{"description":"Documents matching 'security risk undermine integrity personal'","count":1887,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+risk+undermine+integrity+personal&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Request for Information Regarding Security Considerations for Artificial Intelligence Agents","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), housed within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) at the Department of Commerce, is seeking information and insights from stakeholders on practices and methodologies for measuring and improving the secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) agent systems. AI agent systems are capable of taking autonomous actions that impact real-world systems or environments, and may be susceptible to hijacking, backdoor attacks, and other exploits. If left unchecked, these security risks may impact public safety, undermine consumer confidence, and curb adoption of the latest AI innovations. We encourage respondents to provide concrete examples, best practices, case studies, and actionable recommendations based on their experience developing and deploying AI agent systems and managing and anticipating their attendant risks. Responses may inform CAISI's work evaluating the security risks associated with various AI capabilities, assessing security vulnerabilities of AI systems, developing evaluation and assessment measurements and methods, generating technical guidelines and best practices to measure and improve the security of AI systems, and other activities related to the security of AI agent systems.","document_number":"2026-00206","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/08/2026-00206/request-for-information-regarding-security-considerations-for-artificial-intelligence-agents","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-08/pdf/2026-00206.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-00206.pdf?1767793519","publication_date":"2026-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology","name":"National Institute of Standards and Technology","id":352,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/national-institute-of-standards-and-technology","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/352","parent_id":54,"slug":"national-institute-of-standards-and-technology"}],"excerpts":"exploits. If left unchecked, these <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span> may impact public safety, <span class=\"match\">undermine</span> consumer confidence, and curb adoption of the latest AI innovations. We encourage respondents to provide concrete examples, best practices, case studies, and actionable recommendations based on their experience developing and deploying AI agent systems and managing and anticipating their attendant <span class=\"match\">risks</span>. Responses may inform CAISI's work evaluating the <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span> associated with various AI capabilities, assessing <span class=\"match\">security</span> vulnerabilities of AI systems, developing"},{"title":"Pipeline Safety: Clarifying Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Integrity Management Guidance","type":"Rule","abstract":"This DFR makes corrections and clarifications to certain guidance for implementing an integrity management program on hazardous liquid and carbon dioxide pipelines.","document_number":"2026-08074","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/24/2026-08074/pipeline-safety-clarifying-hazardous-liquid-pipeline-integrity-management-guidance","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-24/pdf/2026-08074.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08074.pdf?1776948323","publication_date":"2026-04-24","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","name":"Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration","id":408,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/pipeline-and-hazardous-materials-safety-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/408","parent_id":492,"slug":"pipeline-and-hazardous-materials-safety-administration"}],"excerpts":"potential impacts of a release on an area; \n (2) <span class=\"match\">Risk</span> factors an operator can use to determine an <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> assessment schedule; \n (3) Safety <span class=\"match\">risk</span> indicator tables for leak history, volume or line size, age of pipeline, and product transported, an operator may use to determine if a pipeline segment falls into a high, medium, or low <span class=\"match\">risk</span> category; \n (4) Types of internal inspection tools an operator could use to find pipeline anomalies; \n (5) Measures an operator could use to measure an <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> management program's performance; \n (6) Types of records"},{"title":"Restoring Integrity to the Issuance of Non-Domiciled Commercial Drivers Licenses (CDL)","type":"Rule","abstract":"FMCSA amends the Federal regulations for State Driver's Licensing Agencies (SDLAs) issuing commercial driving credentials to foreign-domiciled individuals. Through this interim final rule (IFR), FMCSA restores the integrity of the commercial driver's license (CDL) issuance processes by significantly limiting the authority for SDLAs to issue and renew non-domiciled commercial learner's permits (CLPs) and CDLs to individuals domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction. This change strengthens the security of the CDL issuance process and enhances the safety of commercial motor vehicle (CMV) operations.","document_number":"2025-18869","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/29/2025-18869/restoring-integrity-to-the-issuance-of-non-domiciled-commercial-drivers-licenses-cdl","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-29/pdf/2025-18869.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-18869.pdf?1758890719","publication_date":"2025-09-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration","name":"Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration","id":181,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-motor-carrier-safety-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/181","parent_id":492,"slug":"federal-motor-carrier-safety-administration"}],"excerpts":"individuals whose driving history exists predominantly or solely within a foreign jurisdiction. Without a verified driving record, there is a serious <span class=\"match\">risk</span> that unsafe or high-<span class=\"match\">risk</span> drivers—who may have prior violations, suspensions, or a history of crashes in foreign jurisdictions—could be granted non-domiciled CLPs and CDLs and operate large trucks and buses on U.S. roadways. This <span class=\"match\">undermines</span> the <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> and safety of the CLP and CDL issuance process. Though there is a need to handle the issuance processes differently (due to the lack of authority"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"equipment—have been entrusted, to be vigilant and to promote the <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> of the FCC's authorization procedures to help protect our nation's supply chain against such unacceptable <span class=\"match\">risk</span>. In light of these responsibilities and ongoing <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span>, the Commission strengthens its oversight of TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies by adopting new rules that will help ensure the <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> of these entities for purposes of the FCC's equipment authorization program, promote national <span class=\"match\">security</span>, and advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"State and the Secretary of Commerce: (a) Has engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the United States or <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety of United States persons; and (b) Poses a significant <span class=\"match\">risk</span> of exploiting government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive <span class=\"match\">personal</span> data to the detriment of the national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the United States or <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety of U.S. persons.” Furthermore, the rules listed “countries of concern” as China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela, identical"},{"title":"Restoring Integrity to the Issuance of Non-Domiciled Commercial Drivers Licenses (CDL)","type":"Rule","abstract":"FMCSA amends the Federal regulations for State Driver's Licensing Agencies (SDLAs) issuing commercial driving credentials to non-domiciled individuals. This final rule reaffirms, with minor changes, the provisions of the interim final rule (IFR) published on September 29, 2025. Specifically, this final rule limits eligibility for non-domiciled Commercial Learner's Permits (CLPs) and Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDLs) for foreign-domiciled individuals to those who hold specific, verifiable employment-based nonimmigrant status. This rule reaffirms the IFR requirements, aligning the issuance of non- domiciled CDLs with FMCSA's statutory mandate to ensure the fitness of all drivers who operate a CMV. By limiting eligibility to statuses subject to enhanced consular vetting of driver history and interagency screening, FMCSA restores the integrity of the CDL system, closes a significant safety gap, and enhances the safety of the traveling public.","document_number":"2026-02965","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/13/2026-02965/restoring-integrity-to-the-issuance-of-non-domiciled-commercial-drivers-licenses-cdl","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-13/pdf/2026-02965.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-02965.pdf?1770844509","publication_date":"2026-02-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration","name":"Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration","id":181,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-motor-carrier-safety-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/181","parent_id":492,"slug":"federal-motor-carrier-safety-administration"}],"excerpts":"transportation industry in their report, \n Predicting Truck Crash Involvement. \n Repeated multiple times since 2005, the top five stable predictors of crash <span class=\"match\">risk</span> include reckless driving violations and past crashes.\n 7 \n \n Similarly, the \n Commercial Driver Safety <span class=\"match\">Risk</span> Factors \n study found that prior moving violations in the last three years were associated with increased crash and moving violation <span class=\"match\">risk</span>.\n 8 \n \n Finally, an FMCSA commissioned literature review, \n Driver Issues: Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Literature Review, \n concluded that drivers"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Additionally, several commenters urged the Commission to address physical <span class=\"match\">risks</span>. Most notably, the Committee “additionally propose[d] applicants to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented comprehensive <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management plans, consistent with industry best practices, for the cable systems that would also include supply chain <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management and physical <span class=\"match\">security</span>.” Therefore, we require the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management plans have measures to address physical <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span> as well.\n \n 106. Beyond those baseline requirements, applicants and licensees"},{"title":"William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Secretary establishes new regulations on the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program in the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program under 34 CFR 685.219 by adding or clarifying provisions to exclude employers that engage in specific enumerated illegal activities such that they have a substantial illegal purpose, including defining obligations and processes tied to making such a determination of an employer, clarifying that borrowers will receive full credit for work performed, until the effective date of the Secretary's determination that an employer is no longer a qualifying employer under the rule; and establishing methods for an employer to regain eligibility following a determination of ineligibility by the Secretary. These regulations ensure that taxpayer dollars are not misused by preventing PSLF benefits from going to individuals employed by organizations that have a substantial illegal purpose. The revisions strengthen accountability, enhance program integrity, and protect hardworking taxpayers from shouldering the cost of improper subsidies granted to employees of organizations that undermine national security and American values through criminal activity.","document_number":"2025-19729","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/31/2025-19729/william-d-ford-federal-direct-loan-direct-loan-program","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-31/pdf/2025-19729.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19729.pdf?1761828307","publication_date":"2025-10-31","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION","name":"Education Department","id":126,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/education-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/126","parent_id":null,"slug":"education-department"}],"excerpts":"are not misused by preventing PSLF benefits from going to individuals employed by organizations that have a substantial illegal purpose. The revisions strengthen accountability, enhance program <span class=\"match\">integrity</span>, and protect hardworking taxpayers from shouldering the cost of improper subsidies granted to employees of organizations that <span class=\"match\">undermine</span> national <span class=\"match\">security</span> and American values through criminal activity. \n \n \n DATES: \n \n These regulations are effective July 1, 2026. For the implementation dates of the regulatory provisions, see the Implementation Date"},{"title":"Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Mitigating Risks Related to Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (DFARS Case 2021-D011)","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"DoD is proposing to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to implement sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021 to mitigate risks related to beneficial ownership or foreign ownership, control, or influence. This proposed rule also implements elements of a DoD policy.","document_number":"2026-09067","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/07/2026-09067/defense-federal-acquisition-regulation-supplement-mitigating-risks-related-to-foreign-ownership","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-07/pdf/2026-09067.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09067.pdf?1778071527","publication_date":"2026-05-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Defense Acquisition Regulations System","name":"Defense Acquisition Regulations System","id":97,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-acquisition-regulations-system","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/97","parent_id":103,"slug":"defense-acquisition-regulations-system"}],"excerpts":"Counterintelligence and <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Agency (DCSA) review the Standard Form (SF) 328, Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests, and supporting documents to include the contact information for each of its foreign owners that is a beneficial owner in the National Industrial <span class=\"match\">Security</span> System, available at \n https://niss.dcsa.mil. \n \n (2) If the requiring activity determines, based on input from DCSA, that FOCI or beneficial ownership poses a <span class=\"match\">risk</span> or potential <span class=\"match\">risk</span> of compromise to national <span class=\"match\">security</span> that may be mitigated, the Offeror shall— \n (i) Agree to the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> mitigation"},{"title":"Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Fuel System Integrity of Hydrogen Vehicles; Compressed Hydrogen Storage System Integrity; Incorporation by Reference","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule establishes two new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) specifying performance requirements for all motor vehicles that use hydrogen as a fuel source. The final rule is based on Global Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 13, Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicles. FMVSS No. 307, \"Fuel system integrity of hydrogen vehicles,\" specifies requirements for the integrity of the fuel system in hydrogen vehicles during normal vehicle operations and after crashes. FMVSS No. 308, \"Compressed hydrogen storage system integrity,\" specifies requirements for the compressed hydrogen storage system to ensure the safe storage of hydrogen onboard vehicles. These two standards will reduce deaths and injuries from fires due to hydrogen fuel leakages and/or explosion of the hydrogen storage system.","document_number":"2024-31367","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/17/2024-31367/federal-motor-vehicle-safety-standards-fuel-system-integrity-of-hydrogen-vehicles-compressed","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-17/pdf/2024-31367.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31367.pdf?1737035114","publication_date":"2025-01-17","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION","name":"Transportation Department","id":492,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/492","parent_id":null,"slug":"transportation-department"},{"raw_name":"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration","name":"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration","id":345,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/national-highway-traffic-safety-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/345","parent_id":492,"slug":"national-highway-traffic-safety-administration"}],"excerpts":"similar to other motor fuels. NHTSA has already set regulations ensuring the safe containment of other motor vehicle fuels such as gasoline in FMVSS No. 301, “Fuel system <span class=\"match\">integrity</span>,” and compressed natural gas (CNG) in FMVSS No. 304, “Compressed natural gas fuel container <span class=\"match\">integrity</span>,” and the fuel <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> systems of those fuels in FMVSS No. 301 and FMVSS No. 303, “Fuel system <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> of compressed natural gas vehicles,” respectively. No such standards currently exist in the United States covering vehicles that operate on hydrogen. Accordingly, this"},{"title":"Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice is issuing a final rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-31486","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-08/pdf/2024-31486.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-31486.pdf?1735911918","publication_date":"2025-01-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"government-related data or Americans' bulk U.S. sensitive <span class=\"match\">personal</span> data through commercial data-brokerage transactions. The rule also imposes <span class=\"match\">security</span> requirements on other kinds of commercial transactions, such as investment, employment, and vendor agreements, that involve government-related data or Americans' bulk U.S. sensitive <span class=\"match\">personal</span> data to mitigate the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> that a country of concern could access such data. The rule addresses <span class=\"match\">risks</span> to government-related data or Americans' bulk U.S. sensitive <span class=\"match\">personal</span> data that current authorities leave vulnerable to"},{"title":"Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is proposing to impose cyber risk management (CRM) requirements on certain pipeline and rail owner/operators and a more limited requirement, on certain over-the-road bus (OTRB) owner/operators, to report cybersecurity incidents. With the proposed addition of requirements applicable to pipeline facilities and systems, TSA is also proposing that a requirement to have a Physical Security Coordinator and report significant physical security concerns be extended to the same facilities and systems. Finally, TSA is proposing clarifications and reorganization of other regulatory requirements necessitated by these changes.","document_number":"2024-24704","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/07/2024-24704/enhancing-surface-cyber-risk-management","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-07/pdf/2024-24704.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24704.pdf?1730900722","publication_date":"2024-11-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Transportation Security Administration","name":"Transportation Security Administration","id":494,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/transportation-security-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/494","parent_id":227,"slug":"transportation-security-administration"}],"excerpts":"authority includes assessing <span class=\"match\">security</span> <span class=\"match\">risks</span>,\n 62 \n \n developing <span class=\"match\">security</span> measures to address identified <span class=\"match\">risks</span>,\n 63 \n \n and enforcing compliance with these measures.\n 64 \n \n TSA has broad regulatory authority to issue, rescind, and revise regulations as necessary to carry out its transportation <span class=\"match\">security</span> functions.\n \n \n \n 61 \n  Public Law 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001). ATSA created TSA as a component of the DOT. \n See \n 49 U.S.C. 114, which codified section 101 of ATSA. Section 403(2) of the Homeland <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Act of 2002 (HSA), Public Law"},{"title":"Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors","type":"Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations by adding a risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive regulatory framework for commercial nuclear plants in response to the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA). The current application and licensing requirements were primarily developed to address license requests concerning light water- cooled reactors and operational requirements for those types of reactors. This final rule responds to NEIMA by creating an alternative, technology-inclusive regulatory framework to accommodate licensing of future commercial nuclear plants, including advanced reactor designs that may not employ light-water technology.","document_number":"2026-06048","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/30/2026-06048/risk-informed-technology-inclusive-regulatory-framework-for-advanced-reactors","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-30/pdf/2026-06048.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-06048.pdf?1774615514","publication_date":"2026-03-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metric or set of metrics and associated <span class=\"match\">risk</span> performance objectives against which calculated values of the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metrics are compared. The comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metrics or set of metrics and associated <span class=\"match\">risk</span> performance objectives support a performance-based approach to developing an appropriate combination of design features and programmatic controls to prevent or mitigate LBEs other than DBAs. The applicant must propose the comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metric or set of metrics and associated <span class=\"match\">risk</span> performance objectives, and the comprehensive <span class=\"match\">risk</span> metric"},{"title":"Required Rulemaking on Personal Financial Data Rights","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is issuing a final rule to carry out the personal financial data rights established by the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA). The final rule requires banks, credit unions, and other financial service providers to make consumers' data available upon request to consumers and authorized third parties in a secure and reliable manner; defines obligations for third parties accessing consumers' data, including important privacy protections; and promotes fair, open, and inclusive industry standards.","document_number":"2024-25079","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/18/2024-25079/required-rulemaking-on-personal-financial-data-rights","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-11-18/pdf/2024-25079.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-25079.pdf?1731678320","publication_date":"2024-11-18","agencies":[{"raw_name":"Consumer Financial Protection Bureau","name":"Consumer Financial Protection Bureau","id":573,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/consumer-financial-protection-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/573","parent_id":null,"slug":"consumer-financial-protection-bureau"}],"excerpts":"research institute commenters stated that the CFPB and prudential regulators should clarify that <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management for authorized third parties is limited to data <span class=\"match\">security</span> or that the agencies' third party <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management guidance is inapplicable. A data provider and a trade association commenter stated that the FFIEC should identify an accreditation standard for third party information <span class=\"match\">security</span>. One bank commenter stated that the CFPB should provide guidance on <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management for data providers not subject to prudential regulation. Two commenters recommended"},{"title":"Proposed Revisions to the Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk and the Guidelines for Account and Services Requests","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) is issuing a notice and request for comment on proposed revisions to the Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk (PSR Policy), including the proposed addition of a new Part IV, to accommodate the provision by Reserve Banks of special-purpose accounts that would clear and settle certain payment activity (Payment Accounts). The Board is also proposing updates to its guidelines for Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks) to utilize in evaluating requests for access to Reserve Bank account and services (Account Access Guidelines or Guidelines) to accommodate requests for access to Payment Accounts. Finally, the Board is encouraging Reserve Banks to pause decisions on requests for Reserve Bank accounts and services from institutions that are Tier 3 under the Account Access Guidelines until the Board has completed its policy development process on the Payment Account proposal.","document_number":"2026-10375","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/26/2026-10375/proposed-revisions-to-the-federal-reserve-policy-on-payment-system-risk-and-the-guidelines-for","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-26/pdf/2026-10375.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-10375.pdf?1779453911","publication_date":"2026-05-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM","name":"Federal Reserve System","id":188,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-reserve-system","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/188","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-reserve-system"}],"excerpts":"payment access to the Fedwire <span class=\"match\">Securities</span> Service means that a participant may only use the service to make <span class=\"match\">securities</span> transfers that will not result in a debit or credit to a Master Account other than a transaction fee.\n \n \n \n In addition to credit <span class=\"match\">risk</span>, the Account Access Guidelines include an assessment of a wide range of <span class=\"match\">risks</span> to the Reserve Banks that can arise from the provision of an account and services, such as operational and cyber <span class=\"match\">risks</span>. Today, Reserve Banks mitigate cyber and operational <span class=\"match\">risk</span> through strong <span class=\"match\">risk</span> management controls and processes"},{"title":"Provisions Pertaining to Preventing Access to U.S. Sensitive Personal Data and Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern or Covered Persons","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Department of Justice proposes a rule to implement Executive Order 14117 of February 28, 2024 (Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and United States Government- Related Data by Countries of Concern), by prohibiting and restricting certain data transactions with certain countries or persons.","document_number":"2024-24582","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/29/2024-24582/provisions-pertaining-to-preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-29/pdf/2024-24582.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-24582.pdf?1729628118","publication_date":"2024-10-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE","name":"Justice Department","id":268,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/justice-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/268","parent_id":null,"slug":"justice-department"}],"excerpts":"Agreements \n iv. <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Requirements \n v. Due Diligence and Recordkeeping \n vi. Audits \n vii. Licenses \n 4. Need for Regulatory Action \n 5. Baseline (Without the Proposed Rule) \n a. Baseline National <span class=\"match\">Security</span> and Foreign-Policy <span class=\"match\">Risks</span> by Category of Data \n i. Human Genomic and Human `Omic Data \n ii. Biometric Identifiers \n iii. Precise Geolocation Data \n iv. <span class=\"match\">Personal</span> Health Data \n v. <span class=\"match\">Personal</span> Financial Data \n vi. Covered <span class=\"match\">Personal</span> Identifiers \n vii. Government-Related Data \n b. Baseline: Total Potential U.S. Population Affected by <span class=\"match\">Risks</span> \n c. Summary"},{"title":"Suitability and Fitness","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is proposing amendments to the Federal Government personnel vetting adjudicative processes for determining suitability and taking suitability actions. The purpose of the proposed rule is to improve the efficiency, rigor and timeliness by which OPM and agencies vet individuals for risk to the integrity and efficiency of the service, and to make clear that individuals who engage in serious misconduct while employed in Federal service are subject to the same suitability procedures and actions as applicants for employment.","document_number":"2025-10067","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/03/2025-10067/suitability-and-fitness","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-03/pdf/2025-10067.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-10067.pdf?1748868321","publication_date":"2025-06-03","agencies":[{"raw_name":"OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT","name":"Personnel Management Office","id":406,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/personnel-management-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/406","parent_id":null,"slug":"personnel-management-office"}],"excerpts":"individuals for <span class=\"match\">risk</span> to the <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> and efficiency of the service. Permitting OPM to take suitability actions against employees for post-appointment conduct, consistent with the President's direction, will allow for faster removals by the agencies of those employees against whom OPM takes suitability actions, as the suitability actions process is more streamlined for the agencies than the Chapter 75 process. Importantly, more streamlined removals by the agencies of such employees will reduce the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> to the efficiency and <span class=\"match\">integrity</span> of the service"},{"title":"Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Marketplace Integrity and Affordability","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule revises standards relating to denial of coverage for failure to pay past-due premium; excludes Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals recipients from the definition of \"lawfully present;\" establishes the evidentiary standard HHS uses to assess an agent's, broker's, or web-broker's potential noncompliance; revises the Exchange automatic reenrollment hierarchy; revises standards related to the annual open enrollment period and special enrollment periods; revises standards relating to failure to file and reconcile, income eligibility verifications for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions, annual eligibility redeterminations, de minimis thresholds for the actuarial value for plans subject to essential health benefits (EHB) requirements, and income-based cost-sharing reduction plan variations. This final rule also revises the premium adjustment percentage methodology and prohibits issuers of coverage subject to EHB requirements from providing coverage for specified sex-trait modification procedures as an EHB.","document_number":"2025-11606","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/25/2025-11606/patient-protection-and-affordable-care-act-marketplace-integrity-and-affordability","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-25/pdf/2025-11606.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11606.pdf?1750709712","publication_date":"2025-06-25","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES","name":"Health and Human Services Department","id":221,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-and-human-services-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/221","parent_id":null,"slug":"health-and-human-services-department"}],"excerpts":"selection between plans can occur when one plan enrolls a disproportionate number of people with higher <span class=\"match\">risk</span> conditions. The ACA's <span class=\"match\">risk</span> adjustment program transfers funds from issuers with relatively low-<span class=\"match\">risk</span> enrollees to issuers with relatively high-<span class=\"match\">risk</span> enrollees, though implementation of the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> adjustment program has been criticized by some commenters for creating further distortions that limit incentives for issuers to attract lower-<span class=\"match\">risk</span> enrollees.\n 6 \n \n To avoid adverse selection between plans sold on and off the Exchanges, the ACA also requires"},{"title":"Visas: Enhancing Vetting and Combatting Fraud in the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Department of State (\"Department\") is amending regulations governing the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (\"DV Program\") to improve the integrity of, and combat fraud in, the program. These amendments require a petitioner to the DV Program to provide valid, unexpired passport information and to upload a scan of the biographic and signature page in the electronic entry form or to otherwise indicate that he or she is exempt from this requirement. Additionally, the Department is standardizing and amending its regulations to add the word \"shall\" to simplify guidance for consular officers; ensure the use of the term \"sex\" in lieu of \"gender\"; and replace the term \"age\" in the DV Program regulations with the phrase \"date of birth\" to accurately reflect the information collected and maintained by the Department during the immigrant visa process.","document_number":"2026-04737","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/11/2026-04737/visas-enhancing-vetting-and-combatting-fraud-in-the-diversity-immigrant-visa-program","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-11/pdf/2026-04737.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-04737.pdf?1773146710","publication_date":"2026-03-11","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF STATE","name":"State Department","id":476,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/state-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/476","parent_id":null,"slug":"state-department"}],"excerpts":"passport requirement effectively reduces fraudulent entries. \n ii. Benefits \n This rule protects U.S. national <span class=\"match\">security</span> by enabling the Department to confirm a petitioner's identity at the entry stage and deterring fraudulent entries. Requiring a passport scan reduces the <span class=\"match\">risk</span> of fabricated passport numbers and allows adjudicators to compare the applicant's name in his or her native alphabet with its English transliteration. This supports <span class=\"match\">security</span> vetting and ensures accurate identification of transliterations associated with the applicant's name. \n Additionally"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) clarifies that rules prohibiting authorization of covered equipment include modular transmitters and adopts a prohibition on authorization of devices that include modular transmitters that are covered equipment. The Commission also adopts a procedure to limit previously granted authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of such equipment. It further discusses the broad scope of the prohibition on authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List by clarifying the term \"produced by\" as used in the Commission's rules concerning covered equipment and clarifying the prohibition on modification to previously authorized covered equipment.","document_number":"2025-21001","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/25/2025-21001/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-25/pdf/2025-21001.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21001.pdf?1763991936","publication_date":"2025-11-25","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"protect the <span class=\"match\">security</span> of America's communications networks and equipment supply chains, the Commission adopted the Equipment Authorization <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Report and Order, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 21-232 and EA Docket 21-233 (EA <span class=\"match\">Security</span> R&amp;O and FNPRM). In that item, the Commission adopted rules as part of its equipment authorization program to prohibit authorization of communications equipment that has been determined to “pose an unacceptable <span class=\"match\">risk</span> to the national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the United States or the <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety"}]}