{"description":"Documents matching 'vulnerability supply chains raise potential'","count":1514,"total_pages":50,"next_page_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents?conditions%5Bterm%5D=vulnerability+supply+chains+raise+potential&format=json&page=2","results":[{"title":"Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standards Revisions; Equipment and Services Produced or Provided by Certain Entities Identified as Risks to National Security","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) directs the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, to develop new or modified Reliability Standards that address the sufficiency of responsible entities' supply chain risk management plans related to the identification of and response to supply chain risks. Further, the Commission directs NERC to develop modifications related to supply chain protections for protected cyber assets. This final action also terminates a related notice of inquiry.","document_number":"2025-18394","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/23/2025-18394/supply-chain-risk-management-reliability-standards-revisions-equipment-and-services-produced-or","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-23/pdf/2025-18394.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-18394.pdf?1758545114","publication_date":"2025-09-23","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY","name":"Energy Department","id":136,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/energy-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/136","parent_id":null,"slug":"energy-department"},{"raw_name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","name":"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission","id":167,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-energy-regulatory-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/167","parent_id":136,"slug":"federal-energy-regulatory-commission"}],"excerpts":"of responsible entities' SCRM plans related to the identification of, assessment of, and response to <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> risks and the applicability of Reliability Standards' <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> protections to PCAs. The Commission <span class=\"match\">raised</span> concerns that gaps exist in the SCRM Reliability Standards that may lead to a responsible entity's SCRM plan being insufficient to identify, assess, and respond to <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> risks and protect against the myriad of <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> threats.\n 16 \n \n Further, the Commission explained that the concern with the exclusion of PCAs from"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Unmanned Aircraft Systems","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seeks public comment on issues related to transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,\" and that are integral to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This ANPRM will assist BIS in determining the technologies and market participants that may be appropriate for regulation in order to address undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, including U.S. ICTS supply chains and critical infrastructure, or/and to the security and safety of U.S. persons.","document_number":"2024-30209","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/03/2024-30209/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-unmanned-aircraft","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-03/pdf/2024-30209.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-30209.pdf?1735825508","publication_date":"2025-01-03","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"susceptible to various forms of <span class=\"match\">potential</span> UAS cyber <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> if not properly secured. <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> security for these components may be essential. Compromised network connectivity chips, for example, may introduce backdoors or other malicious functionalities during the manufacturing process, which may be triggered when the UAS is activated. UAS could also be compromised through the corruption and injection of artificial intelligent code during the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> process in order to introduce <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> or functionalities affecting data"},{"title":"Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals","type":"Notice","abstract":"Critical minerals are essential for national security, economic stability, and supply chain resilience because they underpin key industries, drive technological innovation, and support critical infrastructure vital for a modern American economy. The United States is heavily reliant on imports of certain mineral commodities from foreign sources, some of which are at risk of serious, sustained, and long-term supply chain disruptions. The United States' dependence on imports and the vulnerability of supply chains raise the potential for risks to national security, defense readiness, price stability, and economic prosperity and resilience. The Nation possesses vast mineral resources that can create jobs, fuel prosperity, and significantly reduce our reliance on foreign nations, and the United States is taking actions to facilitate domestic mineral production. The List of Critical Minerals guides strategies to secure the Nation's mineral supply chains. By this notice, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), presents the final 2025 List of Critical Minerals and the methodology used to develop the List. Mineral criticality changes over time and therefore this final 2025 List of Critical Minerals is not a permanent list but will be dynamic and updated not less than biannually to reflect current data on supply, demand, and concentration of production, as well as current policy priorities. The final 2025 List of Critical Minerals, which revises the final List published by the Secretary in 2022, includes the following 60 minerals: aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barite, beryllium, bismuth, boron, cerium, cesium, chromium, cobalt, copper, dysprosium, erbium, europium, fluorspar, gadolinium, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, holmium, indium, iridium, lanthanum, lead, lithium, lutetium, magnesium, manganese, metallurgical coal, neodymium, nickel, niobium, palladium, phosphate, platinum, potash, praseodymium, rhenium, rhodium, rubidium, ruthenium, samarium, scandium, silicon, silver, tantalum, tellurium, terbium, thulium, tin, titanium, tungsten, uranium, vanadium, ytterbium, yttrium, zinc, and zirconium.","document_number":"2025-19813","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/07/2025-19813/final-2025-list-of-critical-minerals","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-07/pdf/2025-19813.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-19813.pdf?1762436706","publication_date":"2025-11-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR","name":"Interior Department","id":253,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/interior-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/253","parent_id":null,"slug":"interior-department"},{"raw_name":"Geological Survey","name":"Geological Survey","id":212,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/geological-survey","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/212","parent_id":253,"slug":"geological-survey"}],"excerpts":"for national security, economic stability, and <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> resilience because they underpin key industries, drive technological innovation, and support critical infrastructure vital for a modern American economy. The United States is heavily reliant on imports of certain mineral commodities from foreign sources, some of which are at risk of serious, sustained, and long-term <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> disruptions. The United States' dependence on imports and the <span class=\"match\">vulnerability</span> of <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span> <span class=\"match\">raise</span> the <span class=\"match\">potential</span> for risks to national security, defense readiness"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles","type":"Rule","abstract":"This final rule, published by the Department of Commerce's (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), sets forth regulations and procedures to address undue or unacceptable risks to national security and U.S. persons posed by classes of transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of certain foreign adversaries and that are integral to connected vehicles as defined herein.","document_number":"2025-00592","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00592/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-16/pdf/2025-00592.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00592.pdf?1736862326","publication_date":"2025-01-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"firmware in the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> could also allow foreign adversaries to insert a backdoor, granting them control over the VCS. \n See \n Cybersecurity &amp; Infrastructure Security Agency, \n Defending Against Software <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Attacks, \n at 6 (Apr. 2021), \n https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/defending_against_software_supply_chain_attacks_508.pdf; \n National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Software <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Attacks, (Apr. 2023), \n https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/supplychain/Software-<span class=\"match\">Supply</span>-<span class=\"match\">Chain</span>-Attacks.pdf."},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) aims to further its actions in strengthening prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment and to clarify the rules and enforcement of such. The Commission seeks additional comment on modular transmitters and component parts in relation to covered equipment. The Commission addresses the partial court remand of the decision in its November 2022 EA Security R&O by proposing a definition of \"critical infrastructure\" as used on the Covered List and seeking comment on the implementation of that definition. The Commission also seeks comment on whether any modification to an authorized device by an entity identified on the Covered List should require a new application for certification. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on clarifying the scope of activities that constitute marketing of equipment and on measures to strengthen enforcement of marketing prohibitions.","document_number":"2025-21928","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/04/2025-21928/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-12-04/pdf/2025-21928.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21928.pdf?1764769515","publication_date":"2025-12-04","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Commission's equipment authorization program—is part of the Commission's overall efforts in carrying out its important role in protecting the security of America's equipment <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>, and also is part of the ongoing efforts of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Commission to identify and eliminate <span class=\"match\">potential</span> security <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> in communications networks and <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>. \n In the EA Security R&amp;O and FNPRM, the Commission established several new rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Commission's Covered List"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain","type":"Rule","abstract":"On January 19, 2021, the Department of Commerce (Department) issued an interim final rule establishing procedures for its review of transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary that may pose undue or unacceptable risk to the United States or U.S. persons. In the interim final rule, the Department solicited public comments and committed to promulgating a final rule. This final rule responds to public comments on the interim final rule and finalizes the practices guiding review of ICTS Transactions, amending and, in some cases, removing terms or concepts which experience has shown to be unnecessary, inefficient, or ineffective.","document_number":"2024-28335","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/06/2024-28335/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-06/pdf/2024-28335.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-28335.pdf?1733406319","publication_date":"2024-12-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"}],"excerpts":"exploit <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> and undermine the resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure or the safety and security of U.S. persons. \n To protect U.S. ICTS <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span> from risks posed by malicious foreign actors' ICTS, it is necessary that the scope of transactions covered by this final rule encompass critical and emerging technologies and industries throughout the ICTS <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span>. The risks posed by ICTS Transactions are not always correlated with the transaction's scale and exist regardless of where or when the ICTS enters into the ICTS <span class=\"match\">supply</span> chain"},{"title":"Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) clarifies that rules prohibiting authorization of covered equipment include modular transmitters and adopts a prohibition on authorization of devices that include modular transmitters that are covered equipment. The Commission also adopts a procedure to limit previously granted authorizations of covered equipment to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of such equipment. It further discusses the broad scope of the prohibition on authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List by clarifying the term \"produced by\" as used in the Commission's rules concerning covered equipment and clarifying the prohibition on modification to previously authorized covered equipment.","document_number":"2025-21001","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/25/2025-21001/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-the-communications-supply-chain-through-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-25/pdf/2025-21001.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-21001.pdf?1763991936","publication_date":"2025-11-25","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"Commission's equipment authorization program—is part of the Commission's overall efforts in carrying out its important role in protecting the security of America's equipment <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>, and also is part of the ongoing efforts of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Commission to identify and eliminate <span class=\"match\">potential</span> security <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> in communications networks and <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>. \n In the EA Security R&amp;O and FNPRM, the Commission established several new rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Commission's Covered List"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the Department of Commerce's (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposes a rule to address undue or unacceptable risks to national security and U.S. persons posed by classes of transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of certain foreign adversaries, and which are integral to connected vehicles, as defined herein. BIS is soliciting comment on this proposed rule, which builds on the advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) issued by BIS on March 1, 2024.","document_number":"2024-21903","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/26/2024-21903/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-09-26/pdf/2024-21903.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-21903.pdf?1727205730","publication_date":"2024-09-26","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"connected vehicles, demonstrates the need for regulation to protect U.S. national security. Such regulation will also incentivize greater <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> transparency for not only existing <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span> but also for developing <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>. To facilitate compliance, the rule would include a delayed implementation timeline so that industry can adjust their existing <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span> and plans for future <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>. BIS is not currently proposing specific due diligence requirements. Instead, VCS hardware importers and connected vehicle manufactures are"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"In this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the Department of Commerce's (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) seeks public comment on issues and questions related to transactions involving information and communications technology and services (ICTS) that are designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign countries or foreign non-government persons identified in the Department's regulations, pursuant to the Executive Order (E.O.) entitled \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,\" and that are integral to connected vehicles (CVs), as defined herein. This ANPRM will assist BIS in determining the technologies and market participants that may be most appropriate for regulation pursuant to the E.O.","document_number":"2024-04382","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/03/01/2024-04382/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-vehicles","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-03-01/pdf/2024-04382.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-04382.pdf?1709214331","publication_date":"2024-03-01","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"},{"raw_name":"Bureau of Industry and Security","name":"Industry and Security Bureau","id":241,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/industry-and-security-bureau","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/241","parent_id":54,"slug":"industry-and-security-bureau"}],"excerpts":"Technology and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>, \n 85 FR 29321 (May 14, 2020); \n Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>, \n 86 FR 26339 (May 13, 2021); \n Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>, \n 87 FR 29645 (May 13, 2022); \n Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>, \n 88 FR 30635 (May"},{"title":"Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance","type":"Notice","abstract":"USTR requests written comments regarding potential trade action in connection with the Section 301 investigation of China's targeting of the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. USTR also will convene a public hearing and accept rebuttal comments in relation to the potential action.","document_number":"2025-03134","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/27/2025-03134/proposed-action-in-section-301-investigation-of-chinas-targeting-of-the-maritime-logistics-and","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-27/pdf/2025-03134.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-03134.pdf?1740577508","publication_date":"2025-02-27","agencies":[{"raw_name":"OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE","name":"Trade Representative, Office of United States","id":491,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/trade-representative-office-of-united-states","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/491","parent_id":null,"slug":"trade-representative-office-of-united-states"}],"excerpts":"from dependence and <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> in sectors critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy; and undermining <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> resilience. \n The dominant positions China seeks and increasingly achieves in each sector, give it market power over global <span class=\"match\">supply</span>, pricing, and access. In order to create leverage to obtain the elimination of China's targeting of these sectors for dominance, USTR proposes to take action against certain services of China and also action on a nondiscriminatory basis on certain services, including those <span class=\"match\">supplied</span> using Chinese goods"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts measures to strengthen national security and encourage reciprocity in testing and certification. The FCC creates a fast-track priority review process for devices subject to Pre-Approval Guidance (PAG) for applications tested in Trusted Test Labs. Also, updates post-market surveillance and enforcement procedures, and establishes confidential reporting channels for industry participants to raise concerns about violations or national security threats. Lastly, directs development of a consolidated list of prohibited entities to streamline applicant screening and aligns ownership reporting timelines for publicly traded companies with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requirements.","document_number":"2026-09822","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/15/2026-09822/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-05-15/pdf/2026-09822.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-09822.pdf?1778762728","publication_date":"2026-05-15","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"efforts to strengthen the integrity and security of the Equipment Authorization Program. Building on the foundation established in the \n First EA Integrity Report and Order, \n 90 FR 38045 (August 7, 2025), this action addresses emerging national security risks and <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> by refining the Commission's rules governing Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs), test laboratories, and laboratory accreditation bodies.\n \n \n The Commission adopts measures to strengthen national security and incentivize domestic testing and certification"},{"title":"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain; Connected Software Applications","type":"Rule","abstract":"On November 26, 2021, the Department of Commerce (Department) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to amend Department regulations, \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain,\" to implement provisions of Executive Order 14034, \"Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries\" (E.O. 14034). This final rule responds to, and adopts changes based on, the comments received to the NPRM. Consistent with the factors enumerated in E.O. 14034, the final rule amends the Securing the Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain regulations to provide additional criteria that the Secretary may consider when determining whether ICTS transactions involving connected software applications present undue or unacceptable risks (as those terms are defined in the regulations). The final rule also adds definitions for \"end-point computing devices\" and \"via the internet\" for the purposes of this rule to clarify the definition of connected software applications provided in E.O. 14034.","document_number":"2023-12925","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/16/2023-12925/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-services-supply-chain-connected-software","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-06-16/pdf/2023-12925.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2023-12925.pdf?1686860122","publication_date":"2023-06-16","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE","name":"Commerce Department","id":54,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/commerce-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/54","parent_id":null,"slug":"commerce-department"}],"excerpts":"INFORMATION: \n \n I. Background \n \n On January 19, 2021, the Department published an interim final rule (the <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Rule) to implement Executive Order 13873, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>” (E.O. 13873). The <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Rule established the Department regulations at title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 7, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>” (part 7). These regulations set out procedures by which the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in"},{"title":"Ensuring National Security and Economic Resilience Through Section 232 Actions on Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products","type":"Presidential Document","abstract":null,"document_number":"2025-06836","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/18/2025-06836/ensuring-national-security-and-economic-resilience-through-section-232-actions-on-processed-critical","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-04-18/pdf/2025-06836.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-06836.pdf?1744893926","publication_date":"2025-04-18","agencies":[{"raw_name":"EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT","name":"Executive Office of the President","id":538,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/executive-office-of-the-president","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/538","parent_id":null,"slug":"executive-office-of-the-president"}],"excerpts":"vulnerabilities and market distortions due to reliance on a small number of foreign suppliers. These <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> and distortions have led to significant United States import dependencies. The dependence of the United States on imports and the <span class=\"match\">vulnerability</span> of our <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span> <span class=\"match\">raises</span> the <span class=\"match\">potential</span> for risks to national security, defense readiness, price stability, and economic prosperity and resilience. \n Processed critical minerals and their derivative products are essential for economic security and resilience because they underpin key industries"},{"title":"Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment Added to the Covered List in 2024 or Earlier","type":"Notice","abstract":"In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. Through Public Notice, acting pursuant to Sec. 2.939 of the Federal Communications Commission's rules, PSHSB and OET apply such prohibitions to communications equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier.","document_number":"2026-13518","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/06/2026-13518/prohibiting-importation-and-marketing-of-previously-authorized-covered-communications-equipment","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-07-06/pdf/2026-13518.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-13518.pdf?1782996313","publication_date":"2026-07-06","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"the Covered List and “participants in the ICT ecosystem can effectively serve the U.S. market without this equipment in their networks or these producers in their <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>.” \n We disagree with commenters like NCTA and USTelecom who contend (without specific data to support their arguments) that we should adopt longer and more flexible transition periods to account for <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> considerations, in-transit equipment, existing inventory, and contractual obligations and reject calls for a “phased implementation.” We also disagree with HCC's suggestion"},{"title":"Establishing a 5G Fund for Rural America","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) takes important and necessary steps to implement the 5G Fund for Rural America (5G Fund) to support the build out of advanced, 5G mobile wireless broadband networks for those who live, work, and travel in rural areas. The Commission also in this document resolves the issues raised in the five pending petitions for reconsideration of its 2020 5G Fund Report and Order.","document_number":"2024-23404","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/13/2024-23404/establishing-a-5g-fund-for-rural-america","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-13/pdf/2024-23404.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-23404.pdf?1734011115","publication_date":"2024-12-13","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"be released.\n \n \n 128. \n <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Risk Management. \n Support recipients' <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> risk management plans must incorporate the key practices discussed in NISTIR 8276, Key Practices in Cyber <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Risk Management: Observations from Industry, and related <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> risk management guidance from NIST 800-161, Cybersecurity <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations (2022).\n \n \n 129. The Commission requires winning bidders to submit their cybersecurity risk management and <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> risk management plans to"},{"title":"Cybersecurity in the Marine Transportation System","type":"Rule","abstract":"The Coast Guard is updating its maritime security regulations by establishing minimum cybersecurity requirements for U.S.-flagged vessels, Outer Continental Shelf facilities, and facilities subject to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 regulations. This final rule addresses current and emerging cybersecurity threats in the marine transportation system by adding minimum cybersecurity requirements to help detect risks and respond to and recover from cybersecurity incidents. These include requirements to develop and maintain a Cybersecurity Plan, designate a Cybersecurity Officer, and take various measures to maintain cybersecurity within the marine transportation system. The Coast Guard is also seeking comments on a potential delay for the implementation periods for U.S.-flagged vessels.","document_number":"2025-00708","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/17/2025-00708/cybersecurity-in-the-marine-transportation-system","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-01-17/pdf/2025-00708.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-00708.pdf?1736802922","publication_date":"2025-01-17","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY","name":"Homeland Security Department","id":227,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/homeland-security-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/227","parent_id":null,"slug":"homeland-security-department"},{"raw_name":"Coast Guard","name":"Coast Guard","id":53,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/coast-guard","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/53","parent_id":227,"slug":"coast-guard"}],"excerpts":"to specify measures to manage cybersecurity risks in the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span>. Legitimate third-party contractors and vendors may inadvertently provide a means of attack or vectors that allow malicious actors to exploit <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> within the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span>. Section 1.1 of the NIST CSF emphasizes managing cybersecurity risks in the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> as part of the “Identify” function.\n 81 \n \n \n \n \n 81 \n  NIST CSF, Version 1.1, “ID.SC: <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Risk Management,” \n https://csf.tools/reference/nist-cybersecurity-framework/v1-1/id/id-sc/ \n , accessed August"},{"title":"Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC): Implementation of the Access to Baby Formula Act of 2022 and Related Provisions","type":"Rule","abstract":"This rulemaking serves to amend the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Program regulations by incorporating provisions of the Access to Baby Formula Act of 2022 and making related amendments. ABFA establishes waiver authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to address certain emergencies, disasters, and supply chain disruptions impacting WIC, and adds requirements to State agency infant formula cost containment contracts to protect against disruptions to the Program in the event of a recall. The provisions focus on improving State agencies' ability to ensure continuity of Program operations during emergency periods (i.e., emergencies, disasters, and public health emergencies) and supply chain disruptions, while ensuring access to Program benefits among low-income pregnant and postpartum participants, infants, and children up to 5 years of age who are at nutritional risk.","document_number":"2023-26641","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-26641/special-supplemental-nutrition-program-for-women-infants-and-children-wic-implementation-of-the","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-12-14/pdf/2023-26641.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2023-26641.pdf?1702475114","publication_date":"2023-12-14","agencies":[{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE","name":"Agriculture Department","id":12,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/agriculture-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/12","parent_id":null,"slug":"agriculture-department"},{"raw_name":"Food and Nutrition Service","name":"Food and Nutrition Service","id":200,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/food-and-nutrition-service","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/200","parent_id":12,"slug":"food-and-nutrition-service"}],"excerpts":"defines \n <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> disruption \n as a shortage of WIC supplemental foods that limits WIC participants' ability to reasonably purchase supplemental foods using WIC benefits within a State agency's jurisdiction, as determined, and declared by the Secretary for the purposes of WIC. This definition reflects ABFA statutory language and clarifies that <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> disruption declarations as defined in this rulemaking are specifically for the purposes of WIC and do not impact or extend authority to other programs or entities. <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> disruptions"},{"title":"Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program","type":"Rule","abstract":"In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) requires all recognized telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and to report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The FCC also amends it rules to state that it will not recognize--and will revoke any existing recognition of--any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. The FCC prohibits recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program, not only with regard to the equipment certification process but also the Supplier's Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) process.","document_number":"2025-14970","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/08/07/2025-14970/promoting-the-integrity-and-security-of-telecommunications-certification-bodies-measurement","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-08-07/pdf/2025-14970.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-14970.pdf?1754484348","publication_date":"2025-08-07","agencies":[{"raw_name":"FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION","name":"Federal Communications Commission","id":161,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-communications-commission","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/161","parent_id":null,"slug":"federal-communications-commission"}],"excerpts":"and Services <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span>.” President Trump issued Executive Order 13873 in response to the national emergency caused by the threat of foreign adversaries exploiting <span class=\"match\">vulnerabilities</span> in information and communications technology and services (ICTS). The same concerns that the Department of Commerce's ICTS rules seek to address are also a key component of the Commission's equipment authorization program; namely, the equipment authorization program seeks to ensure the Commission protects the U.S. communications networks and the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> from equipment"},{"title":"Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Certain Semiconductor Products and Services","type":"Proposed Rule","abstract":"OFPP, DoD, GSA, and NASA (collectively referred to as the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, or FAR Council) are proposing to amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to partially implement a section of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 which prohibits executive agencies from procuring or obtaining certain products and services that include covered semiconductor products or services effective December 23, 2027.","document_number":"2026-03065","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/17/2026-03065/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-certain-semiconductor-products-and-services","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-17/pdf/2026-03065.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-03065.pdf?1770990325","publication_date":"2026-02-17","agencies":[{"raw_name":"OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET","name":"Management and Budget Office","id":280,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/management-and-budget-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/280","parent_id":null,"slug":"management-and-budget-office"},{"raw_name":"Office of Federal Procurement Policy","name":"Federal Procurement Policy Office","id":184,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-procurement-policy-office","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/184","parent_id":280,"slug":"federal-procurement-policy-office"},{"raw_name":"DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE","name":"Defense Department","id":103,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/defense-department","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/103","parent_id":null,"slug":"defense-department"},{"raw_name":"GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION","name":"General Services Administration","id":210,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/general-services-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/210","parent_id":null,"slug":"general-services-administration"},{"raw_name":"NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION","name":"National Aeronautics and Space Administration","id":301,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/national-aeronautics-and-space-administration","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/301","parent_id":null,"slug":"national-aeronautics-and-space-administration"}],"excerpts":"specialized nature, and the economic benefits of geographic manufacturing clusters, which <span class=\"match\">raises</span> the risk of unintentional <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> disruptions. The impact of unintentional disruptions to the semiconductor <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> demonstrates the <span class=\"match\">vulnerability</span> of the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> that is furthered by the risk of malicious disruption to the semiconductor <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span>. The 100-Day <span class=\"match\">Supply</span> <span class=\"match\">Chain</span> Review emphasized how the nature of the semiconductor <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span> increases the risk for malicious disruptions to semiconductors. The report on the Department of Commerce's"},{"title":"Clean Water Act Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category","type":"Rule","abstract":"The United States Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA or Agency) is withdrawing the proposed rule entitled \"Clean Water Act Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category,\" which published in the Federal Register on January 23, 2024. After considering public comments on the proposed rule, the EPA has decided not to finalize revised technology- based effluent limitations guidelines (ELGs) or pretreatment standards for the Meat and Poultry Products (MPP) industry, based on exercise of its statutory discretion and judgment that such revisions would not be appropriate.","document_number":"2025-16868","html_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/03/2025-16868/clean-water-act-effluent-limitations-guidelines-and-standards-for-the-meat-and-poultry-products","pdf_url":"https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-09-03/pdf/2025-16868.pdf","public_inspection_pdf_url":"https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-16868.pdf?1756817115","publication_date":"2025-09-03","agencies":[{"raw_name":"ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY","name":"Environmental Protection Agency","id":145,"url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/environmental-protection-agency","json_url":"https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/agencies/145","parent_id":null,"slug":"environmental-protection-agency"}],"excerpts":"loss of over 10 million individual servings of beef in a single day. Similarly, under established <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chains</span>, closure of a single meat or poultry processing facility can severely disrupt the <span class=\"match\">supply</span> of protein to an entire grocery store <span class=\"match\">chain</span>.” The tenet of this executive order—that the operation of meat and poultry processing facilities is essential to the secure domestic food <span class=\"match\">supply</span> <span class=\"match\">chain</span>—remains true.\n \n \n Accordingly, the EPA examined the <span class=\"match\">potential</span> food price and availability impacts of establishing more stringent ELGs for the MPP industry. The"}]}