SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this final rule. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2024-2546; Project Identifier AD-2024-00574-A” at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this final rule because of those comments.

Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact received about this final rule.

Confidential Business Information

CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as “PROPIN.” The FAA will treat such marked submissions as ( printed page 96864) confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Gregory Koenig, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1801 S Airport Road, Wichita, KS 67209. Any commentary that the FAA receives which is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

The FAA is issuing this AD to correct an unsafe condition on certain Cirrus Model SR20, SR22, and SR22T airplanes. The FAA received a report that a Cirrus Model SR20 airplane was involved in an incident where the upper power lever failed while advancing to full throttle in preparation for takeoff. The flight was successfully aborted by cutting fuel to the airplane. After the incident, an additional 26 upper power levers have been reported to have cracks. The available data indicates that the probability of visual inspection methods to detect cracks in the upper power levers are inadequate, and therefore a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) is also necessary if cracks are not detected during the visual inspection. These cracks have only been discovered on upper power levers that include a takeoff/go-around switch. This condition, if not addressed, could result in loss of engine thrust control and reduced control of the airplane. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

FAA's Determination

The FAA is issuing this AD because the agency determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

The FAA reviewed Cirrus SR2X Service Bulletin SB2X-76-05, dated October 29, 2024 (Cirrus SB2X-76-05). This material specifies procedures for inspecting the upper power lever and replacement of the upper power lever if cracks are found. This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

AD Requirements

This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the material described previously, except as discussed under “Differences Between this AD and the Referenced Material.” This AD also requires sending all inspection results to the FAA.

Differences Between This AD and the Referenced Material

The effectivity in Cirrus SB2X-76-05 specifies certain airplane serial numbers through 9749, but this AD is applicable to Model SR20, SR22, and SR22T airplanes, certificated in any category, that are equipped with upper power lever part number (P/N) 19181-001, 19181-002, or 46505-001.

Cirrus SB2X-76-05 specifies that the compliance time is within 10 flight hours for airplanes with 2,000 flight hours or more, but this AD has a compliance time of before an upper power lever accumulates 1,200 hours time-in-service (TIS), within 10 hours TIS on the upper power lever after the effective date of this AD, or within 15 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. This compliance time was developed based on data received from the 27 reported incidents, which indicated that an incident occurred as low as 2,948 hours TIS and that this unsafe condition could occur on airplanes with 1,200 hours TIS accumulated on the upper power lever. Based on this incident data, coupled with the fact that a large number of airplanes are either approaching or over 1,200 hours TIS and the propagation rate for this unsafe condition is unknown, the FAA's risk assessment was that the accumulation of 2,000 flight hours or more would not adequately mitigate the unsafe condition.

Cirrus SB2X-76-05 includes an action to revise the aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) by including a temporary revision that specifies repetitive inspections every 2,000 hours TIS, but this AD does not require this AMM revision. Instead, this AD requires repetitive inspections at intervals not to exceed 110 hours TIS. While Cirrus specifies a repetitive inspection every 2,000 hours TIS, the FAA is requiring a repetitive inspection at a frequency that considers the potential development and propagation of these cracks beyond 1,200 hours TIS.

Cirrus SB2X-76-05 does not specify reporting inspection results and this AD requires reporting inspection results to the FAA.

Cirrus SB2X-76-05 specifies to return cracked (damaged) upper power levers to Cirrus, but this AD does not require this action. This AD, instead, requires removing any cracked (damaged) upper power lever from service.

Replacing the upper power lever with P/N 19181-001, 19181-002, or 46505-001 does not terminate the requirements of this AD. The inspection would be required before any affected upper power lever accumulates 1,200 hours TIS.

Interim Action

The FAA considers this AD to be an interim action. The manufacturer is currently developing a terminating action that will address the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once the modification is developed, approved, and available, the FAA might consider additional rulemaking.

Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective Date

Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency, for “good cause,” finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Under this section, an agency, upon finding good cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, upon a finding of good cause.

An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD without providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adoption. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies forgoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because cracking in the upper power lever leads to failure of the upper power lever, which could result in loss of engine thrust control and reduced control of the airplane. The FAA's initial analysis based on crack data from the reported incidents shows that this condition could occur on airplanes with 1,200 hours TIS accumulated on the upper power lever. Since a large percentage of the Cirrus Model SR20, SR22, and SR22T airplanes have exceeded or are approaching 1,200 hours TIS and because the propagation rate for this unsafe condition is unknown, an inspection of the upper power lever is required within 10 hours TIS or 15 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, for airplanes before accumulating 1,200 hours TIS to detect cracks in the upper power lever. These compliance times are shorter than the time necessary for the public to comment and for publication of the final rule. Accordingly, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b).

In addition, for the foregoing reason(s), the FAA finds that good cause ( printed page 96865) exists pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt a rule without prior notice and comment. Because FAA has determined that it has good cause to adopt this rule without prior notice and comment, RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 6,811 airplanes of U.S. registry.

The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary replacements that would be required based on the results of the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of airplanes that might need this replacement:

The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. According to the manufacturer, however, some of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected operators.

Paperwork Reduction Act

A federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a currently valid OMB Control Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is 2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is estimated to be approximately 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. All responses to this collection of information are mandatory. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to: Information Collection Clearance Officer, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177-1524.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, and

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

The Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: