{"description":"Documents matching 'security while adversaries rapidly exporting'","count":102,"total_pages":6,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=security+while+adversaries+rapidly+exporting&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Report and Order that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Report and Order adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The Report and Order adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The Report and Order also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the Report and Order adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.","document_number":"2025-19658","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/27/2025-19658/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-10-27/pdf/2025-19658.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19658.pdf?1761309905","publication_date":"2025-10-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"or services. \n 1. Foreign <span class=\"match\">Adversary</span> Definition \n \n 18. \n Foreign <span class=\"match\">Adversary</span>. \n We define “foreign <span class=\"match\">adversary</span>” consistent with the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.2, which defines “foreign <span class=\"match\">adversary</span>” as “any foreign government or foreign non-government person determined by the Secretary to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the United States or <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety of United States persons.”\n \n 19. In identifying foreign <span class=\"match\">adversaries</span> for the purposes of implementing"},{"title":"Modernizing Security Requirements","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to modernize security and fitness-for-duty requirements to enhance efficiency, consistent with Executive Order 14300, \"Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.\" The proposed revisions are intended to reduce regulatory burden, where appropriate, while continuing to provide reasonable assurance that safety and security will be adequately maintained at NRC-licensed facilities.","document_number":"2026-12989","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/26/2026-12989/modernizing-security-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-26/pdf/2026-12989.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-12989.pdf?1782391523","publication_date":"2026-06-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"Facility <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Clearance and Safeguarding of National <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Information and Restricted Data. \n The NRC is proposing to revise 10 CFR part 95, “Facility <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Clearance and Safeguarding of National <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Information and Restricted Data,” to remove requirements that are duplicative and to ensure alignment with 32 CFR part 117, “National Industrial <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).” These changes would provide references to the applicable provisions of 32 CFR part 117 for implementation of the National Industrial <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Program"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Unmanned Aircraft Systems","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seeks public comment on issues related to transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,\" and that are integral to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This ANPRM will assist BIS in determining the technologies and market participants that may be appropriate for regulation in order to address undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, including U.S. ICTS supply chains and critical infrastructure, or/and to the security and safety of U.S. persons.","document_number":"2024-30209","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/03/2024-30209/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-unmanned-aircraft","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-03/pdf/2024-30209.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30209.pdf?1735825508","publication_date":"2025-01-03","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"that ICTS transactions involving foreign <span class=\"match\">adversaries</span> might present to U.S. national <span class=\"match\">security</span> and to the <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety of U.S. persons. Therefore, this ANPRM, which is being issued pursuant to the authorities granted to the Secretary under E.O. 13873, seeks public comment on potential ways to address undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national <span class=\"match\">security</span>, including U.S. ICTS supply chains and critical infrastructure, -and to the <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety of U.S. persons that may arise from foreign <span class=\"match\">adversary</span> ICTS integral to UAS. As part of BIS's efforts"},{"title":"Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security","type":"Presidential Document","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-09796","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/29/2025-09796/deploying-advanced-nuclear-reactor-technologies-for-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-05-29/pdf/2025-09796.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-09796.pdf?1748436327","publication_date":"2025-05-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT","name":"Executive Office of the President","id":538,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/executive-office-of-the-president","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/538","parent_id":null,"slug":"executive-office-of-the-president"}],"excerpts":"necessary to meet the Nation's urgent national <span class=\"match\">security</span> requirements, <span class=\"match\">while</span> our <span class=\"match\">adversaries</span> are <span class=\"match\">rapidly</span> <span class=\"match\">exporting</span> and deploying such technology around the world. \n The Federal Government must utilize its full authority to accelerate the secure and responsible development, demonstration, deployment, and <span class=\"match\">export</span> of United States designed advanced nuclear technologies to bolster readiness and enhance American technological superiority. Additionally, the United States must further enhance our ability to <span class=\"match\">export</span> our nuclear technology to our allies and commercial"},{"title":"Controls on Certain Laboratory Equipment and Related Technology To Address Dual Use Concerns About Biotechnology","type":"Rule","abstract":"With this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to address the accelerating development and deployment of advanced biotechnology tools contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. This rule institutes new controls on certain biotechnology equipment and related technology. It further solicits public comments on the changes it implements.","document_number":"2025-00723","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00723/controls-on-certain-laboratory-equipment-and-related-technology-to-address-dual-use-concerns-about","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-16/pdf/2025-00723.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00723.pdf?1736948728","publication_date":"2025-01-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"those destinations. \n Finally, to better track the <span class=\"match\">export</span> of the items in ECCN 3A069, this IFR revises the filing requirements for Electronic <span class=\"match\">Export</span> Information (EEI) filings in the Automated <span class=\"match\">Export</span> System (AES). Under new paragraph (b)(11) of § 758.1, EEI filings are required for <span class=\"match\">exports</span> of all items in ECCN 3A069 when destined for a Country Group D destination. \n Savings Clause \n For the changes being made in this final rule, shipments of items removed from eligibility for a License Exception or <span class=\"match\">export</span>, reexport, or transfer (in-country) without a"},{"title":"Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other Reactors With Comparable Risk Profiles","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to establish a risk-informed and performance- based regulatory framework for rapid licensing of new microreactors and other reactors with comparable risk profiles and for high-volume deployment of these reactors. The proposed rule would provide a flexible set of licensing pathways, reduce regulatory burden, and ensure that safety and security requirements remain commensurate with the potential hazards posed by these facilities.","document_number":"2026-08550","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/01/2026-08550/licensing-requirements-for-microreactors-and-other-reactors-with-comparable-risk-profiles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-01/pdf/2026-08550.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-08550.pdf?1777553125","publication_date":"2026-05-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION","name":"Nuclear Regulatory Commission","id":383,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/nuclear-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/383","parent_id":null,"slug":"nuclear-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"physical <span class=\"match\">security</span> program, cybersecurity program, information <span class=\"match\">security</span> program, and access authorization program and is equivalent to § 50.34(c). The physical <span class=\"match\">security</span> program would need to meet the <span class=\"match\">security</span> requirements in part 70. For radiological sabotage, because these events could disrupt the performance of the design of reactors licensed under proposed part 57, the applicant would need to perform an assessment against the threat of radiological sabotage. The purpose of this assessment would be to evaluate the design against <span class=\"match\">security</span> events derived"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2026-01127","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/22/2026-01127/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-22/pdf/2026-01127.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-01127.pdf?1769003110","publication_date":"2026-01-22","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"are critical to national <span class=\"match\">security</span>. The system's ability to maintain precise navigation in electronic warfare scenarios makes it a key asset for defensive operations. \n 7. The Tactical Network Rover 2e (TNR2e) is a Type 1 cryptographic radio certified by the National <span class=\"match\">Security</span> Agency (NSA) for securing classified and sensitive communications. As a Type 1 system, it incorporates highly encrypted algorithms and <span class=\"match\">security</span> measures designed to protect national <span class=\"match\">security</span> information form sophisticated cyber threats and <span class=\"match\">adversaries</span>. Due to its sensitive nature"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2026-07237","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/14/2026-07237/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-14/pdf/2026-07237.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07237.pdf?1776084325","publication_date":"2026-04-14","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"and ranging system GPS receiver designed for military operations. The SAASM is a <span class=\"match\">security</span> device controlling the encryption that enables PPS Y-code signals from GPS satellites and resists <span class=\"match\">adversary</span> attempts to spoof GPS signals. The DAGR with SAASM will provide position and location information necessary for ground-based operations. The DAGR provides secure, SAASM-based GPS in a reliable handheld form. It is a military-grade, dual frequency receiver, and has the <span class=\"match\">security</span> hardware necessary to decode encrypted P(Y)-code GPS signals. Imbedded features"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2026-00359","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/12/2026-00359/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-01-12/pdf/2026-00359.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-00359.pdf?1767966315","publication_date":"2026-01-12","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"policy and national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the U.S. by helping to improve the <span class=\"match\">security</span> of a major non-NATO ally that continues to be an important strategic partner in the Middle East. Egypt is the only country in the world, other than the U.S., that produces the M1A1 Abrams. The Egyptian Refurbishment Program will significantly contribute to the flow of M1A1 components and parts from the United States, creating economies of scale and reducing overall unit price of scarce M1A1 parts for the Department of Defense and other U.S. <span class=\"match\">security</span> partners. \n This proposed"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Department of War is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2026-09655","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/14/2026-09655/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-14/pdf/2026-09655.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09655.pdf?1778676322","publication_date":"2026-05-14","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"authenticate friendly interrogation and response signals <span class=\"match\">while</span> preventing <span class=\"match\">adversary</span> spoofing. \n 16. (U) AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loader secure delivery method used to load cryptographic keys to the KIV-78A Cryptographic Applique to enable cryptographic authentication and processing of an identified IFF target. \n 17. (U) The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET. \n 18. (U) If a technologically advanced <span class=\"match\">adversary</span> were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software"},{"title":"Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion","type":"Rule","abstract":"With this interim final rule, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) revises the Export Administration Regulations' (EAR) controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs) and adds a new control on artificial intelligence (AI) model weights for certain advanced closed-weight dual-use AI models. In conjunction with the expansion of these controls, which BIS has determined are necessary to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, BIS is adding new license exceptions and updating the Data Center Validated End User authorization to facilitate the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of advanced computing (ICs) to end users in destinations that do not raise national security or foreign policy concerns. Together, these changes will cultivate secure ecosystems for the responsible diffusion and use of AI and advanced computing ICs.","document_number":"2025-00636","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-15/pdf/2025-00636.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00636.pdf?1736775933","publication_date":"2025-01-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"has been prepared.\n \n \n List of Subjects \n \n Administrative practice and procedure, <span class=\"match\">Exports</span>, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. \n \n Administrative practice and procedure, <span class=\"match\">Exports</span>, Inventions and patents, Research, Science and technology. \n \n Administrative practice and procedure, <span class=\"match\">Exports</span>, Reporting and recordkeeping. \n \n <span class=\"match\">Exports</span>, Terrorism. \n \n <span class=\"match\">Exports</span>, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Terrorism. \n \n Administrative practice and procedure, <span class=\"match\">Exports</span>, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Terrorism. \n \n Administrative practice and"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The Department of War (DoW) is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2026-10950","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/06/01/2026-10950/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-06-01/pdf/2026-10950.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-10950.pdf?1780058732","publication_date":"2026-06-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"services; systems integration and checkout; transportation; field office support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.5 billion. \n This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national <span class=\"match\">security</span> objectives of the United States by improving the <span class=\"match\">security</span> of a major non-NATO ally that has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. \n The proposed sale will improve Kuwait's capability to meet current and future threats by providing advanced air defense"},{"title":"Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"The Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\" or \"Commission\") takes another important step to protect the Nation's submarine cable infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by undertaking the first major comprehensive review of the Commission's submarine cable rules since 2001. This review seeks to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. Among other things, the Commission proposes to adopt a three-year periodic reporting requirement for submarine cable landing licenses; in the alternative, the Commission seeks comment on shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting. The Commission also proposes or seeks comment on codifying the Commission's legal jurisdiction and other legal requirements in its rules to provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Additionally, the Commission proposes and seeks comment on appropriate applicant and application requirements to account for the evolution of technologies and facilities and changes in the national security landscape over the last two decades and to ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, use of a submarine cable system, and other things, which are critical to the Commission's review to assess potential national security risks and other important public interest factors. Further, the Commission seeks comment on improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other Federal agencies. Through these proposals, the Commission seeks to ensure that the Commission is exercising appropriate oversight of submarine cables to safeguard U.S. communications networks.","document_number":"2025-03718","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/13/2025-03718/review-of-submarine-cable-landing-license-rules-and-procedures-to-assess-evolving-national-security","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-03-13/pdf/2025-03718.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03718.pdf?1741783507","publication_date":"2025-03-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"organization in, a “foreign <span class=\"match\">adversary</span>” country, as defined in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4; (2) have a licensee with a place of organization in a “foreign <span class=\"match\">adversary</span>” country; or (3) land in a “foreign <span class=\"match\">adversary</span>” country.\n 43 \n \n \n \n \n 43 \n  15 CFR 7.4 (stating “[t]he Secretary has determined that the following foreign governments or foreign non-government persons have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the \n \n United States or <span class=\"match\">security</span> and safety of United"},{"title":"Expansion of Validated End User Authorization: Data Center Validated End User Authorization","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this rule, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the Validated End User Authorization (VEU) program to include VEU Authorization for data centers located in specified destinations (\"Data Center VEU\" or \"Data Center VEU Authorization\"). This expansion of the VEU program to include Data Center VEU is intended to facilitate quick and reliable export or reexport of items on the Commerce Control List necessary for a data center, including advanced computing items, to preapproved trusted end users. Data Center VEU adopts much of the framework of the existing VEU program, with additional requirements. This expansion of eligibility is intended to update the VEU program to recognize the advancement and benefits of artificial intelligence. As under the original VEU Authorization Program, the U.S. government will rigorously review Data Center VEU candidates' applications subject to detailed and verifiable criteria.","document_number":"2024-22587","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/02/2024-22587/expansion-of-validated-end-user-authorization-data-center-validated-end-user-authorization","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-02/pdf/2024-22587.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-22587.pdf?1727700348","publication_date":"2024-10-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"on October 2, 2024. \n \n \n FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: \n \n Chair, End-User Review Committee, Office of the Assistant Secretary for <span class=\"match\">Export</span> Administration, Bureau of Industry and <span class=\"match\">Security</span>, Department of Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-5991, Email: \n ERC@bis.doc.gov. \n \n \n \n \n SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: \n Background \n \n In this rule, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and <span class=\"match\">Security</span> (BIS), amends the <span class=\"match\">Export</span> \n \n Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR 730-774) to expand the Validated End-User (VEU) program in 15 CFR 748.15 to enable VEU Authorization"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2026-02059","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/02/2026-02059/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-02/pdf/2026-02059.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-02059.pdf?1769780733","publication_date":"2026-02-02","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"advanced <span class=\"match\">adversary</span> were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities. \n \n 10. A determination has been made that Canada can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national <span class=\"match\">security</span> objectives"},{"title":"Unleashing American Drone Dominance","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) seeks comment on additional means by which the Commission can continue to fulfill its public interest mandate and achieve American drone dominance. The Commission's Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and Office of Engineering and Technology seek input on an array of reforms the Commission might take to unleash American drone dominance, including: alleviating unnecessary regulatory burdens; ensuring that American drone manufacturers and users have sufficient spectrum for drone testing and operations; facilitating and encouraging American firms' investment in drone capabilities, infrastructure development, and innovative and advanced capabilities; ensuring regulatory clarity and technical access for United States- based manufacturers and trusted suppliers; coordinating more effectively with other federal agencies; streamlining the Commission's experimental licensing rules; and establishing additional dedicated drone innovation zones or testbeds in partnership with other entities.","document_number":"2026-07381","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/04/16/2026-07381/unleashing-american-drone-dominance","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-04-16/pdf/2026-07381.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-07381.pdf?1776257115","publication_date":"2026-04-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Late last year, the FCC received a specific determination from an interagency body with appropriate national <span class=\"match\">security</span> expertise that found, among other things, that UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national <span class=\"match\">security</span> of the United States and to the safety and <span class=\"match\">security</span> of U.S. persons and should be included on the FCC's Covered List, unless the DoW or the Department of Homeland <span class=\"match\">Security</span> (DHS) makes a specific determination that certain such UAS and UAS critical components do not pose such risks"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2024-25115","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/29/2024-25115/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-29/pdf/2024-25115.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-25115.pdf?1730119531","publication_date":"2024-10-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"collateral damage against point targets. The ER GMLRS maintains the accuracy and effectiveness demonstrated by the baseline GMLRS out to a maximum range of 150 km <span class=\"match\">while</span> also including a new Height of Burst (HOB) capability. \n 5. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET. \n 6. If a technologically advanced <span class=\"match\">adversary</span> were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce weapon system"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2024-25117","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/29/2024-25117/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-10-29/pdf/2024-25117.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-25117.pdf?1730119532","publication_date":"2024-10-29","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.5 billion. \n This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national <span class=\"match\">security</span> objectives of the United States by helping to improve the <span class=\"match\">security</span> of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. \n The proposed sale will improve Bulgaria's <span class=\"match\">rapid</span> infantry deployment and force projection capability. Bulgaria will use this enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats"},{"title":"Revision of Firearms License Requirements","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to enhance the control structure for firearms and related items. These changes will better protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, which include countering the diversion and misuse of firearms and related items and advancing human rights. This rule identifies semi-automatic firearms under new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs); adds additional license requirements for Crime Control and Detection (CC) items, thereby resulting in additional restrictions on the availability of license exceptions for most destinations; amends license review policies so that they are more explicit as to the nature of review that will accompany different types of transactions and license exception availability (including adding a new list of high-risk destinations); updates and expands requirements for support documentation submitted with license applications; and better accounts for the import documentation requirements of other countries (such as an import certificate or other permit prior to importation) when firearms and related items are authorized under a BIS license exception. BIS is publishing this rule as an IFR to solicit comments from the public on additional changes to export controls on firearms and related items that would better protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.","document_number":"2024-08813","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/04/30/2024-08813/revision-of-firearms-license-requirements","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-04-30/pdf/2024-08813.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-08813.pdf?1714144516","publication_date":"2024-04-30","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"better track and more readily identify <span class=\"match\">exports</span> of end-item semi-automatic firearms and shotguns and certain related “parts,” “components,” “accessories,” and “attachments” of concern when reviewing the Electronic <span class=\"match\">Export</span> Information (EEI) that exporters file in the Automated <span class=\"match\">Export</span> System (AES). Pursuant to § 758.1(g)(1) and (2), an EEI must specify the ECCN of the <span class=\"match\">exported</span> item. In order to further enhance transparency and the collection and review of <span class=\"match\">export</span> data on these items, this IFR also implements <span class=\"match\">export</span> clearance changes as described below"},{"title":"Arms Sales Notification","type":"Notice","abstract":"The DoD is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification.","document_number":"2024-19129","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/26/2024-19129/arms-sales-notification","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-08-26/pdf/2024-19129.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-19129.pdf?1724417134","publication_date":"2024-08-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"Office of the Secretary"}],"excerpts":"elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $10 billion. \n This proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national <span class=\"match\">security</span> objectives of the United States by improving the <span class=\"match\">security</span> of a NATO Ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. \n The proposed sale will improve Poland's military goals of updating capability <span class=\"match\">while</span> further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies. Poland intends to use these defense articles and services to modernize its armed"}]}