{"description":"Documents matching 'security including official cable notification'","count":1105,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+including+official+cable+notification&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"the submarine cable ecosystem.\n \n \n II. Background \n \n 6. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the \n 2024 Cable NPRM, \n initiating a comprehensive review of the submarine cable rules to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. As explained in the \n 2024 Cable NPRM, \n the Commission's authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or condition submarine cable landing licenses"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"from new and evolving threats” in the submarine cable ecosystem. \n II. Background \n \n 9. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the \n 2024 Cable NPRM, \n 88 FR 50486, August 1, 2023, initiating a comprehensive review of the submarine cable rules to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. As explained in the \n 2024 Cable NPRM, \n the Commission's authority to grant, withhold"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.","document_number":"2025-03718","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/13/2025-03718/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-13/pdf/2025-03718.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03718.pdf?1741783507","publication_date":"2025-03-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"definition of a submarine cable system. Conceptually and in simple terms, a submarine cable system is comprised of a cable laid beneath the water that carries telecommunication transmission signals between two or more cable landing stations containing equipment that converts submarine cable signals to terrestrial signals.\n 2 \n \n The wet segment of the submarine cable system makes landfall at the beach manhole or beach joint that, in turn, connects to the dry segment and submarine cable landing stations. A submarine cable landing station is a dry"},{"title":"Security Review Committee","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Secretary of State is promulgating rules defining the membership and operating procedures of the Department of State's Security Review Committee, an internal panel that reviews serious security incidents.","document_number":"2026-08148","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/27/2026-08148/security-review-committee","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-27/pdf/2026-08148.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08148.pdf?1777034712","publication_date":"2026-04-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF STATE","name":"State Department","id":476,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/state-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/476","parent_id":null,"slug":"state-department"}],"excerpts":"Diplomatic Security, including an official cable notification of an initial report of a potential serious security incident not later than three days after such incident occurs, whenever feasible. \n (b) The Under Secretary for Management directs Diplomatic Security to assemble a Security Investigative Team within 10 days of receiving a report of a potential serious security incident. \n \n (c) When directed by the Secretary, either Deputy Secretary, or the Under Secretary for Management, the Assistant \n \n Secretary for Diplomatic Security forms the"},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (FCC, Commission, or Agency) proposes to modify an existing system of records, FCC/MB-1, Ownership Reports for Commercial and Noncommercial Broadcast Stations, subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended. This action is necessary to meet the requirements of the Privacy Act to publish in the Federal Register notice of the existence and character of records maintained by the agency. The FCC's Media Bureau (MB) uses the information contained in this system to administer the Commission's regulatory responsibilities that relate (1) to ownership of commercial broadcast stations, including AM and FM radio and television (full power, Class A, and low power); and (2) to ownership of noncommercial broadcast stations, including AM and FM radio and full-power television. The FCC Enforcement Bureau (EB) also uses the information contained in this system to review the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) programs of both commercial and non-commercial AM and FM radio and television stations (full power, Class A, and low power) and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services (SDARS) licensees. And for cable operators and \"Direct Broadcast Satellite\" (DBS) providers, EB similarly reviews their compliance with the FCC's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) rules in this system, in part, via the Cable Operations and Licensing System (COALS) database.","document_number":"2024-20847","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/13/2024-20847/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-09-13/pdf/2024-20847.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-20847.pdf?1726145137","publication_date":"2024-09-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"safeguards, a comprehensive and dynamic set of IT safety and security protocols and features that are designed to meet all Federal privacy standards, including those required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).\n \n RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES: \n Individuals wishing to request access to and/or amendment of records about themselves should follow the Notification Procedures below. \n CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: \n Individuals"},{"title":"HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS or \"Department\") is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to solicit comment on its proposal to modify the Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information (\"Security Rule\") under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act). The proposed modifications would revise existing standards to better protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information (ePHI). The proposals in this NPRM would increase the cybersecurity for ePHI by revising the Security Rule to address: changes in the environment in which health care is provided; significant increases in breaches and cyberattacks; common deficiencies the Office for Civil Rights has observed in investigations into Security Rule compliance by covered entities and their business associates (collectively, \"regulated entities\"); other cybersecurity guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes; and court decisions that affect enforcement of the Security Rule.","document_number":"2024-30983","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-30983/hipaa-security-rule-to-strengthen-the-cybersecurity-of-electronic-protected-health-information","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-06/pdf/2024-30983.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30983.pdf?1735334119","publication_date":"2025-01-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES","name":"Health and Human Services Department","id":221,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-and-human-services-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/221","parent_id":null,"slug":"health-and-human-services-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"Memorandum on National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, National Security Memorandum/NSM-22, The White House (Apr. 30, 2024), \n https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/04/30/national-security-memorandum-on-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/ \n (“Critical infrastructure comprises the physical and virtual assets and systems so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public"},{"title":"Notice of Availability of Security Requirements for Restricted Transactions Under Executive Order 14117","type":"Notice","abstract":"CISA is announcing publication of finalized security requirements for restricted transactions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14117, \"Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern.\" In October 2024, CISA published proposed security requirements for restricted transactions which would apply to classes of restricted transactions identified in regulations issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). CISA solicited comment on those proposed security requirements and considered that public feedback when developing the final security requirements. This notice also provides CISA's responses to the public comments received.","document_number":"2024-31479","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31479/notice-of-availability-of-security-requirements-for-restricted-transactions-under-executive-order","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-31479.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31479.pdf?1735911917","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"}],"excerpts":"same direction to CISA for promulgating the security requirements. By design, the security requirements themselves are not a rule governed by the process laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553. While this allows CISA to update the security requirements quickly, tracking new developments in technology and data security, such updated security requirements will not be enforceable against entities regulated by DOJ's rule unless DOJ updates its rule to change the version of the security requirements incorporated therein by reference"},{"title":"Resilient Networks; Concerning Disruptions to Communications","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) modernizes the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) to reduce reporting burdens on stakeholders and ensure that the information being collected is useful for disaster response. Our modernization allows manual filers to submit a single, dynamic form instead of multiple worksheets, and enables them to use a \"one-click\" option to easily indicate there is no change from the previous day's report. Further, unnecessary fields and worksheets will be eliminated to ensure that DIRS is collecting the information that is most important for emergency response. This modernization also eliminates the requirement for service providers to file a DIRS final report within 24 hours of DIRS' deactivation, and exempts non-facilities-based providers from DIRS reporting. This document also recognizes the emergence of public safety voice and broadband networks and the critical connectivity they provide to public safety stakeholders by requiring providers of these services to submit DIRS reports on the status of their public safety network infrastructure. Finally, we augment providers' ability to voluntarily submit geospatial information on infrastructure affected by disasters. Together, these changes provide public safety officials with the additional information they need, while also making it easier for service providers to satisfy their reporting obligations.","document_number":"2026-13155","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/30/2026-13155/resilient-networks-concerning-disruptions-to-communications","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-30/pdf/2026-13155.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13155.pdf?1782737115","publication_date":"2026-06-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"142 \n 83.04 \n \n \n \n Table 4—Cable Entities Data \n \n Cable entities \n Size standard \n Total firms \n Small firms \n \n % Small \n firms in \n industry \n \n \n \n Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard) Small Cable Operator \n Serves fewer than 498,000 subscribers, either directly or through affiliates \n 530 \n 524 \n 98.87 \n \n \n Cable Companies and Systems (Rate Regulation) Small Cable Company \n Serves 400,000 or fewer subscribers nationwide \n 530 \n 523 \n 98.51 \n \n \n \n Cable Companies and Systems (Rate Regulation) Small Cable System (headends) \n Serves"},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (FCC, Commission, or Agency) proposes to modify an existing system of records, FCC/MB-2, Broadcast Station Public Inspection Files, which has been renamed FCC/ MB-2, Online Public Inspection File. The Commission requires television broadcasters to submit their public filing information to the FCC to be posted in an online public inspection file. In 2016, the Commission expanded its Online Public Inspection File (OPIF) requirements to cable operators, satellite TV (also referred to as \"Direct Broadcast Satellite\" or \"DBS\") providers, broadcast radio licensees, and satellite radio (also referred to as \"Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services\" or \"SDARS\") licensees. This system of records covers the personally identifiable information (PII) that may be contained in an OPIF.","document_number":"2024-20848","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/13/2024-20848/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-09-13/pdf/2024-20848.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-20848.pdf?1726145138","publication_date":"2024-09-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"safeguards, a comprehensive and dynamic set of IT safety and security protocols and features that are designed to meet all Federal privacy standards, including those required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).\n \n RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES: \n Individuals wishing to request access to and/or amendment of records about themselves should follow the Notification Procedures below. \n CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: \n Individuals"},{"title":"Designation-Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"This action would implement section 2209, of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016, by establishing a process for operators and proprietors of certain fixed site facilities to request and maintain an unmanned aircraft flight restriction. The proposal also establishes requirements for applicants to demonstrate the unmanned aircraft flight restriction is necessary for: aviation safety, protection of people and property on the ground, national security, or homeland security. Lastly, the proposal identifies the types of operations that are allowed in the unmanned aircraft flight restriction UAFR.","document_number":"2026-08943","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/06/2026-08943/designation-restrict-the-operation-of-unmanned-aircraft-in-close-proximity-to-a-fixed-site-facility","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-06/pdf/2026-08943.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08943.pdf?1777985132","publication_date":"2026-05-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Aviation Administration","name":"Federal Aviation Administration","id":159,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-aviation-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/159","parent_id":492,"slug":"federal-aviation-administration"}],"excerpts":"Protective Security (§ 74.56) \n FAA proposes under § 74.56 the outline of protective security that satisfies the eligibility requirements under § 74.54. As high-risk sites, FAA expects facilities to have layered security measures to protect against a multitude of threats, including threats from unmanned aircraft. Therefore, sites would be required to show they meet all of the following security requirements: \n (1) Access to the facility, certain areas, or key components must be restricted \n (2) The facility must have designated security personnel"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"protect the equipment supply chain from pre-authorization exposure to entities that present national security concerns. \n Other Entities That Raise National Security Concerns \n The Covered List is only one source that identifies entities presenting national security concerns that have potential to compromise the integrity of the equipment authorization program. Several federal agencies with particular national security responsibilities—including two agencies that also serve as sources of determinations for the Covered List—develop or maintain lists that"},{"title":"Requirements To File Notice for Meteorological Towers and Other Wind Energy Systems","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The FAA is proposing to amend requirements applicable to meteorological towers and permanent wind energy systems. This rule would require any person that owns (sponsor) any proposed, altered, or existing meteorological tower to file notice with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) if the highest point of the structure is at least 50 feet above ground level (AGL) up to and including 200 feet AGL at its site. The FAA is also proposing marking requirements for meteorological towers constructed or altered after the effective date of a final rule if the highest point of the structure is at least 50 feet AGL up to and including 200 feet AGL at its site. Additionally, the FAA proposes making certain pertinent information about any meteorological tower with the highest point of the structure at least 50 feet AGL up to and including 200 feet AGL at its site available on the FAA's official database. The FAA expects these changes to lower the collision risk for aircraft during low-altitude operations. Moreover, these requirements would partially address two statutory mandates and two National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations.","document_number":"2024-26741","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/18/2024-26741/requirements-to-file-notice-for-meteorological-towers-and-other-wind-energy-systems","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-18/pdf/2024-26741.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-26741.pdf?1731678327","publication_date":"2024-11-18","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Aviation Administration","name":"Federal Aviation Administration","id":159,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-aviation-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/159","parent_id":492,"slug":"federal-aviation-administration"}],"excerpts":"meteorological towers. The FAA would process notifications of existing and new meteorological towers, including notifications of dismantled out-of-service meteorological towers. Processing these notifications would cost the FAA about $41 per existing notification and about $163 per dismantling notification. The primary benefit of the proposed rule would be enhanced conspicuity to prevent agricultural pilots from colliding with meteorological towers with the highest point of the structure at least 50 feet AGL up to and including 200 feet AGL at its site. \n B."},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"Pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-108, notice is hereby given that the Central Intelligence Agency (\"CIA\") is submitting to the Federal Register one (1) new System of Records Notice (SORN), CIA-46 Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Office (SHARP) Records. This new SORN covers records related to CIA's assessment, processing, and tracking of sexual harassment and sexual assault inquiries, allegations, and reports, which includes case management, dispositions, guidance, and reporting to CIA leadership, stakeholders, and oversight bodies.","document_number":"2026-13283","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/01/2026-13283/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-01/pdf/2026-13283.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13283.pdf?1782823516","publication_date":"2026-07-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY","name":"Central Intelligence Agency","id":46,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/central-intelligence-agency","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/46","parent_id":null,"slug":"central-intelligence-agency"}],"excerpts":"assault. “Restricted” reports are those reports of sexual harassment or sexual assault that are kept confidential and are made to SHARP without notifications or investigation. “Unrestricted” reports are those reports of sexual harassment or sexual assault that are kept confidential, but include notification to management and appropriate investigators. The SHARP Office is also responsible for various notification, reporting, policy setting, training, and data analysis related to reports of sexual harassment and sexual assault by CIA personnel.\n \n CIA"},{"title":"Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions-Spring 2025","type":"Notice","abstract":"Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA; 5 U.S.C 601- 612) the Federal Communications Commission is required to publish a regulatory flexibility agenda twice-yearly in the Federal Register describing any regulatory proceedings under development or review which are likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 5 U.S.C. 602. In addition, Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review (Sep. 30, 1993), requires each agency to publish, twice yearly, a regulatory agenda (Agenda) of regulations under development or review during the next year which will be included in the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda). 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993). The Agenda required by Executive Order 12866 must include all regulations the agency expects to develop or review during the next 12 months, regardless of whether they may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. E.O. 12866 provides that agencies may combine this agenda with the regulatory flexibility agenda required under the RFA. To help keep the public informed of significant rulemaking proceedings and meet its obligations under the RFA and E.O. 12866, the Commission has prepared Agenda entries providing a brief description and summary of each regulatory activity that is currently planned for the 12 months, subject to revision, including the objectives and legal basis for each, and the name and telephone number of an agency official who is knowledgeable about items in the agenda. The Commission's Agenda entries published in the Federal Register are only those entries for rules that are likely to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities pursuant to the RFA. The Commission's complete list of regulatory and deregulatory actions for the Unified Agenda will be published on the internet in a searchable format at www.reginfo.gov.","document_number":"2025-18318","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/22/2025-18318/unified-agenda-of-federal-regulatory-and-deregulatory-actions-spring-2025","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-22/pdf/2025-18318.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-18318.pdf?1758285917","publication_date":"2025-09-22","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. Over the last two decades, there have been substantial changes in technology, consumer expectations, international submarine cable traffic patterns, and investment in and construction of submarine cable infrastructure as well as significant evolution in national security and law enforcement threat environments. The proposed rules on which Commission seeks comment in"},{"title":"Facilitating Implementation of Next Generation 911 Services (NG911); Improving 911 Reliability","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC or Commission) adopts rules to ensure that emerging Next Generation 911 (NG911) networks are reliable and interoperable. NG911 is replacing legacy 911 technology across the country with internet Protocol (IP)- based infrastructure that will support new 911 capabilities, including text, video, and data. However, for NG911 to be fully effective, NG911 networks must be designed to safeguard the reliability of critical components and support the interoperability needed to seamlessly transfer 911 calls and data from one network to another. The rules require entities essential to delivering emergency calls in the NG911 environment to implement common sense measures to safeguard the reliability of NG911 networks and reduce the risk of 911 outages, and require certain entities to report on their support for NG911 interoperability. The rules also eliminate unnecessary and burdensome legacy rules to increase flexibility and encourage technical innovation to make NG911 services reliable, interoperable, and accessible to all.","document_number":"2026-13998","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/10/2026-13998/facilitating-implementation-of-next-generation-911-services-ng911-improving-911-reliability","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-10/pdf/2026-13998.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13998.pdf?1783601118","publication_date":"2026-07-10","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"77 \n \n \n \n Table 3—Cable Entities Data \n \n Cable entities \n Size standard \n Total firms \n Small firms \n \n Percent small firms in\n industry \n \n \n \n \n Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard)\n Small Cable Operator \n \n Serves fewer than 498,000 subscribers, either directly or through affiliates \n 530 \n 524 \n 98.87 \n \n \n \n Cable Companies and Systems (Rate Regulation)\n Small Cable Company \n \n Serves 400,000 or fewer subscribers nationwide \n 530 \n 523 \n 98.51 \n \n \n \n Cable Companies and Systems (Rate Regulation)\n Small Cable System (headends) \n"},{"title":"Notice of Adoption of Categorical Exclusions under Section 109 of the National Environmental Policy Act","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Department of the Interior (Department) is notifying the public and documenting the adoption of 11 Department of Energy (DOE) and 6 National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) categorical exclusions (CXs) for use by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), under section 109 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In accordance with section 109, this notice identifies the types of actions for which the BLM and BIA will rely on the CXs, the considerations that the BLM and BIA will use in determining the applicability of the CXs, and the consultation between the agencies on the use of the CXs, including application of extraordinary circumstances.","document_number":"2025-01057","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-01057/notice-of-adoption-of-categorical-exclusions-under-section-109-of-the-national-environmental-policy","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-16/pdf/2025-01057.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-01057.pdf?1736948757","publication_date":"2025-01-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR","name":"Interior Department","id":253,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/interior-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/253","parent_id":null,"slug":"interior-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"CFR 1021.410(b)(2) and those of the NTIA found at 89 FR 22688; therefore, BLM and BIA Responsible Officials intending to rely on these CXs will review whether the proposed action has the potential to result in significant effects as described in the Department's extraordinary circumstances. If the Responsible Official cannot rely on a CX to support a decision on a particular proposed action due to extraordinary circumstances, the Responsible Official will prepare an EA or EIS, consistent with 40 CFR 1501.4(b)(2) and 43 CFR 46.205(c). \n Notice to"},{"title":"Resilient Networks; Disruptions to Communications","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) commences a thorough review of the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) and proposes changes to ensure the system is collecting information useful to disaster response without imposing unreasonable burdens on stakeholders. To reduce these burdens, this document proposes replacing the different DIRS worksheets with a single, dynamic form and introduces a \"one-click\" option for indicating there is \"no change\" from the preceding day's DIRS report. Further, this document proposes eliminating or modifying information fields that are duplicative or that may not request information that offers significant value for disaster response. The document further proposes reducing burdens by removing the requirement for mandatory DIRS filers to submit a final report within 24 hours of DIRS deactivation, and eliminating the reporting obligations for non- facilities-based providers. Other modernization proposals include suspending Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) reporting requirements for providers that timely report in DIRS Lite and removing barriers to outage information sharing for state agencies.","document_number":"2025-16737","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/02/2025-16737/resilient-networks-disruptions-to-communications","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-02/pdf/2025-16737.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-16737.pdf?1756471520","publication_date":"2025-09-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"on whether requiring mandatory DIRS reporting for cable communications, wireline, wireless, and interconnected VoIP providers has resulted in useful information for emergency managers and other public safety officials. For those public safety officials who have experienced DIRS activations under both voluntary and mandatory reporting regimes, are public safety officials receiving more useful and/or complete information than they did when DIRS reporting was voluntary? How are public safety officials using this information? Is it premature to make this"},{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to protect the Nation's communications networks against foreign adversary threats by proposing to expand foreign ownership disclosure requirements for covered Commission-issued licenses and authorizations. The proposed certification and information collection requirements would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically, the Commission proposes to apply new certification and disclosure requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, as the Commission currently does. Furthermore, the Commission proposes to go beyond foreign ownership to also cover all regulated entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.","document_number":"2025-11360","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/20/2025-11360/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-20/pdf/2025-11360.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11360.pdf?1750250720","publication_date":"2025-06-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"\n \n (d) Submarine Cables \n \n Submarine cable landing licenses. \n We propose to require, and seek comment on how best to receive, certification and reporting from submarine cable landing licensees. Under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, the Commission has authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or condition submarine cable landing licenses for cables that land in the United States. Section 1.767 of the Commission's rules sets forth the framework for the Commission's consideration of applications for cable landing licenses. The"},{"title":"Modernization of the Nation's Alerting Systems","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) begins a reexamination of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) from the ground up and seeks comment on whether fundamental changes could make these alerting systems more effective, efficient, and better able to serve the public's needs. EAS was introduced 31 years ago, and WEA was introduced 13 years ago, using the technology available at the time. The Commission seeks comment on what goals these alerting systems should aim to achieve, whether these systems are currently effective at achieving these goals, and what steps should be taken to modernize these systems to improve their usefulness and better leverage modern technology while minimizing burdens on stakeholders.","document_number":"2025-16333","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/26/2025-16333/modernization-of-the-nations-alerting-systems","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-26/pdf/2025-16333.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-16333.pdf?1756125960","publication_date":"2025-08-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"as small cable operators under the definition in the Communications Act.\n \n \n Cable Companies and Systems (Rate Regulation). \n The Commission has developed its own small business size standard for the purpose of cable rate regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a “small cable company” is one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers nationwide. Based on industry data, there are about 420 cable companies in the U.S. Of these, only seven have more than 400,000 subscribers. In addition, under the Commission's rules, a “small system” is a cable system serving"},{"title":"Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is proposing to impose cyber risk management (CRM) requirements on certain pipeline and rail owner/operators and a more limited requirement, on certain over-the-road bus (OTRB) owner/operators, to report cybersecurity incidents. With the proposed addition of requirements applicable to pipeline facilities and systems, TSA is also proposing that a requirement to have a Physical Security Coordinator and report significant physical security concerns be extended to the same facilities and systems. Finally, TSA is proposing clarifications and reorganization of other regulatory requirements necessitated by these changes.","document_number":"2024-24704","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/07/2024-24704/enhancing-surface-cyber-risk-management","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-07/pdf/2024-24704.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24704.pdf?1730900722","publication_date":"2024-11-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Transportation Security Administration","name":"Transportation Security Administration","id":494,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-security-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/494","parent_id":227,"slug":"transportation-security-administration"}],"excerpts":"“Operations” to “Security of Rail Security Sensitive Materials” without any revisions to the requirements in this subpart.\n \n \n \n 113 \n \n See \n §§ 1580.3, 1582.3, and 1584.3 for definitions of “security-sensitive employees” as applied to freight railroads, PTPR, and OTRB, respectively.\n \n \n \n Physical security encompasses threats to physical infrastructure that could affect the safety and security of people, cargo, and infrastructure. The definition for physical security in this NPRM includes measures that provide for the security of systems and"}]}