{"description":"Documents matching 'security government facilities physical surveillance'","count":2528,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+government+facilities+physical+surveillance&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Modernizing Requirements Relating to Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is conducting a review and wholesale revision of its regulations. As part of this initiative, the NRC is proposing to revise its regulations relating to physical protection and security of category 1 and category 2 quantities of radioactive material.","document_number":"2026-06877","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/09/2026-06877/modernizing-requirements-relating-to-physical-protection-of-category-1-and-category-2-quantities-of","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-09/pdf/2026-06877.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06877.pdf?1775652318","publication_date":"2026-04-09","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"significant changes include relocation of security zones, changes to physical security systems, and updates to response procedures. This revision would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees. In addition, because each licensee would still be required to provide refresher training to responsible individuals when significant changes are made to the security program, the effectiveness of the security program would be maintained. \n 4. Reducing the Required Frequency of Coordination With Local Law Enforcement Agencies (LLEA) in § 37.45(d) \n"},{"title":"Modernizing Security Requirements","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency, consistent with Executive Order 14300, \"Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\" The proposed revisions are intended to reduce regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained at NRC-licensed facilities.","document_number":"2026-12989","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/26/2026-12989/modernizing-security-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-26/pdf/2026-12989.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-12989.pdf?1782391523","publication_date":"2026-06-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"technology-inclusive approach to security requirements would provide greater flexibility in both the design and implementation of physical protection programs. Licensees and applicants using this approach could integrate security considerations into the safety design process, enabling the effective implementation of security measures through the use of both design-based and engineered security features. This approach could enable safety and security functions to work collaboratively in the implementation of the physical protection program. Additionally"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) proposes and seeks comment on further measures to safeguard the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program. The Commission seeks comment on whether to extend recently adopted prohibitions to include entities subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary or alternatively apply a presumption-of-prohibition to a larger class of entities. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment on expanding the group of prohibited entities to include several additional lists from federal agencies or statutes and ways it can facilitate and encourage more equipment authorization testing to occur at test labs within the United States or allied countries. Lastly, the Commission encourages further comment on post-market surveillance procedures to ensure compliance to prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment.","document_number":"2025-13308","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/16/2025-13308/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-07-16/pdf/2025-13308.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-13308.pdf?1752583514","publication_date":"2025-07-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"or cooperate with the Chinese Government's intelligence work and to ensure that the Chinese Government has the power to access and control private data the company holds.” As the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau has previously recognized, “the Chinese government is highly centralized and exercises strong control over commercial entities in its sphere of influence, permitting the government, including state intelligence agencies, to demand that private communications sector entities cooperate with governmental requests, including revealing"},{"title":"Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is proposing to impose cyber risk management (CRM) requirements on certain pipeline and rail owner/operators and a more limited requirement, on certain over-the-road bus (OTRB) owner/operators, to report cybersecurity incidents. With the proposed addition of requirements applicable to pipeline facilities and systems, TSA is also proposing that a requirement to have a Physical Security Coordinator and report significant physical security concerns be extended to the same facilities and systems. Finally, TSA is proposing clarifications and reorganization of other regulatory requirements necessitated by these changes.","document_number":"2024-24704","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/07/2024-24704/enhancing-surface-cyber-risk-management","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-07/pdf/2024-24704.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24704.pdf?1730900722","publication_date":"2024-11-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Transportation Security Administration","name":"Transportation Security Administration","id":494,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-security-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/494","parent_id":227,"slug":"transportation-security-administration"}],"excerpts":"proposing to distinguish between physical security and cybersecurity. TSA is proposing to move the requirements currently in subchapter D related to designating a security coordinator and reporting significant security concerns. TSA is proposing to move these requirements to revised subparts B within parts 1580, 1582, and 1584, respectively. These revised subparts B would contain security program requirements primarily focused on physical security. TSA also proposes to apply these same requirements to pipeline facilities and systems through the new part"},{"title":"Designation-Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"This action would implement section 2209, of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016, by establishing a process for operators and proprietors of certain fixed site facilities to request and maintain an unmanned aircraft flight restriction. The proposal also establishes requirements for applicants to demonstrate the unmanned aircraft flight restriction is necessary for: aviation safety, protection of people and property on the ground, national security, or homeland security. Lastly, the proposal identifies the types of operations that are allowed in the unmanned aircraft flight restriction UAFR.","document_number":"2026-08943","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/06/2026-08943/designation-restrict-the-operation-of-unmanned-aircraft-in-close-proximity-to-a-fixed-site-facility","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-06/pdf/2026-08943.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08943.pdf?1777985132","publication_date":"2026-05-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Aviation Administration","name":"Federal Aviation Administration","id":159,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-aviation-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/159","parent_id":492,"slug":"federal-aviation-administration"}],"excerpts":"standard for managing airspace security at sensitive sites. \n FAA also recognizes that certain non-Federal facilities or critical infrastructure as described in subpart C may support national or homeland security, even when those facilities are not directly owned or operated by the Federal Government. These facilities may include infrastructure supporting defense production, intelligence operations, continuity of government functions, or other activities where disruption could create significant national security risks. \n Proposed paragraph (a)"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) aims to further its actions in strengthening prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment and to clarify the rules and enforcement of such. The Commission seeks additional comment on modular transmitters and component parts in relation to covered equipment. The Commission addresses the partial court remand of the decision in its November 2022 EA Security R&O by proposing a definition of \"critical infrastructure\" as used on the Covered List and seeking comment on the implementation of that definition. The Commission also seeks comment on whether any modification to an authorized device by an entity identified on the Covered List should require a new application for certification. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on clarifying the scope of activities that constitute marketing of equipment and on measures to strengthen enforcement of marketing prohibitions.","document_number":"2025-21928","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/04/2025-21928/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-04/pdf/2025-21928.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21928.pdf?1764769515","publication_date":"2025-12-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"listed “video surveillance and telecommunications equipment” produced by these entities only to the extent such equipment is “for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.” 2019 NDAA section 889(f)(3)(B). In March 2021, consistent with the statutory language of NDAA section 889(f)(3)(B), the Commission included this same language on its Covered List.\n \n \n Equipment Authorization Security R&O. \n In the EA Security R&O and"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"of its efforts to ensuring the integrity and security of the equipment authorization program.\n \n \n Foreign Adversary Governments and Persons. \n The Department of Commerce has developed a list of “foreign adversary” governments and persons, which includes “any foreign government or foreign non-government person determined by the Secretary [of Commerce] to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.” Currently"},{"title":"Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. Through Public Notice, acting pursuant to Sec. 2.939 of the Federal Communications Commission's rules, PSHSB and OET apply such prohibitions to communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier.","document_number":"2026-13518","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/06/2026-13518/prohibiting-importation-and-marketing-of-previously-authorized-covered-communications-equipment","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-06/pdf/2026-13518.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13518.pdf?1782996313","publication_date":"2026-07-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.” Under the approach the Commission adopted in the \n EA Security R&O \n (88 FR 7592), new equipment authorization applications for covered equipment produced by entities subject to use-based restrictions (\n i.e., \n equipment that is covered when “used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes”) are generally prohibited until those manufacturers"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to strengthen requirements and oversight relating to telecommunications certification bodies and measurement facilities to help ensure the integrity of these entities for purposes of the equipment authorization, to better protect national security, and to advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain.","document_number":"2024-14491","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/05/2024-14491/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-07-05/pdf/2024-14491.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-14491.pdf?1720010716","publication_date":"2024-07-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"list of “foreign adversary” countries that identifies any foreign government or foreign non-government person that the Secretary of Commerce has determined to have engaged in a “long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security interest of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.” The Department of Commerce's list of foreign adversaries currently includes several foreign governments and foreign non-government persons, including China (including Hong Kong), Cuba, Iran, and Russia"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service. We will require licensees to submit a certification, within thirty (30) days of the date the submarine cable is placed into service, that they have created and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the in-service date. Licensees must continue to implement and update the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, as required based on material changes to the cybersecurity and physical security"},{"title":"Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To List and Trade Units of the Sprott Physical Copper Trust","type":"Notice","abstract":null,"document_number":"2026-01969","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/02/2026-01969/self-regulatory-organizations-nyse-arca-inc-notice-of-filing-of-amendment-no-1-and-order-granting","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-02/pdf/2026-01969.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-01969.pdf?1769780717","publication_date":"2026-02-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"listing on the Exchange of Sprott Physical Gold Trust).\n \n \n \n \n 15 \n \n See \n Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63043 (October 5, 2010), 75 FR 62615 (October 12, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-84) (approving listing on the Exchange of the Sprott Physical Silver Trust).\n \n \n \n \n 16 \n \n See \n Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-82448 (January 5, 2018), 83 FR 1428 (November 1, 2018) (SR-NYSEArca-2017-131) (approving listing on the Exchange of the Sprott Physical Gold and Silver Trust).\n \n \n \n \n 17 \n \n See \n Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69256 (March"},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the DoD is modifying and reissuing a current system of records notice (SORN) titled, \"Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER) System, EDHA 20 DoD.\" This system of records was originally established to collect and maintain records on Reportable Events involving Active Duty and Reserve personnel to support ongoing population-based health surveillance and activities within DoD, analyze and evaluate Reportable Events to identify risk factors and trends; prevent suicide behaviors, and implement Reportable Events within the DoD. This notice updates the system identifier, system's location, expands reporting to the Space Force and Coast Guard, clarifies its purpose, and revises the routine uses. The DoD is also modifying various other sections within the SORN to improve clarity or update information that has changed.","document_number":"2026-13367","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/02/2026-13367/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-02/pdf/2026-13367.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13367.pdf?1782909914","publication_date":"2026-07-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)); DoDD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance; and E.O. 9397 (SSN), as amended. \n PURPOSE(S) OF THE SYSTEM: \n A. To establish, collect, and maintain integrated DoD enterprise and survey data to be used for direct reporting of Reportable Events involving individuals on Active Duty or serving in the Reserves, supporting ongoing population-based health surveillance activities and public health within DoD, and for analysis. Surveillance activities include the systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and"},{"title":"Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To List and Trade Shares of the Sprott Physical Copper Trust","type":"Notice","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-11732","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/26/2025-11732/self-regulatory-organizations-nyse-arca-inc-notice-of-filing-of-proposed-rule-change-to-list-and","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-26/pdf/2025-11732.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11732.pdf?1750855510","publication_date":"2025-06-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"listing on the Exchange of Sprott Physical Gold Trust).\n \n \n \n \n 7 \n \n See \n Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63043 (October 5, 2010), 75 FR 62615 (October 12, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-84) (approving listing on the Exchange of the Sprott Physical Silver Trust).\n \n \n \n \n 8 \n \n See \n Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-82448 (January 5, 2018), 83 FR 1428 (November 1, 2018) (SR-NYSEArca-2017-131) (approving listing on the Exchange of the Sprott Physical Gold and Silver Trust).\n \n \n \n \n 9 \n \n See \n Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69256 (March"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule sets forth the regulations that implement Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, \"Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,\" which declares a national emergency to address the threat to the United States posed by countries of concern that seek to develop and exploit sensitive technologies or products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. The final rule requires United States persons to provide notification to the U.S. Department of the Treasury regarding certain transactions involving persons of a country of concern that are engaged in activities involving certain national security technologies and products that may contribute to the threat to the national security of the United States; and prohibits United States persons from engaging in certain other transactions involving persons of a country of concern that are engaged in activities involving certain other national security technologies and products that pose a particularly acute national security threat to the United States.","document_number":"2024-25422","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/15/2024-25422/provisions-pertaining-to-us-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-15/pdf/2024-25422.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-25422.pdf?1730996188","publication_date":"2024-11-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY","name":"Treasury Department","id":497,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/497","parent_id":null,"slug":"treasury-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of Investment Security","name":"Investment Security Office","id":603,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/investment-security-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/603","parent_id":497,"slug":"investment-security-office"}],"excerpts":"military advantages. The potential military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled applications of these technologies and products pose risks to U.S. national security, particularly when developed in or by a country of concern in which the government seeks to (1) direct entities to obtain technologies to achieve national security objectives and (2) compel public or private entities to share or transfer these technologies to the government's military, intelligence, surveillance, or security apparatuses. \n U.S. investments are often more valuable"},{"title":"Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Reactors With Comparable Risk Profiles","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to establish a risk-informed and performance- based regulatory framework for rapid licensing of new microreactors and other reactors with comparable risk profiles and for high-volume deployment of these reactors. The proposed rule would provide a flexible set of licensing pathways, reduce regulatory burden, and ensure that safety and security requirements remain commensurate with the potential hazards posed by these facilities.","document_number":"2026-08550","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/01/2026-08550/licensing-requirements-for-microreactors-and-other-reactors-with-comparable-risk-profiles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-01/pdf/2026-08550.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08550.pdf?1777553125","publication_date":"2026-05-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"unnecessary. Consistent with other NRC-licensed facilities that do not have defined EPZs, the proposed rule would ensure that applicants and licensees develop and maintain capabilities to protect emergency workers and the public.\n \n \n Proposed § 57.60(a)(8)(v) would require the applicant to describe its physical security program, cybersecurity program, information security program, and access authorization program and is equivalent to § 50.34(c). The physical security program would need to meet the security requirements in part 70. For radiological sabotage"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"applicant's security policies. In addition, we propose that, in order to qualify for exclusion from referral, the applicant must certify that it will exclude any company personnel, including contractors, that is a citizen of a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules, from physical or logical access to the submarine cable system. Finally, we seek comment on the physical security requirements and best practices (\n e.g., \n perimeter security, physical barriers, surveillance, environmental controls, security personnel"},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) is establishing a new Privacy Act system of records titled \"CFTC-59, Insider Risk Program Records.\" This system of records contains information that the Commission collects, maintains, and uses to administer its Insider Risk program and to detect, deter, and mitigate risks to individuals, facilities, information, equipment, networks, and systems within the CFTC. This newly established system of records will be included in the CFTC's inventory of record systems.","document_number":"2026-08978","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/06/2026-08978/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-06/pdf/2026-08978.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08978.pdf?1777985137","publication_date":"2026-05-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION","name":"Commodity Futures Trading Commission","id":77,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commodity-futures-trading-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/77","parent_id":null,"slug":"commodity-futures-trading-commission"}],"excerpts":"AND NUMBER: \n Insider Risk Program Records, CFTC-59. \n SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: \n Unclassified. \n SYSTEM LOCATION: \n The Cyber Security Section, Cyber and Physical Security Branch, Division of Administration in the CFTC office at Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC, is responsible for the collection and maintenance of the records in this system of records. \n SYSTEM MANAGER(S): \n Deputy Chief Information Security Officer, Cybersecurity Section, Cyber and Physical Security Branch, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette"},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the DoD is establishing a new Department-wide system of records titled, \"Counterintelligence Investigations and Collection Activities (CICA),\" DoD-0025. This system of records covers DoD's maintenance of records about counterintelligence (CI) investigations and collection activities. The purpose of CICA is to determine whether an individual is acting for or on behalf of foreign powers organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. This differs from the purpose of Counterintelligence Functional Services (CIFS), DoD-0010, which protects Department resources and personnel from foreign adversaries who seek to exploit sensitive information, operations, and agency programs to the detriment of the U.S. Government. It is also separate from the purpose of the DoD Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System, DUSDI 01-DoD, which addresses security functions. Additionally, DoD is issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which proposes to exempt this system of records from certain provisions of the Privacy Act, elsewhere in today's issue of the Federal Register.","document_number":"2025-13582","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/21/2025-13582/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-07-21/pdf/2025-13582.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-13582.pdf?1752842708","publication_date":"2025-07-21","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":" National Security Agency Act of 1959, as amended (Pub. L. 86-36) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 3601 \n et seq. \n ); the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended (Pub. L. 95-511) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1801 \n et seq. \n ); 44 U.S.C. Subchapter II (3551-3559), Information Security (Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA)); 50 U.S.C. 3381, Coordination of Counterintelligence Activities; Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, as amended, United States intelligence activities; E.O. 13526, Classified National Security Information;"},{"title":"Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice is issuing a final rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-31486","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-31486.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31486.pdf?1735911918","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"thereof has any interest (“transaction”), where the transaction: involves United States Government-related data (“government-related data”) or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data, as defined by final rules implementing the Order; falls within a class of transactions that has been determined by the Attorney General to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States because it may enable access by countries of concern or covered persons to government-related data or Americans' bulk U.S. sensitive personal data; and meets other criteria"},{"title":"HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS or \"Department\") is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit comment on its proposal to modify the Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information (\"Security Rule\") under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act). The proposed modifications would revise existing standards to better protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information (ePHI). The proposals in this NPRM would increase the cybersecurity for ePHI by revising the Security Rule to address: changes in the environment in which health care is provided; significant increases in breaches and cyberattacks; common deficiencies the Office for Civil Rights has observed in investigations into Security Rule compliance by covered entities and their business associates (collectively, \"regulated entities\"); other cybersecurity guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes; and court decisions that affect enforcement of the Security Rule.","document_number":"2024-30983","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-06/pdf/2024-30983.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30983.pdf?1735334119","publication_date":"2025-01-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES","name":"Health and Human Services Department","id":221,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-and-human-services-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/221","parent_id":null,"slug":"health-and-human-services-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"Memorandum on National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, National Security Memorandum/NSM-22, The White House (Apr. 30, 2024), \n https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/ \n (“Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public"}]}