{"description":"Documents matching 'security threats domestic telecommunications service'","count":1084,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+threats+domestic+telecommunications+service&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Pub. L. 116-124, 134 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609)) mandates that the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) publish and maintain a list of communications equipment and services (i.e., the Covered List) that have been determined by agencies with national security responsibilities to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of U.S. persons. In this document, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposes to exclude entities identified on the \"Covered List\" from providing domestic interstate telecommunications services pursuant to blanket authority under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. 214). The NPRM also seeks comment on other potential exclusions from blanket authority under section 214 and other related measures.","document_number":"2026-09190","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/08/2026-09190/protecting-against-national-security-threats-in-domestic-telecommunications-service","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-08/pdf/2026-09190.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09190.pdf?1778157919","publication_date":"2026-05-08","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"seeking to provide domestic interstate telecommunications services to submit a foreign adversary control attestation prior to providing service? Should the Commission also consider excluding from blanket domestic section 214 authority any entity that installs any covered communications equipment or service after the adoption of this rule? Would such an exclusion be justified on the basis that such equipment or service has been found to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts measures to strengthen national security and encourage reciprocity in testing and certification. The FCC creates a fast-track priority review process for devices subject to Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs. Also, updates post-market surveillance and enforcement procedures, and establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. Lastly, directs development of a consolidated list of prohibited entities to streamline applicant screening and aligns ownership reporting timelines for publicly traded companies with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.","document_number":"2026-09822","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/15/2026-09822/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-15/pdf/2026-09822.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09822.pdf?1778762728","publication_date":"2026-05-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"strengthen the integrity and security of the Equipment Authorization Program. Building on the foundation established in the \n First EA Integrity Report and Order, \n 90 FR 38045 (August 7, 2025), this action addresses emerging national security risks and supply chain vulnerabilities by refining the Commission's rules governing Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs), test laboratories, and laboratory accreditation bodies.\n \n \n The Commission adopts measures to strengthen national security and incentivize domestic testing and certification, including"},{"title":"Sunshine Act Meeting; Open Commission Meeting Thursday, April 30, 2026","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Commission will consider a Report and Order that would promote efficient spectrum sharing between geostationary and non-geostationary satellite systems. To take account of today's satellite technology and operations and to promote expanded services to American consumers, the item would update the decades-old framework for how non-geostationary and geostationary satellite systems share spectrum. 2.................. Consumer and Title: Advanced Methods to Governmental Affairs. Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls (CG Docket No. 17-59); Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (CG Docket No. 02- 278). Summary: The Commission will consider a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to enhance existing \"Know-Your- Customer\" (KYC) requirements by seeking comment on the information that originating providers must obtain from customers before they make calls, how providers should verify that information, and proposing to better set penalties for violations of these requirements proportionate to harm. This would fill gaps between general KYC requirements and the types of rigorous steps necessary to protect consumers from illegal calls. 3.................. Office of Engineering Title: Promoting the and Technology. Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program (ET Docket No. 24-136). Summary: The Commission will consider a Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking aimed at strengthening national security and reciprocity through the equipment authorization program. The item would incentivize U.S. and allied testing and certification by creating a fast[dash]track review process for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs, direct updates to post[dash]market surveillance procedures, bolster enforcement tools, and establish confidential channels for industry to report potential violations or national security concerns. 4.................. Wireline Competition.. Title: Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service (WC Docket No. 26-82). Summary: The Commission will consider a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would continue its efforts to protect the nation's telecommunications networks by proposing to exclude entities identified on the \"Covered List\" from providing domestic interstate telecommunications services pursuant to blanket authority under section 214 of the Communications Act, and seek comment on other potential exclusions from blanket authority under section 214 and other related measures. 5.................. Wireline Competition.. Title: Promoting Fair and Open Competitive Bidding in the E-Rate Program (WC Docket 21-455); Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism (CC Docket 02-6). Summary: The Commission will consider a Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration that would strengthen the integrity of the E-Rate program by establishing a competitive bidding portal and adopt several proposals aimed at streamlining and simplifying E-Rate program procedures. The portal would be used by applicants and service providers during the procurement process beginning in funding year 2028. 6.................. Media................. Title: Amending the Audible Crawl Rule (MB Docket No. 12-107). Summary: The Commission will consider a Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the Audible Crawl Rule and eliminate a technically unworkable provision while ensuring that people who are visually impaired continue receiving the critical emergency information they need. ------------------------------------------------------------------------","document_number":"2026-08267","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/28/2026-08267/sunshine-act-meeting-open-commission-meeting-thursday-april-30-2026","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-28/pdf/2026-08267.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08267.pdf?1777061706","publication_date":"2026-04-28","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"industry to report potential violations or national security concerns.\n \n \n \n \n 4 \n Wireline Competition \n \n Title: \n Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service (WC Docket No. 26-82).\n \n Summary: \n The Commission will consider a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would continue its efforts to protect the nation's telecommunications networks by proposing to exclude entities identified on the “Covered List” from providing domestic interstate telecommunications services pursuant to blanket authority under section 214"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) aims to further its actions in strengthening prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment and to clarify the rules and enforcement of such. The Commission seeks additional comment on modular transmitters and component parts in relation to covered equipment. The Commission addresses the partial court remand of the decision in its November 2022 EA Security R&O by proposing a definition of \"critical infrastructure\" as used on the Covered List and seeking comment on the implementation of that definition. The Commission also seeks comment on whether any modification to an authorized device by an entity identified on the Covered List should require a new application for certification. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on clarifying the scope of activities that constitute marketing of equipment and on measures to strengthen enforcement of marketing prohibitions.","document_number":"2025-21928","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/04/2025-21928/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-04/pdf/2025-21928.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21928.pdf?1764769515","publication_date":"2025-12-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Commission to publish a list of equipment and services that pose “an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons” based solely on specific determinations made by certain enumerated sources (Covered List). In June 2021, the Commission initiated this proceeding in Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the Equipment Authorization Program; Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain through the"},{"title":"Protecting the Nation's Communications Systems From Cybersecurity Threats","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (\"Commission\" or \"FCC\") announces that it has reconsidered and rescinded a prior Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, neither of which had been published in the Federal Register. The Declaratory Ruling misconstrued the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was based in part on the Declaratory Ruling's flawed legal analysis and proposed ineffective cybersecurity requirements. This Order follows the FCC's engagement with providers to help strengthen their cybersecurity posture.","document_number":"2025-22830","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/15/2025-22830/protecting-the-nations-communications-systems-from-cybersecurity-threats","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-15/pdf/2025-22830.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-22830.pdf?1765547125","publication_date":"2025-12-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"defense . . . .” The Commission's commitment to improving the security of the nation's communications networks remains steadfast, as demonstrated by coordinated efforts and rulemakings to protect the security of our nation's communications networks and infrastructure from potential security threats. \n A. Recent Commission Action To Protect the Nation's Communications Systems \n The Commission has taken a series of recent actions to harden communications networks and improve their security posture. The Commission works closely with federal partner agencies"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) proposes and seeks comment on further measures to safeguard the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program. The Commission seeks comment on whether to extend recently adopted prohibitions to include entities subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary or alternatively apply a presumption-of-prohibition to a larger class of entities. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment on expanding the group of prohibited entities to include several additional lists from federal agencies or statutes and ways it can facilitate and encourage more equipment authorization testing to occur at test labs within the United States or allied countries. Lastly, the Commission encourages further comment on post-market surveillance procedures to ensure compliance to prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment.","document_number":"2025-13308","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/16/2025-13308/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-07-16/pdf/2025-13308.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-13308.pdf?1752583514","publication_date":"2025-07-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"potential national security threats? What could the Commission do to assist this transition and mitigate economic harms? As an alternative to wholesale prohibitions, should the Commission consider other limitations on TCBs and test labs operating in foreign adversary countries to mitigate the potential risks to national security and the integrity of the \n \n equipment authorization program? If so, what sort of mitigation measures would suffice to ensure the integrity of the equipment authorization program against national security risks?\n \n The Commission"},{"title":"Improving Customer Service and Protecting Consumers Through Onshoring","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes actions that would encourage and facilitate the onshoring of foreign call centers. Specifically, the Commission proposes rules and otherwise explore ways to improve customer service communications and better protect consumers' sensitive personal information by limiting use of foreign call centers and by improving standards applicable to a company's remaining foreign call center operations. It also seeks comment on extending these protections to modes of customer service communications other than calls, such as emails, texts, and on-line chats, and on ideas to deter scam and other unlawful calls made to the United States from foreign countries. Finally, it explore steps we can take to financially deter unlawful foreign-originated calls, such as bond requirements. The Commission proposes to apply these requirements to providers of telecommunications services, CMRS, interconnected VoIP service, cable television service, and DBS services, or affiliates of such providers. It also proposes to apply these requirements to the use of foreign call centers for consumer communications relating to internet access service offered by any of the foregoing providers or their affiliates and seeks comment on whether it should extend some or all of the proposed rules to providers of other types of services.","document_number":"2026-07960","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/23/2026-07960/improving-customer-service-and-protecting-consumers-through-onshoring","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-23/pdf/2026-07960.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07960.pdf?1776861922","publication_date":"2026-04-23","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"\n We propose to apply these requirements to providers of telecommunications services, CMRS, interconnected VoIP service, cable television service, and DBS services, or affiliates of such providers. Where we seek comment on applying the proposed rules to providers of other services, the term “providers” includes providers of those services as well. We also propose to apply these requirements to the use of foreign call centers for consumer communications relating to internet access service offered by any of the foregoing providers or their affiliates"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"\n \n b. Cybersecurity and Physical Security Risk Management Plan Certifications \n 103. To protect submarine cable infrastructure from cybersecurity and physical security threats, we require all applicants for an initial cable landing license to certify that they have created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from these threats that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"international section 214 authorizations that are most likely to raise national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns.” The Commission also sought comment on further actions it could take to protect the nation's telecommunications infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by proposing comprehensive changes to the Commission's rules that allow carriers to provide international telecommunications service. The Commission proposed, among other things, to adopt a renewal framework"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies.","document_number":"2025-19657","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19657/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19657.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19657.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Federal Communications Commission, \n List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist \n (last updated June 5, 2025) (\n List of Covered Equipment and Services \n ). An entity is placed on the Covered List based on a determination made by, among others, an appropriate national security agency that the entity's equipment and/or services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons pursuant to the Secure"},{"title":"Modernizing Security Requirements","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency, consistent with Executive Order 14300, \"Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\" The proposed revisions are intended to reduce regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained at NRC-licensed facilities.","document_number":"2026-12989","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/26/2026-12989/modernizing-security-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-26/pdf/2026-12989.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-12989.pdf?1782391523","publication_date":"2026-06-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"innovation, reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, and maintain protection against credible threats.\n \n \n • \n Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. \n The NRC is proposing to revise 10 CFR part 95, “Facility Security Clearance and Safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data,” to remove requirements that are duplicative and to ensure alignment with 32 CFR part 117, “National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).” These changes would provide references to the"},{"title":"Request for Comments on Bolstering Data Center Growth, Resilience, and Security","type":"Notice","abstract":"The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) hereby requests comments on the challenges surrounding data center growth, resilience and security in the United States amidst a surge of computing power demand due to the development of critical and emerging technologies. This request focuses on identifying opportunities for the U.S. government to improve data centers' market development, supply chain resilience, and data security. NTIA will rely on these comments, along with other public engagements on this topic, to draft and issue a public report capturing economic and security policy considerations and policy recommendations for fostering safe, secure, and sustainable data center growth.","document_number":"2024-19524","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/04/2024-19524/request-for-comments-on-bolstering-data-center-growth-resilience-and-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-09-04/pdf/2024-19524.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-19524.pdf?1725367514","publication_date":"2024-09-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"National Telecommunications and Information Administration","name":"National Telecommunications and Information Administration","id":373,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/national-telecommunications-and-information-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/373","parent_id":54,"slug":"national-telecommunications-and-information-administration"}],"excerpts":"like competitive pressure, lack of demand, lack of cybersecurity professionals, or lack of security frameworks or regulations obstacles to improving security? \n \n c. Data center operators and cloud service providers often rely on a shared responsibility model to outline security responsibilities between the customer and the data center or cloud service provider.\n 13 \n \n How could data center operators, cloud service providers or customers improve the shared responsibility model?\n \n \n \n 13 \n \n See \n NIST Special Publication 500-292 “NIST Cloud Computing"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.","document_number":"2025-03718","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/13/2025-03718/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-13/pdf/2025-03718.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03718.pdf?1741783507","publication_date":"2025-03-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"applicant currently markets, offers, and provides services and/or expects to market, offer, and provide services; and (5) identify the general terms and conditions that currently apply and/or will apply to the services, such as contract duration, minimum capacity/bandwidth requirements, IRU requirements, termination clauses, security requirements, delivery or Service Level Agreement (SLA) requirements, dispute resolution, and other applicable provisions. This information might be provided as service tiers, ranges, or other applicable frames of reference"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Unmanned Aircraft Systems","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seeks public comment on issues related to transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,\" and that are integral to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This ANPRM will assist BIS in determining the technologies and market participants that may be appropriate for regulation in order to address undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, including U.S. ICTS supply chains and critical infrastructure, or/and to the security and safety of U.S. persons.","document_number":"2024-30209","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/03/2024-30209/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-unmanned-aircraft","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-03/pdf/2024-30209.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30209.pdf?1735825508","publication_date":"2025-01-03","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"the protection of national security interests by individuals and entities subject to the jurisdiction of China. These laws require network operators and technology companies to assist public security agencies in safeguarding cybersecurity and providing access to data stored within China's borders (see Department of Homeland Security, \n Data Security Business Advisory \n (July 11, 2022), \n https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_1222_data-security-business-advisory.pdf \n ). Specifically, the National Security Law of 2015 imposes obligations"},{"title":"Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes to protect the Nation's communications networks against foreign adversary threats by proposing to expand foreign ownership disclosure requirements for covered Commission-issued licenses and authorizations. The proposed certification and information collection requirements would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically, the Commission proposes to apply new certification and disclosure requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, as the Commission currently does. Furthermore, the Commission proposes to go beyond foreign ownership to also cover all regulated entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.","document_number":"2025-11360","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/06/20/2025-11360/protecting-our-communications-networks-by-promoting-transparency-regarding-foreign-adversary-control","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-06-20/pdf/2025-11360.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-11360.pdf?1750250720","publication_date":"2025-06-20","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Related Services. \n This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in providing computing infrastructure, data processing services, Web hosting services (except software publishing), and related services, including streaming support services (except streaming distribution services). Cloud storage services, computer data storage services, computing platform infrastructure provision Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), optical scanning services, Platform as a service (PaaS), and video and audio technical streaming support services are included"},{"title":"Numbering Policies for Modern Communications","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes rules regarding direct access to numbers by providers of interconnected Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) services. The Commission takes this action in furtherance of Congress' directive in the Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act to examine ways to reduce access to telephone numbers by potential perpetrators of illegal robocalls. These proposals aim to safeguard U.S. numbering resources and consumers, protect national security interests, promote public safety, and ensure compliance with other important Commission rules.","document_number":"2026-02858","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/12/2026-02858/numbering-policies-for-modern-communications","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-12/pdf/2026-02858.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-02858.pdf?1770817516","publication_date":"2026-02-12","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"firms \n \n \n Wired Telecommunications Carriers \n 517111 \n 1,500 employees \n 3,403 \n 3,027 \n 88.95 \n \n \n Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) \n 517112 \n 1,500 employees \n 1,184 \n 1,081 \n 91.30 \n \n \n Telecommunications Resellers \n 517121 \n 1,500 employees \n 955 \n 847 \n 88.69 \n \n \n Satellite Telecommunications \n 517410 \n $44 million \n 332 \n 195 \n 58.73 \n \n \n All Other Telecommunications \n 517810 \n $40 million \n 1,673 \n 1,007 \n 60.19 \n \n \n \n Table 2—Telecommunications Service Provider Data \n \n \n 2024 Universal service monitoring report"},{"title":"Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Certain Semiconductor Products and Services","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"OFPP, DoD, GSA, and NASA (collectively referred to as the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, or FAR Council) are proposing to amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to partially implement a section of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 which prohibits executive agencies from procuring or obtaining certain products and services that include covered semiconductor products or services effective December 23, 2027.","document_number":"2026-03065","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/17/2026-03065/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-certain-semiconductor-products-and-services","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-17/pdf/2026-03065.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-03065.pdf?1770990325","publication_date":"2026-02-17","agencies":[{"raw_name":"OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET","name":"Management and Budget Office","id":280,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/management-and-budget-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/280","parent_id":null,"slug":"management-and-budget-office"},{"raw_name":"Office of Federal Procurement Policy","name":"Federal Procurement Policy Office","id":184,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-procurement-policy-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/184","parent_id":280,"slug":"federal-procurement-policy-office"},{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION","name":"General Services Administration","id":210,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/general-services-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/210","parent_id":null,"slug":"general-services-administration"},{"raw_name":"NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION","name":"National Aeronautics and Space Administration","id":301,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/national-aeronautics-and-space-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/301","parent_id":null,"slug":"national-aeronautics-and-space-administration"}],"excerpts":"products, and commercial IT services and telecommunication services (\n i.e., \n services in Category D: Information Technology (IT) and Telecommunications (Telecom) of the Federal Procurement Data System Product and Service Codes (PSC) Manual) from the requirements of Section 5949 of the NDAA for FY 2023. As such, this rule would apply to acquisitions for commercial products and commercial IT services and commercial telecommunication services. With regards to subcontracts for commercial products and commercial services, the FAR Council intends to"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule, published by the Department of Commerce's (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), sets forth regulations and procedures to address undue or unacceptable risks to national security and U.S. persons posed by classes of transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of certain foreign adversaries and that are integral to connected vehicles as defined herein.","document_number":"2025-00592","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00592/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-16/pdf/2025-00592.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00592.pdf?1736862326","publication_date":"2025-01-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"to support national security efforts—which are more broadly defined in the PRC than in the United States—or military agents upon request. The PRC pursues its broad national security and geopolitical objectives through the creation of backdoors and security vulnerabilities in products sold abroad, and, in many cases, the PRC prohibits companies from disclosing that such a request was made. \n See \n U.S. Department of Homeland Security, \n Data Security Business Advisory: Risks and Considerations for Businesses Using Data Services and Equipment from"},{"title":"Incarcerated People's Communication Services; Implementation of the Martha Wright-Reed Act; Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) modifies the Commission's previous incarcerated people's communications services (IPCS) rate caps in response to record evidence of the significant unintended consequences of those rate caps. It establishes new interim audio and video IPCS rate caps by basing the calculation of the Commission's rate caps only on billed minutes, incorporating all safety and security measure expenses that IPCS providers reported incurring, and creating an additional rate cap tier for extremely small jails. It also creates a separate interim rate additive to ensure recovery of correctional facilities' costs of administering IPCS. Additionally, it sets a new compliance date for providers' compliance with the new rules and clarifies that the rate cap, site commission, and per-minute pricing rules from the Commission's 2021 Order will no longer apply following that date.","document_number":"2025-22125","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/05/2025-22125/incarcerated-peoples-communication-services-implementation-of-the-martha-wright-reed-act-rates-for","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-05/pdf/2025-22125.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-22125.pdf?1764855936","publication_date":"2025-12-05","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"follows: Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) compliance measures; law enforcement support services; communication security services; communication recording services; call monitoring services; voice biometrics services; and other safety and security measures. This approach applies the used and useful framework to an imperfect record and therefore best ensures that all used and useful costs from safety and security measures necessary to the provision of IPCS will be accounted for in the governing interim rate caps pending the"},{"title":"Unleashing American Drone Dominance","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) seeks comment on additional means by which the Commission can continue to fulfill its public interest mandate and achieve American drone dominance. The Commission's Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology seek input on an array of reforms the Commission might take to unleash American drone dominance, including: alleviating unnecessary regulatory burdens; ensuring that American drone manufacturers and users have sufficient spectrum for drone testing and operations; facilitating and encouraging American firms' investment in drone capabilities, infrastructure development, and innovative and advanced capabilities; ensuring regulatory clarity and technical access for United States- based manufacturers and trusted suppliers; coordinating more effectively with other federal agencies; streamlining the Commission's experimental licensing rules; and establishing additional dedicated drone innovation zones or testbeds in partnership with other entities.","document_number":"2026-07381","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/16/2026-07381/unleashing-american-drone-dominance","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-16/pdf/2026-07381.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07381.pdf?1776257115","publication_date":"2026-04-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Late last year, the FCC received a specific determination from an interagency body with appropriate national security expertise that found, among other things, that UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons and should be included on the FCC's Covered List, unless the DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination that certain such UAS and UAS critical components do not pose such risks"}]}