{"description":"Documents matching 'security risk assessments associated projects'","count":10000,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+risk+assessments+associated+projects&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standards Revisions; Equipment and Services Produced or Provided by Certain Entities Identified as Risks to National Security","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) directs the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, to develop new or modified Reliability Standards that address the sufficiency of responsible entities' supply chain risk management plans related to the identification of and response to supply chain risks. Further, the Commission directs NERC to develop modifications related to supply chain protections for protected cyber assets. This final action also terminates a related notice of inquiry.","document_number":"2025-18394","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/23/2025-18394/supply-chain-risk-management-reliability-standards-revisions-equipment-and-services-produced-or","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-23/pdf/2025-18394.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-18394.pdf?1758545114","publication_date":"2025-09-23","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","id":167,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-energy-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/167","parent_id":136,"slug":"federal-energy-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"the periodicity of <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">assessments</span> according to equipment type (\n i.e. \n require different periodicities for workstations, servers, networking and <span class=\"match\">security</span> appliances, energy management systems, and substation equipment) because each type may have different cycles for <span class=\"match\">risk</span> re-<span class=\"match\">assessments</span>.\n \n 31. Regarding Trade Associations' concerns about how entities would comply with a requirement to periodically review <span class=\"match\">risks</span> <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with existing contracts, we clarify that if a responsible entity discovers a supply chain <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with an existing contract"},{"title":"Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Reactors With Comparable Risk Profiles","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to establish a risk-informed and performance- based regulatory framework for rapid licensing of new microreactors and other reactors with comparable risk profiles and for high-volume deployment of these reactors. The proposed rule would provide a flexible set of licensing pathways, reduce regulatory burden, and ensure that safety and security requirements remain commensurate with the potential hazards posed by these facilities.","document_number":"2026-08550","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/01/2026-08550/licensing-requirements-for-microreactors-and-other-reactors-with-comparable-risk-profiles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-01/pdf/2026-08550.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08550.pdf?1777553125","publication_date":"2026-05-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"physical <span class=\"match\">security</span> program, cybersecurity program, information <span class=\"match\">security</span> program, and access authorization program and is equivalent to § 50.34(c). The physical <span class=\"match\">security</span> program would need to meet the <span class=\"match\">security</span> requirements in part 70. For radiological sabotage, because these events could disrupt the performance of the design of reactors licensed under proposed part 57, the applicant would need to perform an <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> against the threat of radiological sabotage. The purpose of this <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> would be to evaluate the design against <span class=\"match\">security</span> events derived"},{"title":"Order No. 918; Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standard CIP-003-11-Cyber Security-Security Management Controls","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves the proposed Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standard CIP-003-11 (Cyber Security--Security Management Controls). The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission- certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted the proposed Reliability Standard to mitigate risks posed by a coordinated cyberattack on low-impact facilities, the aggregate impact of which could be much greater.","document_number":"2026-05711","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/24/2026-05711/order-no-918-critical-infrastructure-protection-reliability-standard-cip-003-11-cyber","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-24/pdf/2026-05711.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-05711.pdf?1774269913","publication_date":"2026-03-24","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","id":167,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-energy-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/167","parent_id":136,"slug":"federal-energy-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"several focus areas that directly affect low impact BES Cyber Systems, including <span class=\"match\">risks</span> <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with remote and third-party access, shared and cloud-managed infrastructure, lateral movement pathways, and the maturity of detection capabilities.\n 57 \n \n The CIP Roadmap emphasizes that low impact BES Cyber Systems may present increased system <span class=\"match\">risk</span> when leveraged as part of coordinated attacks and recommends that these <span class=\"match\">risks</span> be addressed through the prioritized, <span class=\"match\">risk</span>-based evolution of CIP Reliability Standards and supporting guidance, rather than"},{"title":"Enhanced Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS)","type":"Rule","abstract":"To address ongoing aviation security threats, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is amending its regulations pertaining to the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) program to require the transmission of additional data elements. The ACAS program enhances the security of flights carrying cargo into the United States by requiring the transmission of certain air cargo data and performing targeted risk assessments based on the transmitted data prior to an aircraft's departure for the United States. These risk assessments identify and prevent high-risk air cargo from being loaded onto an aircraft that could pose a risk to an aircraft during flight.","document_number":"2025-20606","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/21/2025-20606/enhanced-air-cargo-advance-screening-acas","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-21/pdf/2025-20606.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-20606.pdf?1763646322","publication_date":"2025-11-21","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"U.S. Customs and Border Protection","name":"U.S. Customs and Border Protection","id":501,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/u-s-customs-and-border-protection","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/501","parent_id":227,"slug":"u-s-customs-and-border-protection"}],"excerpts":"to the <span class=\"match\">security</span> programs are considered Sensitive <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Information (SSI),\n 9 \n \n and are made available to carriers as necessary. Alternatively, carriers may request TSA approval to follow National Cargo <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Program (NCSP) recognition procedures in lieu of TSA <span class=\"match\">security</span> program requirements.\n 10 \n \n When the <span class=\"match\">security</span> environment or operational factors necessitate the modification of a <span class=\"match\">security</span> program, TSA or an air carrier may initiate a <span class=\"match\">security</span> program amendment.\n 11 \n \n TSA also has the regulatory authority to issue <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Directives"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"review, mitigation, or monitoring for national <span class=\"match\">security</span> or law enforcement <span class=\"match\">risk</span>.” The Committee further articulates that foreign adversary-affiliated entities that own or operate SLTE pursuant to an IRU or similar legal agreement, may effectively operate a submarine cable system that thereby “allow[s] an adversary to intercept or misroute U.S. persons' communications and sensitive data transiting the cable, posing a serious counterintelligence <span class=\"match\">risk</span>.” These concerns pose significant national <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span> that would justify requiring SLTE owners or"},{"title":"System Safety Assessments","type":"Rule","abstract":"The FAA is amending certain airworthiness regulations to standardize the criteria for conducting safety assessments for systems, including flight controls and powerplants, installed on transport category airplanes. With this action, the FAA seeks to reduce risk associated with airplane accidents and incidents that have occurred in service, and reduce risk associated with new technology in flight control systems. The intended effect of this rulemaking is to improve aviation safety by making system safety assessment (SSA) certification requirements more comprehensive and consistent.","document_number":"2024-18511","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/27/2024-18511/system-safety-assessments","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-08-27/pdf/2024-18511.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-18511.pdf?1724676312","publication_date":"2024-08-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Aviation Administration","name":"Federal Aviation Administration","id":159,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-aviation-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/159","parent_id":492,"slug":"federal-aviation-administration"}],"excerpts":"of § 25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2) with the latent failure assumed, in the applicant's <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">assessment</span>, to have already occurred, or where the applicant took no credit in that <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> for the latency period. The FAA agrees to add this exclusion to § 25.1309(b)(4) \n \n because it meets the decision criteria that the specific <span class=\"match\">risk</span> of concern will be evaluated as per the 2010 ARAC ASAWG specific <span class=\"match\">risk</span> tasking report.\n 25 \n \n When a latent failure or the specific <span class=\"match\">risk</span> of concern is assumed as having occurred, its probability becomes 1 in the calculation"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"specific findings that the transactions pose a national <span class=\"match\">security</span> or law enforcement <span class=\"match\">risk</span>, given that the customers in such transactions typically do not have the ability to exert influence or control over the cable.” Other commenters, however, address national <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span> <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with submarine cables in the current threat environment. FDD states that “Beijing has also repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use <span class=\"match\">security</span> gaps within U.S. critical infrastructure” and “[t]hese <span class=\"match\">risks</span> are heightened by private firms' use of remote network management"},{"title":"Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standards","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to direct the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, to develop and submit for Commission approval new or modified Reliability Standards that address the: sufficiency of responsible entities' supply chain risk management plans related to the identification of, assessment of, and response to supply chain risks, and applicability of Reliability Standards' supply chain protections to protected cyber assets.","document_number":"2024-22230","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/01/2024-22230/supply-chain-risk-management-reliability-standards","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-01/pdf/2024-22230.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-22230.pdf?1727700322","publication_date":"2024-10-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","id":167,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-energy-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/167","parent_id":136,"slug":"federal-energy-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"development <span class=\"match\">project</span> was to revise “CIP-013-2 to have complete and accurate <span class=\"match\">assessments</span> of supply chain <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span> that reflect actual threat(s) posed to the entity” and “provide triggers on when the supply chain <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">assessment</span>(s) must be performed (\n i.e., \n planning for procurement, procurement, and installation) and require a response to <span class=\"match\">risks</span> identified.” \n 38 \n \n Specifically, the draft SAR <span class=\"match\">project</span> scope was to revise Reliability Standard CIP-013-2 to require entities to: (1) create specific triggers to activate the supply chain <span class=\"match\">risk</span> assessment(s);"},{"title":"Assessments Thresholds, Rate Schedules, and Adjustments","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) invites public comment on a proposed rule that would amend the assessment regulations in 12 CFR part 327 to: update the $10 billion asset threshold in the definitions of small and large institutions to $30 billion and adjust the threshold every four years to reflect inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined indexing methodology; decrease initial base deposit insurance assessment rate schedules by 2 basis points for small institutions and by 1 basis point for large and highly complex institutions; provide a downward resolution readiness adjustment to assessment rates for large and highly complex institutions, including 0.5 basis points for passing virtual data room testing and 0.5 basis points for providing prescribed data access; and remove obsolete provisions.","document_number":"2026-13192","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/30/2026-13192/assessments-thresholds-rate-schedules-and-adjustments","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-30/pdf/2026-13192.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13192.pdf?1782737120","publication_date":"2026-06-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION","name":"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation","id":164,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-deposit-insurance-corporation","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/164","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-deposit-insurance-corporation"}],"excerpts":"years, and if so, why? \n \n III. Proposed Revisions to <span class=\"match\">Assessment</span> Rates \n A. Background \n 1. Deposit Insurance <span class=\"match\">Assessment</span> Rates \n \n Pursuant to section 7 of the FDI Act, the FDIC has established a <span class=\"match\">risk</span>-based <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> system through which it charges all IDIs an <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> amount for deposit insurance.\n 46 \n \n Under the FDIC's <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> regulations, an IDI's <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> amount is equal to its <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> base multiplied by its <span class=\"match\">risk</span>-based <span class=\"match\">assessment</span> rate.\n 47 \n \n The FDIC is authorized to set <span class=\"match\">assessments</span> for IDIs in such amounts as the FDIC may determine"},{"title":"Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital and Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are proposing to modify certain aspects of the regulatory capital rule (the proposal). The proposal would revise the risk-based capital treatment of certain exposure categories under the standardized approach, focusing on improving the calibration and risk sensitivity of risk weights that are particularly material to covered banking organizations' lending activities. The proposal would also modify the definition of regulatory capital by removing the threshold- based deduction for mortgage servicing assets for all banking organizations subject to the regulatory capital rule, including banking organizations subject to the community bank leverage ratio framework. In addition, the proposal would require Category III and IV banking organizations to recognize most elements of accumulated other comprehensive income in their regulatory capital. The agencies are concurrently publishing a separate proposal, which would require Category I and II banking organizations to use a new framework to calculate risk-weighted assets, called the expanded risk-based approach and would allow other banking organizations to elect to use the expanded risk-based approach.","document_number":"2026-05960","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-05960/regulatory-capital-rules-regulatory-capital-and-standardized-approach-for-risk-weighted-assets","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-27/pdf/2026-05960.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-05960.pdf?1774529110","publication_date":"2026-03-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY","name":"Treasury Department","id":497,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/treasury-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/497","parent_id":null,"slug":"treasury-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Comptroller of the Currency","name":"Comptroller of the Currency","id":80,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/comptroller-of-the-currency","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/80","parent_id":497,"slug":"comptroller-of-the-currency"},{"raw_name":"FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM","name":"Federal Reserve System","id":188,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-reserve-system","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/188","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-reserve-system"},{"raw_name":"FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION","name":"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation","id":164,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-deposit-insurance-corporation","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/164","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-deposit-insurance-corporation"}],"excerpts":"and operational <span class=\"match\">risk</span>—and a revised market <span class=\"match\">risk</span> framework. Notably, the expanded <span class=\"match\">risk</span>-based proposal would allow banking organizations of any size to elect to use the expanded <span class=\"match\">risk</span>-based approach to determine requirements for credit <span class=\"match\">risk</span>, equity <span class=\"match\">risk</span>, and operational <span class=\"match\">risk</span> in place of the standardized approach.\n 7 \n \n \n \n \n 6 \n  Banking organizations with significant trading activities that are not Category I or II banking organizations would apply (1) the market <span class=\"match\">risk</span> framework under the expanded <span class=\"match\">risk</span>-based proposal and (2) the standardized approach"},{"title":"Regulatory Capital Rule (Regulation Q): Risk-Based Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies; Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15)","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) is inviting public comment on a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the Board's rule that identifies and establishes risk-based capital surcharges for U.S. global systemically important bank holding companies (GSIBs). The proposal would also amend the Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15), which is the source of inputs to the implementation of the GSIB framework under the capital rule. The proposal would make several changes to better align surcharges with risk. First, it would modify certain coefficients used to calculate GSIB surcharges under method 2 of the GSIB surcharge framework to reflect changes in the financial system and the economy and provide for annual adjustments for real economic growth and inflation going forward. Second, the proposal would modify the measurement and weighting of the weighted short-term wholesale funding systemic indicator. Third, for certain systemic indicators currently measured as of a single date each year, the proposal would require measurement based on average values to reduce the effects of temporary changes to indicator values around measurement dates. Fourth, the proposal would reduce cliff effects and enhance the sensitivity of the surcharge to changes in a GSIB's systemic risk profile. Fifth, to improve risk capture, the proposal would also make improvements to the measurement of some systemic indicators used in the GSIB surcharge framework and the framework for determining prudential standards for large banking organizations. In addition to these changes, the proposal would make several amendments to the FR Y-15 to improve the consistency of data reporting and streamline the reporting process.","document_number":"2026-05961","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-05961/regulatory-capital-rule-regulation-q-risk-based-capital-surcharges-for-global-systemically-important","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-27/pdf/2026-05961.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-05961.pdf?1774529110","publication_date":"2026-03-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM","name":"Federal Reserve System","id":188,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-reserve-system","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/188","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-reserve-system"}],"excerpts":"fixed income <span class=\"match\">securities</span> includes money market instruments, certificates of deposit, bills, bonds, and other fixed income <span class=\"match\">securities</span>, such as commercial paper, corporate bonds, syndicated corporate loans, covered bonds, convertible debt, and securitized products.\n 80 \n \n This indicator includes <span class=\"match\">securities</span> issued by public sector entities (as defined in 12 CFR 217.2) as well as <span class=\"match\">securities</span> issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored agencies, multilateral development banks, and state and local governments, but does not include <span class=\"match\">securities</span> issued by a"},{"title":"Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records","type":"Notice","abstract":"As required by the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars A-108 and A-130, the Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) is publishing notice of a newly established Privacy Act system of records. DOE proposes to establish System of Records DOE-85 Research, Technology, and Economic Security (RTES) Due Diligence Review Records as part of the Department's implementation of Government-wide and Departmental RTES requirements included in National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33), the CHIPS and Science Act, and other laws or Executive orders related to research security. Records in this system are maintained and used by the Department to track and monitor research, technology, and economic security risk assessments associated with the projects for which the Department receives applications, proposals, and submissions for research, development, deployment, demonstrations, commercialization, and scientific activities, and Departmental laboratories and facilities performing such activities, as well as certain high-risk non-scientific and non-research and development activities and for projects DOE otherwise is or is considering supporting.","document_number":"2024-20376","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/10/2024-20376/privacy-act-of-1974-system-of-records","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-09-10/pdf/2024-20376.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-20376.pdf?1725885933","publication_date":"2024-09-10","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"}],"excerpts":"DOE-85 Research, Technology, and Economic <span class=\"match\">Security</span> (RTES) Due Diligence Review Records as part of the Department's implementation of Government-wide and Departmental RTES requirements included in National <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33), the CHIPS and Science Act, and other laws or Executive orders related to research <span class=\"match\">security</span>. Records in this system are maintained and used by the Department to track and monitor research, technology, and economic <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">assessments</span> <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with the <span class=\"match\">projects</span> for which the Department receives applications"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.","document_number":"2025-03718","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/13/2025-03718/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-13/pdf/2025-03718.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03718.pdf?1741783507","publication_date":"2025-03-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"FOIA.\n \n \n 6. Regulatory Compliance Certifications \n \n 85. Given concerns about ensuring the <span class=\"match\">security</span> and integrity of this critical infrastructure, the Commission proposes new certifications to protect against national <span class=\"match\">security</span>, law enforcement, and other <span class=\"match\">risks</span>. The Commission tentatively \n \n concludes that such requirements would help mitigate national <span class=\"match\">security</span>, economic <span class=\"match\">security</span>, law enforcement, and other concerns <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with threats to the <span class=\"match\">security</span> of submarine cable infrastructure. The Commission also expects that requiring applicants to"},{"title":"Notice of Issuance of the Department of the Army Program Comment for Army Warfighting Readiness and Associated Infrastructure","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation has issued a program comment for the U.S. Department of the Army that sets forth how the Army may comply with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act on Army installations for its warfighting readiness activities and associated infrastructure, including: training, testing, equipping, and industrial activities and management actions on associated infrastructure.","document_number":"2026-08674","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/05/2026-08674/notice-of-issuance-of-the-department-of-the-army-program-comment-for-army-warfighting-readiness-and","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-05/pdf/2026-08674.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08674.pdf?1777898746","publication_date":"2026-05-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION","name":"Advisory Council on Historic Preservation","id":225,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/advisory-council-on-historic-preservation","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/225","parent_id":null,"slug":"advisory-council-on-historic-preservation"}],"excerpts":"operate in lieu of 36 CFR 800.3-800.7, meaning program comment procedures replace the <span class=\"match\">project</span>-by-<span class=\"match\">project</span> review procedures in the regulation. A benefit of program comments is that they allow a federal agency to comply with Section 106 in a tailored, consistent way for an agency-wide category of undertakings rather than addressing each undertaking individually through <span class=\"match\">project</span>-by-<span class=\"match\">project</span> review. Program comments enable a federal agency's headquarters to establish a broader, more holistic agency-wide approach to Section 106 compliance than is possible at"},{"title":"Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is proposing to impose cyber risk management (CRM) requirements on certain pipeline and rail owner/operators and a more limited requirement, on certain over-the-road bus (OTRB) owner/operators, to report cybersecurity incidents. With the proposed addition of requirements applicable to pipeline facilities and systems, TSA is also proposing that a requirement to have a Physical Security Coordinator and report significant physical security concerns be extended to the same facilities and systems. Finally, TSA is proposing clarifications and reorganization of other regulatory requirements necessitated by these changes.","document_number":"2024-24704","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/07/2024-24704/enhancing-surface-cyber-risk-management","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-07/pdf/2024-24704.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24704.pdf?1730900722","publication_date":"2024-11-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Transportation Security Administration","name":"Transportation Security Administration","id":494,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-security-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/494","parent_id":227,"slug":"transportation-security-administration"}],"excerpts":"the inclusion of IT and OT systems for purposes of vulnerability <span class=\"match\">assessments</span> and <span class=\"match\">security</span> planning. \n See \n TSA-2016-0002-0013, available at \n https://www.regulations.gov \n under Docket No. TSA-2016-0002. This commenter indicated that, at the time of the comment, the Rail Information <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Committee of the Association of American Railroads focuses on cybersecurity and the “industry's physical and cyber <span class=\"match\">security</span> committees annually conduct <span class=\"match\">risk</span> <span class=\"match\">assessments</span> using “relevant <span class=\"match\">security</span> information” from a variety of resources. As part of this effort"},{"title":"Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors","type":"Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations by adding a risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive regulatory framework for commercial nuclear plants in response to the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA). The current application and licensing requirements were primarily developed to address license requests concerning light water- cooled reactors and operational requirements for those types of reactors. This final rule responds to NEIMA by creating an alternative, technology-inclusive regulatory framework to accommodate licensing of future commercial nuclear plants, including advanced reactor designs that may not employ light-water technology.","document_number":"2026-06048","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/30/2026-06048/risk-informed-technology-inclusive-regulatory-framework-for-advanced-reactors","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-30/pdf/2026-06048.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06048.pdf?1774615514","publication_date":"2026-03-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metric or set of metrics and <span class=\"match\">associated</span> <span class=\"match\">risk</span> performance objectives against which calculated values of the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metrics are compared. The comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metrics or set of metrics and <span class=\"match\">associated</span> <span class=\"match\">risk</span> performance objectives support a performance-based approach to developing an appropriate combination of design features and programmatic controls to prevent or mitigate LBEs other than DBAs. The applicant must propose the comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metric or set of metrics and <span class=\"match\">associated</span> <span class=\"match\">risk</span> performance objectives, and the comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metric"},{"title":"Tanker Security Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule implements the Tanker Security Program (TSP) and makes certain changes to the TSP interim final rule (IFR) published in the Federal Register on December 7, 2022, in response to public comments received on the IFR, feedback from stakeholders, and MARAD's own experience during initial program administration. The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to establish TSP, comprised of a fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately owned product tank vessels of the United States. The TSP Fleet is intended to meet national defense and other security requirements and maintain a United States presence in international commercial shipping. TSP supports the United States maritime industries and workforce to promote national security and economic resilience.","document_number":"2026-12547","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/23/2026-12547/tanker-security-program","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-23/pdf/2026-12547.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-12547.pdf?1782132312","publication_date":"2026-06-23","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Maritime Administration","name":"Maritime Administration","id":282,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/maritime-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/282","parent_id":492,"slug":"maritime-administration"}],"excerpts":"The report's summary found a substantial <span class=\"match\">risk</span> to the Nation's defense <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with a heavy reliance on foreign-flagged tankers, particularly within a contested environment. The location, timing, and specific missions <span class=\"match\">associated</span> with some tanker requirements dictate the need for U.S.-flagged assets, for which there are currently insufficient numbers available. The report's gap analysis found a clear and critical need for a tanker <span class=\"match\">security</span> program to increase U.S.-flagged tanker capacity, to reduce the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> of reliance on foreign-flagged tankers"},{"title":"Concept Release on Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Disclosures and Enhancements to Asset-Backed Securities Registration","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Securities and Exchange Commission (\"Commission\") is publishing this concept release to solicit comments on whether to amend the asset-level disclosure requirements for residential mortgage-backed securities in Item 1125 of Regulation AB and whether to revise generally the definition of \"asset-backed security\" and/or other definitions in Item 1101 of Regulation AB. The Commission is considering these steps to expand issuer and investor access to the registered asset-backed securities markets and facilitate enhanced capital formation and liquidity while maintaining appropriate investor protections.","document_number":"2025-19152","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/01/2025-19152/concept-release-on-residential-mortgage-backed-securities-disclosures-and-enhancements-to","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-01/pdf/2025-19152.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19152.pdf?1759236316","publication_date":"2025-10-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION","name":"Securities and Exchange Commission","id":466,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/securities-and-exchange-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/466","parent_id":null,"slug":"securities-and-exchange-commission"}],"excerpts":"92% of single-family mortgage-related <span class=\"match\">securities</span> issuances in 2024 were conducted by the Agencies while 8% were private-label <span class=\"match\">securities</span> issuances).\n \n \n \n \n 28 \n  <span class=\"match\">Securities</span> issued or guaranteed by the Agencies are, like government <span class=\"match\">securities</span>, exempt from the registration and reporting requirements of the <span class=\"match\">Securities</span> Act and the Exchange Act. \n See \n 12 U.S.C. 1455(g) and 1723c. They are, however, subject to other regulatory reporting requirements.\n \n \n \n \n 29 \n  \n See \n Diana Knyazeva, \n Asset-Backed <span class=\"match\">Securities</span> Markets: Issuance and Structure \n (Apr"},{"title":"Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Anthracite Coal","type":"Notice","abstract":"On June 29, 2026, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of anthracite coal. This investigation has been initiated under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (Section 232). Interested parties are invited to submit written comments, data, analyses, or other information pertinent to the investigation to the Department of Commerce's (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security. This notice identifies issues on which the Department is especially interested in obtaining the public's views.","document_number":"2026-13663","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/07/2026-13663/notice-of-request-for-public-comments-on-section-232-national-security-investigation-of-anthracite","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-07/pdf/2026-13663.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13663.pdf?1783005309","publication_date":"2026-07-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"of the \n \n National <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Industrial Base Regulations (15 CFR parts 700 to 709) (NSIBR). Interested parties are invited to submit written comments, data, analyses, or information pertinent to this investigation to BIS's Office of Strategic Industries and Economic <span class=\"match\">Security</span> no later than July 21, 2026. The Department is particularly interested in comments and information directed at the criteria listed in §  705.4 of the regulations as they affect national <span class=\"match\">security</span>, including the following:\n \n (i) the current and <span class=\"match\">projected</span> demand for anthracite"},{"title":"Critical Infrastructure Protection Reliability Standard CIP-015-1-Cyber Security-Internal Network Security Monitoring","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves proposed Reliability Standard CIP-015-1 (Cyber Security--Internal Network Security Monitoring), which the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), submitted in response to a Commission directive. In addition, the Commission directs NERC to develop certain modifications to proposed Reliability Standard CIP-015-1 to extend internal network security monitoring to include electronic access control or monitoring systems and physical access control systems outside of the electronic security perimeter. The Commission also provides greater clarity about the term CIP-networked environment as it is used in proposed Reliability Standard CIP-015-1.","document_number":"2025-12309","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/02/2025-12309/critical-infrastructure-protection-reliability-standard-cip-015-1-cyber-security-internal-network","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-07-02/pdf/2025-12309.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-12309.pdf?1751373912","publication_date":"2025-07-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","id":167,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-energy-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/167","parent_id":136,"slug":"federal-energy-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"and PACS that have the greatest impact on grid <span class=\"match\">security</span>.” \n 74 \n \n Trade Associations assert that “not all EACMS and PACS are high <span class=\"match\">risk</span>” and continue that revisions to CIP Reliability Standards should be “<span class=\"match\">risk</span> based and outcome oriented.” \n 75 \n \n According to Trade Associations, EACMS and PACS that perform (or rely on) access control functions pose a higher <span class=\"match\">risk</span>, while those that perform a monitoring function such as a <span class=\"match\">security</span> information and event management solution presents a lower reliability <span class=\"match\">risk</span>. Consequently, Trade Associations aver that any"}]}