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Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Removal of the Restriction on Floor Brokers From Trading in the Same Crowds as Affiliated Designated Primary Market-Makers

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Start Preamble June 25, 2002.

On April 18, 2002, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (“CBOE” or “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”)[1] and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,[2] a proposed rule change to delete existing CBOE Rule 8.91(d) that prohibits a member affiliated with a Designated Primary Market-Maker (“DPM”) from acting as a floor broker in any trading crowd in which that DPM is the appointed DPM.

The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on May 17, 2002.[3] The Commission received no comments on the proposal. This order approves the proposed rule change.

The Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange and, in particular, the requirements of section 6 of the Act [4] and the rules and regulations thereunder.[5] Specifically, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,[6] which, among other things, requires that the CBOE's rules be designed to facilitate transactions in securities, and remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system. According to the CBOE, its Rule 8.91(d) was originally intended to prevent DPMs from circumventing their affirmative obligations, such as placing eligible public orders in the book, according priority to any order which the DPM acts as agent over the DPM's Start Printed Page 44655principal transactions, not charging any brokerage commission for the execution of orders for which the DPM acts as both agent and principal and not representing discretionary orders. The CBOE represented that its current rules will continue to prohibit DPMs from circumventing their obligations.[7] Therefore, the Commission believes that the regulatory concerns that CBOE Rule 8.91(d) was intended to address will continue to be prevented. The Commission expects the CBOE to surveil its DPMs and affiliated floor brokers to ensure that they are not using their affiliations to circumvent CBOE rules.

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to section 19(b)(2) of the Act,[8] that the proposed rule change (File No. SR-CBOE-2002-16) be, and it hereby is, approved.

Start Signature

For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation, pursuant to delegated authority.[9]

Margaret H. McFarland,

Deputy Secretary.

End Signature End Preamble


3.  See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45909 (May 10, 2002), 67 FR 35165.

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5.  In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission notes that it has considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).

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7.  For example, according to the CBOE, its Rule 6.43, Manner of Bidding and Offering, prohibits a DPM from directing its trades to particular members. Also, according to the CBOE, its Rule 7.4, Obligations for Orders, requires a DPM to “use due diligence to execute the orders placed in his custody at the best prices available to him under the Rules of the Exchange.” Finally, the CBOE represented that its Rule 4.1, Just and Equitable Principles of Trade, provides a general protection from any illicit intentions by stating that: “No member shall engage in acts or practices inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. Persons associated with members shall have the same duties and obligations as members under the Rules of this Chapter [IV].”

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[FR Doc. 02-16690 Filed 7-2-02; 8:45 am]