting through the Coast"},{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to protect the Nation's communications networks against foreign adversary threats by proposing to expand foreign ownership disclosure requirements for covered Commission-issued licenses and authorizations. The proposed certification and information collection requirements would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically, the Commission proposes to apply new certification and disclosure requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, as the Commission currently does. Furthermore, the Commission proposes to go beyond foreign ownership to also cover all regulated entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.","document_number":"2025-11360","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/20/2025-11360/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-20/pdf/2025-11360.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11360.pdf?1750250720","publication_date":"2025-06-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.” Adopting this definition of “foreign adversary” would be consistent with our earlier action in the \n Evolving Risks Order \n to conduct a one-time collection of foreign ownership information from international section 214 authorization holders. Such determinations are made with extensive input from across national security agencies, including (1) the National Security Strategy of the United States; (2) [t]he Director of National Intelligence's Worldwide Threat Assessments"},{"title":"Implementing Voluntary Agreements Under the Defense Production Act","type":"Rule","abstract":"This interim final rule codifies standards and procedures the Department of Energy will follow when developing and carrying out voluntary agreements and plans of action under the Defense Production Act. The Defense Production Act provides a defense from antitrust laws with respect to any action taken to develop or carry out any voluntary agreement or plan of action when certain criteria are met. The rule will apply the Defense Production Act's long-standing provisions and will be set out in a new and dedicated part in the Code of Federal Regulations.","document_number":"2025-16235","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/25/2025-16235/implementing-voluntary-agreements-under-the-defense-production-act","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-25/pdf/2025-16235.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-16235.pdf?1755866726","publication_date":"2025-08-25","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"}],"excerpts":"expeditious action and authorized the Secretary of Energy to take immediate steps to address this situation through section 708 of the DPA.\n \n E.O. 14302 identifies the national defense threat facing the Nation with respect to its domestic energy needs. E.O. 14302 determined that expeditious action is required to address this domestic energy national security threat and authorized the Secretary of Energy to take immediate steps to strengthen the domestic nuclear energy industry through section 708 of the DPA. Following the normal notice and comment"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to strengthen requirements and oversight relating to telecommunications certification bodies and measurement facilities to help ensure the integrity of these entities for purposes of the equipment authorization, to better protect national security, and to advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain.","document_number":"2024-14491","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/05/2024-14491/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-07-05/pdf/2024-14491.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-14491.pdf?1720010716","publication_date":"2024-07-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"authorization program. Now, as part of ongoing efforts to promote national security and protect our nation's communications equipment supply chain, the Commission has placed significant new national security related responsibilities on TCBs and test labs. By establishing new equipment authorization program rules that prohibit authorization of communications equipment that has been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons, these entities now must help ensure"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Unmanned Aircraft Systems","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seeks public comment on issues related to transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,\" and that are integral to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This ANPRM will assist BIS in determining the technologies and market participants that may be appropriate for regulation in order to address undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, including U.S. ICTS supply chains and critical infrastructure, or/and to the security and safety of U.S. persons.","document_number":"2024-30209","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/03/2024-30209/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-unmanned-aircraft","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-03/pdf/2024-30209.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30209.pdf?1735825508","publication_date":"2025-01-03","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"the protection of national security interests by individuals and entities subject to the jurisdiction of China. These laws require network operators and technology companies to assist public security agencies in safeguarding cybersecurity and providing access to data stored within China's borders (see Department of Homeland Security, \n Data Security Business Advisory \n (July 11, 2022), \n https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-security-business-advisory.pdf \n ). Specifically, the National Security Law of 2015 imposes obligations"},{"title":"Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum Applicants","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposes to modify regulations governing applications for asylum and withholding of removal (asylum applications) and employment authorization based on a pending asylum application. The proposed rule would change filing and eligibility requirements for aliens requesting employment authorization and an employment authorization document (EAD) based on a pending asylum application. The changes include pausing acceptance of EAD applications from asylum applicants during periods when affirmative asylum average processing time exceeds 180 days, extending the waiting period to apply for employment authorization to 365 days, changing EAD application processing time requirements, and adding eligibility requirements.","document_number":"2026-03595","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/23/2026-03595/employment-authorization-reform-for-asylum-applicants","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-23/pdf/2026-03595.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-03595.pdf?1771595129","publication_date":"2026-02-23","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"}],"excerpts":"aliens for a labor pool are unlikely to prefer aliens with criminal arrests and convictions, aliens who pose national security threats, or aliens who committed fraud during the immigration process. Similarly, while state and local communities have an economic interest in newly arrived aliens sustaining themselves and contributing to the economy, they also have an interest in protecting their communities from national security threats, aggravated felons, and other criminal and fraud risks. \n It is the policy of the Executive Branch to protect the national"},{"title":"Review of International Authorizations To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Amendment of the Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) takes another important step to protect the nation's telecommunications infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by proposing comprehensive changes to the Commission's rules that allow carriers to provide international telecommunications service. The Commission proposes rules that would require carriers to renew, every 10 years, their international authorizations. In the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on adopting rules that would require all international authorization holders to periodically update information enabling the Commission to review the public interest and national security implications of those authorizations based on that updated information. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of international authorization holders to safeguard U.S. telecommunications networks.","document_number":"2023-13040","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/01/2023-13040/review-of-international-authorizations-to-assess-evolving-national-security-law-enforcement-foreign","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-08-01/pdf/2023-13040.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2023-13040.pdf?1690807521","publication_date":"2023-08-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":" In the \n Foreign Participation Order, \n the Commission also stated it considers “national security” and “foreign policy” concerns when granting authorizations under section 214 of the Act. \n Foreign Participation Order, \n 12 FCC Rcd at 23919 through 20, paragraphs 61 through 63 (in regulating foreign participation in the U.S. telecom market in the late 1990s, the Commission recommitted to considering “national security” and “foreign policy” concerns when granting licenses under section 310(b)(4) and authorizations under section 214(a) of the Act"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule, published by the Department of Commerce's (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), sets forth regulations and procedures to address undue or unacceptable risks to national security and U.S. persons posed by classes of transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of certain foreign adversaries and that are integral to connected vehicles as defined herein.","document_number":"2025-00592","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00592/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-16/pdf/2025-00592.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00592.pdf?1736862326","publication_date":"2025-01-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"such a framework. BIS ultimately declines to consider compliance with SAE 21434 as a standalone security control sufficient for mitigating the national security risks identified in this rule. BIS determined that a combination of security controls could successfully mitigate the national security risk relating to connected vehicles and intends to use a multi-layered approach when issuing a specific authorization. BIS anticipates that requiring security features controls such as conformity with cybersecurity standards, audits conducted by third parties"},{"title":"Revision of Firearms License Requirements","type":"Rule","abstract":"On April 30, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (Firearms IFR) that imposed new export license requirements for firearms and related ammunition and components. American firearms manufacturers estimated that these regulatory restrictions would cost them hundreds of millions of dollars per year in lost sales. BIS, informed by public comments on the Firearms IFR, has determined that the Firearms IFR should be rescinded in its entirety--with the only exception being to maintain new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs). This final rule also amends the EAR by removing the Congressional notification requirement for certain semi-automatic firearms license applications. By restoring export controls on firearms to the state they were in at the end of the first Trump Administration, BIS is advancing the Administration's commitment to reducing regulatory burdens on industry and law-abiding firearms owners.","document_number":"2025-18992","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/30/2025-18992/revision-of-firearms-license-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-30/pdf/2025-18992.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-18992.pdf?1759149920","publication_date":"2025-09-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. When the 0x5zz items were moved from the USML to the CCL, BIS described the absence of a purchase order requirement as one of the reductions in regulatory burden. The other items that moved from the USML to the CCL, the “600 series” and 9x515 items, also did not have a purchase order requirement. BIS assesses that treating 0x5zz items at least equivalently, and not more restrictively, than “600 series” and 9x515 items is sufficient to protect national security and foreign policy interests. \n Requiring"}]}