This PDF is the current document as it appeared on Public Inspection on 10/07/2016 at 08:45 am.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”), and Rule 19b-4 thereunder, notice is hereby given that, on September 23, 2016, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (“Nasdaq” or “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change
Nasdaq is proposing to amend proposed [sic] Nasdaq Rule 7046 (Nasdaq Trading Insights) by adding the corresponding fee for the optional Nasdaq Trading Insights product.
The text of the proposed rule change is available at nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com, at Nasdaq's principal office, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, Nasdaq included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend Nasdaq Rule 7046 (Nasdaq Trading Start Printed Page 70208Insights) by adding the corresponding fees for the optional Nasdaq Trading Insights product. As discussed in the NTI Filing, the Nasdaq Trading Insights product is a single optional market data service comprised of four market data components: (a) Missed Opportunity—Liquidity; (b) Missed Opportunity—Latency; (c) Peer Benchmarking; and (d) Liquidity Dynamics Analysis.
Upon request by a potential subscribing firm, Nasdaq will provide the Nasdaq Trading Insights product for a 14-day period at no charge. This waiver may be provided only once per firm. A firm will be charged the monthly fee rate listed in Nasdaq Rule 7046(b)(2) if it does not cancel by the conclusion of the trial offer and the fee will not be pro-rated.
The monthly fee rates set forth in Nasdaq Rule 7046(b), as well as in the chart below, will apply to a firm that subscribes to the Nasdaq Trading Insights product. The monthly fee will be based on the number of ports the firm is subscribing to within the Nasdaq Trading Insights product and in no case will the Nasdaq Trading Insights fees be pro-rated. The fees for the Nasdaq Trading Insights product will be in accordance with the following table.
|Tiers||Number of ports||Monthly charges|
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, in general, and with Sections 6(b)(4) and (5) of the Act, in particular, in that it provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members, issuers and other persons using its facilities, and does not unfairly discriminate between customers, issuers, brokers or dealers.
In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted SROs and broker-dealers (“BDs”) increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the provision of market data. Nasdaq believes that its Nasdaq Trading Insights market data product is precisely the sort of market data product that the Commission envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS. The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS—by deregulating the market in proprietary data—would itself further the Act's goals of facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive (and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis of the need for such data.
By removing unnecessary regulatory restrictions on the ability of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to BDs at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market as well.
Moreover, fee liable data products such as the Nasdaq Trading Insights product are a means by which exchanges compete to attract order flow, and this proposal simply adds the relevant fee structure into an Exchange rule. To the extent that exchanges are successful in such competition, they earn trading revenues and also enhance the value of their data products by increasing the amount of data they are able to provide. Conversely, to the extent that exchanges are unsuccessful, the inputs needed to add value to data products are diminished. Accordingly, the need to compete for order flow places substantial pressure upon exchanges to keep their fees for both executions and data reasonable.
The fee structure for the Nasdaq Trading Insights product, including the 14-day trial offer, also reflects an equitable allocation and will not be unfairly discriminatory because it is a voluntary product designed to ensure that the amount of the charge is tailored to the specific port usage patterns of the subscriber. Thus, for example, a subscriber's monthly charge for receiving access to the Nasdaq Trading Insights product for five ports is $1,500, while a subscriber's monthly charge for receiving access to the Nasdaq Trading Insights product for 26 ports is $3,500. The range of fee options further ensures that subscribers are not charged a fee that is inequitably disproportionate to the use that they make of the product. Additionally, the 14-day trial offer provides a potential subscriber an opportunity to try the product before signing on to receive it for a fee.
The proposal would not permit unfair discrimination because the Nasdaq Trading Insights product will be available to all interested market participants opting to subscribe, regardless of whether they take advantage of the 14-day trial offer, and will help to protect a free and open market by continuing to provide additional non-core data (offered on an optional basis for a fee) to the marketplace and by providing investors with greater choices.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The proposed fee structure is designed to ensure a fair and reasonable use of Exchange resources by allowing the Exchange to recoup costs while continuing to offer its data products at competitive rates to firms.
The market for data products is extremely competitive and firms may freely choose alternative venues and data vendors based on the aggregate fees assessed, the data offered, and the value provided. The Nasdaq Trading Insights product is part of the existing market for proprietary market data products that is currently competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market.Start Printed Page 70209
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality and price, and distribution of its data products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, the operation of the exchange is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs. This cost structure is common in content and content distribution industries such as software, where developing new software typically requires a large initial investment (and continuing large investments to upgrade the software), but once the software is developed, the incremental cost of providing that software to an additional user is typically small, or even zero (e.g., if the software can be downloaded over the internet after being purchased). In Nasdaq's case, it is costly to build and maintain a trading platform, but the incremental cost of trading each additional share on an existing platform, or distributing an additional instance of data, is very low. Market information and executions are each produced jointly (in the sense that the activities of trading and placing orders are the source of the information that is distributed) and are each subject to significant scale economies. In such cases, marginal cost pricing is not feasible because if all sales were priced at the margin, Nasdaq would be unable to defray its platform costs of providing the joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. Nasdaq pays rebates and credits to attract orders, charges relatively low prices for market information and charges relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity, and setting relatively high prices for market information. Still others may provide most data free of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to recover their costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by providing opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to charge lower direct fees for executions and data.
In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an “excessive” price for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in lower prices for other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm will experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse to its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price of data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the cost of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will fall.
The proposed charges for the Nasdaq Trading Insights product are designed to ensure a fair and reasonable use of Exchange resources by allowing the Exchange to recoup costs and ease administrative burden while continuing to offer its data products at competitive rates to firms.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action
The foregoing change has become effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.
At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
- Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
- Send an email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Please include File Number SR-NASDAQ-2016-124 on the subject line.
- Send paper comments in triplicate to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2016-124. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule Start Printed Page 70210change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2016-124, and should be submitted on or before November 1, 2016.Start Signature
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.
Robert W. Errett,
3. This filing is referenced in the recently approved Nasdaq Trading Insights filing (the “NTI Filing”) that proposed Nasdaq Rule 7046 (Nasdaq Trading Insights) to the Exchange rule book. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78886 (Sept. 20, 2016) (SR-NASDAQ-2016-101) (order granting approval).Back to Citation
6. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005) (“Regulation NMS Adopting Release”).Back to Citation
7. Id.Back to Citation
8. See Sec. Indus. Fin. Mkts. Ass'n (SIFMA), Initial Decision Release No. 1015, 2016 SEC LEXIS 2278 (ALJ June 1, 2016) (finding the existence of vigorous competition with respect to non-core market data). See also the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“NetCoalition I”) (upholding the Commission's reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data).Back to Citation
9. See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, “The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2003).Back to Citation
10. Moreover, the level of competition and contestability in the market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow, including eleven SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and various forms of alternative trading systems (“ATSs”), including dark pools and electronic communication networks (“ECNs”). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated TRFs compete to attract internalized transaction reports. It is common for BDs to further and exploit this competition by sending their order flow and transaction reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single market. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products. The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including Nasdaq, NYSE, NYSE MKT, NYSE Arca, and BATS/Direct Edge.Back to Citation
[FR Doc. 2016-24420 Filed 10-7-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P