[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 205 (Monday, October 27, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48557-48578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-19657]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 205 / Monday, October 27, 2025 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 48557]]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 1
[OI Docket No. 24-523, MD Docket No. 24-524; FCC 25-49; FR ID 311053]
Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To
Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and
Trade Policy Risks
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(FNPRM) that proposes to prevent national security risks from current
and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted
technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine
cables. The FNPRM proposes a regulatory framework that would grant a
blanket license to entities that own or operate Submarine Line Terminal
Equipment (SLTEs), subject to certain exclusions and routine
conditions, such as a tailored foreign adversary annual report. The
FNPRM proposes new certifications and routine conditions related to
foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national
security risks. The FNPRM also proposes an approach to expedite
deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by
presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to
the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards.
The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring existing licensees to remove from
their submarine cable system covered equipment or services, within a
specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. The FNPRM
also seeks comment on how the Commission can use its authority to
incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted
technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign
allies.
DATES: Comments are due November 26, 2025; reply comments are due
December 26, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and
reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of
this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS). You may submit comments, identified by OI
Docket No. 24-523 or MD Docket No. 24-524, by any of the following
methods:
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
Hand-delivered or messenger delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. by
the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class
Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L
Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
People with Disabilities. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Desiree Hanssen, Office of
International Affairs, Telecommunications and Analysis Division, at
[email protected] or at (202) 418-0887. For additional
information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information
collection requirements contained in this document, send an email to
[email protected] or contact Cathy Williams at 202-418-2918 or
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), in OI Docket No. 24-523,
in MD Docket No. 24-524, FCC 25-49, adopted on August 7, 2025, and
released on August, 13, 2025. The full text of this document is
available online at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-49A1.pdf. The full text of this document is also available for public
inspection and copying during business hours in the FCC Reference
Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an email to
[email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at
202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act. The Providing
Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 118-9, requires
each agency, in providing notice of a rulemaking, to post online a
brief plain-language summary of the proposed rule. The required summary
of this FNPRM is available at https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings.
To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities
(e.g. Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an
email to [email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at (202) 418-0530.
Ex Parte Presentations. The proceeding this Notice initiates shall
be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with
the Commission's ex parte rules. See 47 CFR 1.1200 et seq. Persons
making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written
presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within
two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline
applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex
parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and
[[Page 48558]]
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with Sec. 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
Sec. 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method
of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Commission has prepared an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning the potential impact
of rule and policy change proposals on small entities in the Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The Commission invites the general
public, in particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA.
Comments must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicated on the first page of this
document and must have a separate and distinct heading designating them
as responses to the IRFA.
Paperwork Reduction Act. This document may also contain proposed
new or modified information collection requirements. The Commission, as
part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the
general public and OMB to comment on any information collection
requirements contained in this document, as required by the PRA. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment
on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Synopsis
I. Introduction
1. In this item, we modernize and streamline the Commission's
submarine cable rules to facilitate faster and more efficient
deployment of submarine cables, while at the same time ensuring the
security and resilience of this critical infrastructure. We recognize
that investment in such infrastructure is vital to American prosperity
and economic dynamism. The rules that we adopt today will ensure that
the United States remains ready and able to deploy submarine cable
infrastructure with increasing amounts of capacity to meet current and
future internet and data demands so that the United States remains
``the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies--
such as artificial intelligence.'' With global competition for
submarine cables increasing, connections to the United States should
continue to be at the forefront of the submarine cable marketplace.
Nonetheless, ``[i]nvestment at all costs is not always in the national
interest,'' because of the potential for foreign adversary
exploitation. We also recognize that ``[e]conomic security is national
security,'' and thus protecting our communications networks against
foreign threats is crucial. With these principles in mind today, we
undertake the first major comprehensive update of our submarine cable
rules since 2001. Since that time, technology, consumer expectations,
international submarine cable traffic patterns, submarine cable
infrastructure, and the foreign threat landscape have changed greatly.
2. To advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a
more secure and resilient communications supply chain, we adopt rules
that place a strong emphasis on preventing and mitigating national
security risks from foreign adversaries, while welcoming investment
from United States allies and partners. We also lighten the regulatory
burden on industry by modernizing and simplifying the submarine cable
license approval process.
3. In the FNPRM, we propose to build upon the efforts adopted in
the Report and Order to prevent national security risks from current
and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted
technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine
cables. We propose and seek comment on a regulatory framework that
would require entities that own or operate SLTEs to become licensees.
We propose granting SLTE owners and operators a blanket license,
subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions, to reduce burdens
on industry and encourage the investment in and deployment of submarine
cable systems. As a condition of any grant of a blanket license, we
also propose to require existing SLTE owners and operators that are
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
a foreign adversary, or other relevant criteria, to submit a tailored
annual report (SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report) to ensure that the
Commission maintains consistent oversight over their operations. We
propose new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign
adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security
risks.
4. While the FNPRM is pending, and to streamline the processing of
submarine cable applications during this time, we will consistently
implement our streamlined processing rules and not defer action on a
submarine cable application unless the Executive Branch agencies,
including the agencies that form the Committee for the Assessment of
Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services
Sector (Committee), provide specific and compelling national security,
law enforcement, or other justifications to defer action. We propose an
approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the
United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications
from referral to the relevant Executive Branch agencies if they meet
certain standards. To further protect U.S. submarine cable networks
from national security and law enforcement threats, we seek comment on
whether to require existing licensees to remove from their submarine
cable system any and all covered equipment or services, within a
specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. We also
seek comment on how the Commission can use its authority pursuant to
the Cable Landing License Act of 1921 (Cable Landing License Act or the
Act) and Executive Order 10530 of 1954, to incentivize and encourage
the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided
by the United States and its foreign allies. Finally, we seek comment
on whether under certain circumstances to streamline approval of
domestic cables.
5. In short, we ``maintain[ ] the strong, open investment
environment that benefits our economy and our people, while enhancing
our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving
threats'' in the submarine cable ecosystem.
[[Page 48559]]
II. Background
6. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the 2024 Cable NPRM,
initiating a comprehensive review of the submarine cable rules to
develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables,
identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law
enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and
capacity to the market. As explained in the 2024 Cable NPRM, the
Commission's authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or condition
submarine cable landing licenses derives from the Cable Landing License
Act and Executive Order 10530. The Commission discussed in detail its
rules and coordination of applications with the Executive Branch
agencies, including the Committee, to assess applicants and licensees
for assessment of any national security, law enforcement, foreign
policy, and/or trade policy concerns. The Commission also discussed the
existing procedures by which it coordinates with the State Department
on all submarine cable applications and obtains approval of any
proposed grant of an application or revocation of a cable landing
license pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order
10530.
7. Recent Commission Actions Regarding National Security. The
Commission has recognized that national security is built on both
protecting the nation's communications infrastructure from foreign
adversary threats and promoting the prosperity and robustness of the
communications sector. The Commission in its recent rulemaking
proceedings and actions is continuing its ongoing efforts to secure and
protect communications networks from foreign adversaries, while
recognizing that investment in U.S. communications networks bolsters
national security. In December 2024, the Commission engaged with
stakeholders in light of U.S. government confirmed reports that state-
sponsored foreign actors tied to the People's Republic of China (PRC)
infiltrated at least eight U.S. communications companies in a massive
espionage effort, an incident known as Salt Typhoon. The Commission has
continued to remain vigilant against this and other foreign adversary
cyberthreats.
8. Earlier this year, shortly after President Trump announced in
February 2025 the America First Investment Policy, which states that
``[e]conomic security is national security'' and discusses the need to
limit certain investments in strategic sectors by six identified
foreign adversaries, the Commission initiated a series of actions. In
March 2025, the Commission responded to threats posed by the People's
Republic of China and to the evolving threat environment more
generally, by establishing a Council for National Security to bring
together the Commission's regulatory, investigatory, and enforcement
authorities to counter foreign adversaries. The Council was established
with a three-part goal: ``(1) Reduce the American technology and
telecommunications sectors' trade and supply chain dependencies on
foreign adversaries; (2) Mitigate America's vulnerabilities to
cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance by foreign adversaries; and
(3) Ensure the U.S. wins the strategic competition with China over
critical technologies, such as 5G and 6G, AI, satellites and space,
quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, and the Internet of
Things.'' In the same month, the Commission opened a separate
proceeding, the Delete, Delete, Delete proceeding, with an aim to
remove outdated and unnecessary regulations to clear away obstacles to
investment.
9. On May 22, 2025, the Commission took action in two distinct
proceedings to protect our nation's communications infrastructure from
foreign adversary threats. First, in the Equipment Authorization Report
and Order and FNPRM, the Commission adopted new rules to help ensure
that the telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), measurement
facilities (test labs), and laboratory accreditation bodies that
participate in our equipment authorization program are not subject to
ownership, direction, or control by untrustworthy actors, including
foreign adversaries, that pose a risk to national security. The
Equipment Authorization Report and Order prohibits Commission
recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited
entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory
accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment
authorization program.
10. Second, in the Foreign Adversary NPRM, the Commission proposed
to adopt certification and information collection requirements that
would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the
Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats
from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically,
the Commission proposed to apply new certification and disclosure
requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or
authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, and to go
beyond foreign adversary ownership to also cover all regulated entities
controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary. The Commission stated that, by focusing on foreign adversary
ownership or control, rather than foreign influence more broadly, the
proposed rules are tailored to avoid needless burden on regulated
entities.
11. 2024 Cable NPRM. On November 22, 2024, the Commission adopted
the 2024 Cable NPRM, which initiated the first major review of the
submarine cable rules since 2001, and sought comment on how best to
improve and streamline the rules to facilitate efficient deployment of
submarine cables while ensuring the security, resilience, and
protection of this critical infrastructure. Among other things, the
Commission sought comment on codifying the scope of the Commission's
licensing requirements under the Cable Landing License Act and
Executive Order 10530 and other legal requirements, improving the
Commission's oversight of submarine cable landing licenses, and
adopting targeted requirements to protect submarine cables from
national security and law enforcement risks. The Commission further
sought comment on streamlining procedures to expedite submarine cable
review processes and improving the quality of the circuit capacity data
and facilitating the sharing of such information with other federal
agencies. To address evolving national security, law enforcement, and
other risks, the Commission sought comment on updating application
requirements for national security purposes and ensuring the Commission
has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control,
and use of a submarine cable system, adopting new compliance
certifications, and on any additional steps the Commission can take to
protect this critical infrastructure, including activities in
coordination with other federal agencies.
12. Earlier this year, the Commission received 18 comments, nine
reply comments, and several ex partes pertaining to a wide range of
topics discussed in the 2024 Cable NPRM. Several commenters supported
the proposal to codify a definition of a submarine cable system in the
Commission's rules. Some commenters offered reservations about
potentially duplicative requirements between the proposed periodic
reporting, which sought updated ownership and other information, and
similar requirements in mitigation agreements with the Committee, as
well as concerns about requiring SLTE owners and operators to
[[Page 48560]]
be licensees. Other commenters offered generally critical views about
the proposal to lower the ownership threshold for reportable interests
from 10% to 5%, with some further refinements suggested. Some
commenters expressed reservations about including capacity holders or
IRU holders and lessees under a licensing requirement. Meanwhile,
several commenters supported the effort to streamline applications and
offered recommendations. As explained below, we have considered these
and other comments in the thorough record received and either take
action today or seek additional comment.
III. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
13. In this FNPRM, we propose concrete steps to build upon the
Report and Order and recent proceedings to prevent national security
risks from current and potential foreign adversaries. While this FNPRM
is pending, and to streamline the processing of submarine cable
applications during this time, we will consistently implement our
streamlined processing rules and not defer action on a submarine cable
application unless the Committee provides specific and compelling
national security, law enforcement, or other justifications to defer
action. We propose to require SLTE owners and operators to become
licensees on a cable landing license and seek comment on a regulatory
framework for SLTE owners and operators that balances national security
concerns with the need to reduce regulatory burdens. In addition, we
propose new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign
adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security
risks. Moreover, we propose an approach to expedite deployment of
submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively
excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the Executive
Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. Finally, we propose and
broadly seek comment on additional measures to reform and streamline
the submarine cable licensing rules and processes, with the goal of
accelerating and enhancing the buildout of submarine cable
infrastructure, and seek comment on the costs and benefits of the
proposed rules and any alternatives.
A. Regulatory Framework for SLTEs
14. In the 2024 Cable NPRM, the Commission sought comment on
whether to require entities that own or control the SLTE to be
applicants for and licensees on a cable landing license. The Commission
explained that ``[t]he SLTE is among the most important equipment
associated with the submarine cable system and this modification to our
rule would enable the Commission to know and assess any national
security and law enforcement concerns related to the entities that will
deploy SLTE and thus who can significantly affect the cable system's
operations.'' The Commission also noted that a proposed cable system
could have multiple locations where SLTE is deployed and therefore
sought comment on whether and if so, how, to incorporate entities with
ownership or control of SLTEs into our regulatory framework. The 2024
Cable NPRM included an example of how the Commission would apply this
licensing requirement, including certain IRU holders or grantees. Many
commenters, including NASCA, Coalition, Microsoft, ICC, INCOMPAS, and
ITI, disagree that the Commission should require SLTE owners and
operators to become licensees. However, the Committee identified
substantial national security risks associated with SLTE.
15. Although we decline in the Report and Order to require SLTE
owners and operators to become licensees, we are taking steps to
identify, through the one-time information collection adopted in the
Report and Order, how many entities currently own or operate SLTEs on
existing licensed cable systems. Through the one-time information
collection, we will seek information from licensees regarding SLTEs to
inform our decisions regarding the questions presented in this FNPRM.
1. Requirements for SLTE Owners and Operators To Be a Licensee
16. We propose to adopt a rule that would require any entity that
owns or operates SLTE to become a licensee (SLTE owner and operator)
and also be subject to certain routine conditions. We propose to amend
Sec. 1.70003 of our newly adopted rules to include as licensees ``all
entities that own or operate submarine line terminal equipment.'' To
reduce the burden of requiring existing SLTE owners and operators to
file an application to become a licensee, we propose to adopt a blanket
license for existing owners and operators of SLTE subject to the
conditions below. We use the term ``existing owners and operators of
SLTE'' to refer to any entity that owns and/or operates SLTE on a
Commissioned-licensed submarine cable system prior to the effective
date of any new applicable rules subsequently adopted in this
proceeding. We seek comment on this proposal or whether there are
alternatives to this approach. We seek comment on whether our approach
is properly tailored to reduce burdens on existing SLTE owners and
operators and to limit any impacts of such proposal on existing
licensees. We also seek comment on whether this proposal will
disproportionately impact small entities that own or operate SLTE.
17. We tentatively conclude the Cable Landing License Act
authorizes the Commission to regulate SLTE owners and operators.
INCOMPAS and Microsoft state that there is no basis in the Cable
Landing License Act for requiring these entities to become licensees
because such entities do not ``land or operate'' a cable system, as
required by the Act. We disagree with these commenters' assertions.
Under the Cable Landing License Act, a license is required to land or
operate a submarine cable connecting to the United States. An entity
that owns or operates SLTE operates a significant component of the
submarine cable system. In the Report and Order, we adopt a definition
that ``a submarine cable system carries bidirectional data and voice
telecommunications traffic consisting of one or more submarine cable(s)
laid beneath the water, and all associated components that support the
operation of the submarine cable system end-to-end, including the
segments up to the system's terrestrial terminations at one or more
SLTEs as well as the transponders that convert optical signals to
electrical signals and vice versa.''
18. The ability to convert the telecommunications traffic optical
signals to electrical signals and vice versa is simply not possible
without equipment that performs that function. That is, the submarine
cable system cannot be operated without the SLTE. We determine in the
Report and Order that SLTE is a significant component of the system
that may be owned separately from the other licensees who are required
to comply with routine conditions and oversight under the Cable Landing
Act and current Commission rules. Further, SLTE allows an entity to
exercise control over its own fiber, capacity, or spectrum on the
submarine cable system. With the advent of open cable systems,
submarine cable owners and operators now have the ability to pass on an
important responsibility of lighting the fiber to certain customers who
wish to control their traffic and technology, i.e., dark fiber IRU or
lease holders.
19. The Committee explains that entities with dark fiber IRUs that
deploy their own SLTE could be foreign
[[Page 48561]]
adversary-controlled landing parties, telecommunications companies, and
governments with interest, access, and control over the fiber,
capacity, or spectrum for the ``entire life of the cable.'' In essence,
``[a] foreign adversary-controlled non-licensee entity that owns,
controls, or operates its own SLTE, or equivalent equipment, on a
submarine cable landing in the United States may have connectivity
comparable to operating their own communications cable to the United
States without a license, or any regulatory review, mitigation, or
monitoring for national security or law enforcement risk.'' The
Committee further articulates that foreign adversary-affiliated
entities that own or operate SLTE pursuant to an IRU or similar legal
agreement, may effectively operate a submarine cable system that
thereby ``allow[s] an adversary to intercept or misroute U.S. persons'
communications and sensitive data transiting the cable, posing a
serious counterintelligence risk.'' These concerns pose significant
national security risks that would justify requiring SLTE owners or
operators to be licensees on a cable landing license.
20. Based on the ownership of SLTE and ability to operate a
significant component of the submarine cable system, we believe SLTE
owners and operators fit within the Cable Landing License Act as
operators of a submarine cable system. Therefore, we propose to require
SLTE owners and operators to become licensees so that we can
effectively carry out our duty to protect national security. Moreover,
``[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the
Communications] Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions.'' Given that submarine cable systems are only functional
with SLTE, regulating SLTE owners and operators seems necessary to
execute the Commission's duties under the Cable Landing License Act and
Executive Order 10530 to regulate submarine cable landing or operation,
including withholding or revoking a cable landing license where such
action would ``promote the security of the United States.'' We seek
comment on our analysis.
2. Blanket License for SLTE Owners and Operators
21. To reduce burdens and ensure that the Commission tailors this
requirement so that it does not interfere with the existing licensing
process under our rules, we propose to adopt a blanket license for SLTE
owners and operators. We understand that SLTE owners and operators may
be different entities from the cable owners and operators that are
required to be applicants/licensees under our rules, as amended in
Sec. 1.70003. We expect to have a better understanding of SLTEs after
the completion of the one-time collection adopted today.
22. We believe that this blanket license approach for SLTE owners
and operators is important to ensure the Commission is aware of all the
entities that install their own SLTE to use fiber, capacity, or
spectrum on the submarine cable system, while also not impacting those
entities that are required to apply for a cable landing license
pursuant to Sec. 1.70003 of our newly adopted rules. Commenters voice
concern that if the Commission requires SLTE owners and operators to
become licensees, then it will take a very long time for such entities
to obtain a license, resulting in backlog and harm to investment in the
submarine cable industry. In addition, commenters are concerned that
each time a new SLTE owner and operator is added to the submarine cable
system, a modification application would be required in advance, which
would exacerbate aforementioned harms. By proposing a blanket license
for SLTE owners and operators, we believe that this approach will
obviate the need for an initial application for a cable landing license
or a modification application as contended by AWS and Coalition, and
thus streamline the licensing process for this category of licensees.
23. To protect national security and law enforcement interests, we
propose to exclude certain entities from the grant of this blanket
license to the extent such entities seek to own or operate new SLTE on
any current or future submarine cables landing in the United States.
Specifically, we propose to exclude from the grant of this blanket
license, any entity that would be subject to the foreign adversary and/
or character presumptive disqualifying conditions that we adopt in the
Report and Order.
24. We seek comment on whether this proposal is sufficient to
ensure the protection and security of the submarine cable
infrastructure. Should we instead exclude a larger or smaller category
of entities from grant of the blanket license? We seek comment on how
this proposal could affect existing licensees as well as the users of
submarine cable systems. Are there any alternative approaches that may
better achieve our objectives in a less burdensome way? For example,
should we adopt regular reporting requirements instead?
25. We seek comment on whether we should allow entities that are
excluded from the grant of a blanket license to file an application in
accordance with our application rules, as amended in the Report and
Order, if they seek to own or operate SLTE. Or should such entities
provide an alternative showing, in lieu of an application, that they
can overcome the adverse presumption set out in the disqualifying
condition? We address in the Report and Order the written process that
will apply where the Commission considers whether denial of an
application or revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license
is warranted. To the extent the Commission or OIA considers that a
denial of an application is warranted or revocation and/or termination
of a license is warranted, OIA pursuant to its delegated authority
would determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis as
required by due process and applicable law and in light of the relevant
facts and circumstances, including providing the applicant or licensee
with notice and opportunity to cure noncompliance to the extent such an
opportunity is required by the APA, and to respond to allegations and
evidence in the record. We seek comment on whether the exclusion of
certain SLTE owners and operators from the grant of a blanket license
may disturb existing licensees' operations and interfere with
investment-backed reliance interests of such licensees.
3. Routine Conditions for SLTE Owners and Operators
26. We seek comment on whether to apply distinct routine conditions
to SLTE owners and operators as a separate category of licensees.
Although SLTE owners and operators operate a significant portion of the
submarine cable system as it pertains to an entity's control over a
fiber, capacity, or spectrum, we understand that SLTE owners and
operators may have distinct responsibilities from other submarine cable
owners and operators, such as those licensees that own and maintain
common infrastructure for the submarine cable system. Therefore, to
satisfactorily tailor any regulatory obligations of SLTE owners and
operators, we seek comment on appropriate routine conditions to apply
to SLTE owners and operators, as set forth below.
27. With the understanding that certain existing routine conditions
may not neatly apply to this category of cable landing licensees, we
seek comment to examine whether we should specifically tailor routine
conditions to apply to SLTE owners and operators, including for small
providers. Are there national security or law enforcement reasons
[[Page 48562]]
why we may want to apply certain routine conditions to SLTE owners and
operators? Are there any reasons why we should limit the number of
routine conditions required for SLTE owners and operators? We seek
comment on what routine conditions should apply to SLTEs generally. We
seek comment on whether we should adopt the same routine conditions
that currently apply to cable landing licensees. What routine
conditions are appropriate for SLTE owners and operators so that the
Commission may retain oversight of these entities and ensure compliance
with the Cable Landing License Act and Commission rules?
28. Specifically, we propose that the Commission should require the
following as routine conditions on the grant of a blanket license: (1)
compliance with all rules and regulations of the Commission; (2)
compliance with any treaties or conventions relating to communications
to which the United States is or may hereafter become a party; (3)
compliance with any action by the Commission or the Congress of the
United States rescinding, changing, modifying or amending any rights
accruing to any person by grant of the license; (4) the licensee, or
any person or company controlling it, controlled by it, or under direct
or indirect common control with it, does not enjoy and shall not
acquire any right to handle traffic to or from the United States, its
territories or its possessions unless such service is authorized by the
Commission pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act, as
amended; (5) the licensee shall file a notification for prior approval
to become affiliated with a foreign carrier; (6) the licensee shall
file annual circuit capacity reports as required by Sec. 43.82 of this
chapter; (7) the cable landing license is revocable by the Commission
after due notice and opportunity for hearing pursuant to section 2 of
the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 35, or for failure to comply
with the terms of the license or with the Commission's rules; and (8)
the licensee must comply with proposed rule, Sec. 1.70017, by filing
the SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report, if one or more of the
criteria under the proposed rule are met. We believe that the routine
conditions will promote the statutory purposes under the Cable Landing
License Act and better enable the Commission to carry out its licensing
duties in furtherance of those purposes. We seek comment on this view.
29. Licensees under Sec. 1.70003 of our newly adopted rules that
seek to consummate a transaction, such as a transfer of control or
assignment of the cable landing license, must seek prior approval from
the Commission or provide a post-consummation notification consistent
with Sec. Sec. 1.70012 and 1.70013. We seek comment on whether, and if
so, how, to apply the Commission's new rules at Sec. Sec. 1.70012 and
1.70013 to transactions by SLTE owners and operators. If SLTE is sold
or transferred to another entity that resumes operation of the SLTE
connected to the licensed submarine cable system, the Commission cannot
maintain oversight of the SLTE without this information. We seek
comment on whether the Commission should be made aware if the SLTE and/
or SLTE owner and operator is transferred or assigned to another
entity. We seek comment on the impact of such a reporting requirement
on small SLTE owners and operators. For transactions involving
transfers of control or assignments of the SLTE itself or the SLTE
owner and operator, how should the Commission frame its rules? For both
scenarios, should the existing SLTE owner and operator be obligated to
file an application seeking prior approval of the transaction? Or
should the existing SLTE owner and operator file a notification
including basic information about the transaction? We seek comment on
how the Commission should handle pro forma transactions, such as
whether it should merely apply the transaction rules set forth in our
newly adopted rules to this category of licensees. We seek comment on
methods the Commission can employ to ensure its records remain up-to-
date, but that do not unduly delay or interfere with the ability of an
SLTE owner and operator to sell, purchase, transfer, or take a similar
action that is consistent with the SLTE owner's and operator's business
needs. Our existing rules require that ``[t]he licensee, or in the case
of multiple licensees, the licensees collectively, shall maintain de
jure and de facto control of the U.S. portion of the cable system,
including the cable landing stations in the United States, sufficient
to comply with the requirements of the Commission's rules and any
specific conditions of the license.'' We consider that this routine
condition may be difficult to impose on SLTE owners and operators who
may not have ownership interests in common infrastructure in the
submarine cable system and may instead hold interests in a fiber,
capacity, or spectrum that they must light themselves. Should we adopt
a routine condition requiring that SLTE owners and operators must
maintain de jure and de facto control of the SLTE? We seek comment on
other alternatives that we should consider.
30. In the Report and Order, we adopt routine conditions for
existing licensees and future licensees with regard to cybersecurity
and physical security risk management, the Covered List, and foreign
adversary-related disclosures and prohibitions. We seek comment on
whether to adopt these new routine conditions for SLTE owners and
operators. For example, should we adopt routine conditions requiring
all SLTE owners and operators to certify that they have created,
updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk
management plan and to certify that they will not add to the submarine
cable systems, covered equipment or services that are currently
identified or newly identified in the future? We seek comment on
whether to require SLTE owners and operators to disclose whether or not
their submarine cable systems use equipment or services identified on
the Covered List. Consistent with the proposal under section IV.B.1.-2.
of this FNPRM, we also seek comment on whether to require an applicant
for a cable landing license to certify, as a condition of the potential
grant of an application, that it will not use any equipment in the
operation of the submarine cable system that is produced or provided by
any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g).
Should we also require this certification if an entity seeks to own or
operate new SLTE on any current or future submarine cables landing in
the United States?
31. In the Report and Order, we also adopt routine conditions to
ensure we receive timely updates from licensees when there are certain
changes requiring the Commission's attention. Consistent with those
adopted routine conditions, we propose and seek comment on adopting the
following additional routine conditions for all SLTE owners and
operators. We propose that SLTE owners and operators must file a
notification updating the Commission within thirty (30) days of any
change in: (1) the point of contact of the SLTE owner and operator; (2)
the name of the SLTE owner and operator or the submarine cable system;
(3) ownership of the SLTE owner and operator resulting in the entity
becoming owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g), to
the extent such change does not require prior Commission approval under
our rules; and (4) location of SLTE such as a change of
[[Page 48563]]
address or coordinates of the SLTE. We seek comment on whether any SLTE
owners or operators should be exempt from these routine conditions. We
seek comment on whether there are any other changes that the Commission
should be aware of and what method of reporting would be the least
burdensome to SLTE owners and operators while ensuring that the
Commission is timely notified of important new or updated information.
We seek comment on whether there should be any exceptions to the (30)
day requirement.
32. Lastly, we seek comment on whether to adopt any other new rules
applicable to SLTE owners and operators, or apply any other existing
rules to such entities. Should SLTE owners and operators be subject to
certain certification requirements such as cybersecurity
certifications? Should we attach additional routine conditions to the
blanket license for SLTE owners and operators that would require
certain notifications to the Commission? Should the Commission be aware
if there is a change in the third-party entity that operates the SLTE
to the extent the SLTE owner itself does not operate the SLTE? We seek
comment on whether there are national security and law enforcement
concerns that we should consider in adopting rules that may be
applicable and warranted in the case of SLTE owners and operators.
Additionally, we seek comment on whether SLTE and/or SLTE owners and
operators are more vulnerable to physical exploitation or attack by
foreign adversaries, given their presence on land. Are there are
additional measures we should require of SLTE owners and operators to
ensure physical security of SLTE and the submarine cable system?
4. SLTE Owner and Operator Foreign Adversary Annual Report
33. Similar to the Foreign Adversary Annual Report that we adopt in
the Report and Order, we propose to adopt an annual reporting
requirement for existing SLTE owners and operators that meet any of the
criteria below (SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report). We propose a
tailored approach under which SLTE owners and operators that do not
meet the foreign adversary criteria will not be subject to such
reporting requirements. Instead, we propose to limit the reporting
requirements to SLTE owners and operators that meet our foreign
adversary criteria and thus present potential national security and law
enforcement concerns. To the extent SLTE owners and operators
demonstrate any of the proposed criteria, it would be indicative of
heighted national security and law enforcement concerns and warrant
providing relevant information to the Commission on a consistent basis.
34. We propose that SLTE owners and operators that meet one or more
of the following criteria must submit an SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual
Report to the Commission on an annual basis:
(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g);
(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission
maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act; \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act, and Sec. Sec. 1.50002 and 1.50003 of
the Commission's rules, the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and
services that have been determined by one of the sources specified
in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States or the security and safety of United
States persons (``covered'' equipment and services). See Secure and
Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Public Law 116-124, 133
Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609 (Secure
Networks Act); see also 47 CFR 1.50002 and 1.50003; Federal
Communications Commission, List of Equipment and Services Covered by
Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (last updated June 5, 2025) (List of Covered
Equipment and Services). An entity is placed on the Covered List
based on a determination made by, among others, an appropriate
national security agency that the entity's equipment and/or services
pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United
States or the security and safety of United States persons pursuant
to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. See
Secure Networks Act. See also 47 CFR 1.50000 et seq.; List of
Covered Equipment and Services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) That has purchased, rented, leased, or otherwise obtained
equipment or services on the Commission's Covered List and is using in
the submarine cable infrastructure;
(4) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval,
whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or
revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in
the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as
the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity;
and/or
(5) The submarine cable system for which the SLTE owner and
operator is licensed to operate in the United States lands in a foreign
adversary country or the SLTE is located or operated from a foreign
adversary country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f).
The Commission must be able to receive on a regular basis information
necessary to ascertain foreign adversary control or ownership of SLTE
owners and operators, which is directly relevant to the Commission's
oversight role of cable landing licensees. We propose to adopt a
requirement for SLTE owners and operators, that meet one or more of the
criteria described above, to provide the SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual
Report on an annual basis. This will ensure that the Commission has the
information it needs to timely monitor and continually assess evolving
national security and other risks.
35. The Commission currently does not know the identity of every
single owner and operator of SLTE. In the Report and Order, the
Commission adopted a one-time information collection for the purpose of
ascertaining the identities of SLTE owners and operators and location
information of the SLTE. We intend to use the information collected to
better understand the size of this category of potential licensees so
that we can regulate in a reasonably-tailored manner. At this time,
however, the Commission also has incomplete information regarding SLTE
owners and operators that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to
the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in
Sec. 1.70001(g). We propose to require SLTE owners and operators to
self-identify and fulfill the reporting requirements for the SLTE
Foreign Adversary Annual Report.
36. Content of SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report. For existing
SLTE owners and operators that meet the above criteria, we propose to
require them to file the STLE Foreign Adversary Annual Report that must
include the following information that is current as of thirty (30)
days prior to the date of the submission: (1) the information of the
SLTE owner and operator as required in Sec. 1.70005(a) through (d),
(g), (j)(1); (2) the location(s) of the SLTE(s) that the SLTE owner and
operator owns or operates; (3) identify and describe whether the
SLTE(s) is managed or operated by a third party; (4) identify and
describe whether the SLTE owner and operator leases, sells, shares, or
swaps fiber, capacity, or spectrum on a Commission-licensed submarine
cable system, including the name of the specific submarine cable
system; and (5) certifications as set forth under Sec. 1.70006. We
tentatively conclude that requiring this SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual
Report will improve the Commission's oversight of certain high-risk
SLTE owners and operators. We further propose that SLTE owners and
operators must provide a copy of the Foreign Adversary Annual Report
directly to the Committee at the time of filing with the Commission. We
seek comment on this. In an effort to ease burdens on SLTE owners and
operators
[[Page 48564]]
that do not meet the above criteria, we seek comment on whether to
adopt routine conditions to ensure SLTE owners and operators provide
updated information to the Commission as circumstances change.
37. We seek comment on whether an entity that meets one or more of
the criteria to file a Foreign Adversary Annual Report and an SLTE
Foreign Adversary Annual Report (as both a licensee under Sec.
1.70003(a) or (b) and an SLTE owner and operator) should file both
reports every year. If both reports should be required, what timing or
reporting deadlines should we consider? Should such entity be permitted
to seek a waiver of a requirement to file the SLTE Foreign Adversary
Annual Report if it incorporates necessary information about its SLTE
ownership and location in the Foreign Adversary Annual Report? Should
the Commission instead use a single form for both the SLTE Foreign
Adversary Annual Report and the Foreign Adversary Annual Report and
require the filer to indicate which annual report it is submitting? We
seek comment on our proposed approach and whether there are any other
approaches that would reduce burdens on licensees.
B. New Applicant Certifications and Routine Conditions
38. Below, we propose to further amend our newly adopted rules by
adopting new certification requirements for submarine cable
applications and new routine conditions. Generally, we propose to
require applicants for a cable landing license or modification,
assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable
landing license, to certify in their application that they will comply
with all of the routine conditions set out in our rules, as amended. We
seek comment on these proposals and any burdens on applicants and
licensees.
1. Use of Foreign Adversary Entity Equipment
39. We seek comment on whether to require an applicant for a cable
landing license to certify, as a condition of the potential grant of an
application, that it will not use any equipment in the operation of the
submarine cable system that is produced by any entity owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g). We propose that
notifications of pro forma assignments and transfers of control
involving cable landing licenses that are granted after the effective
date of this Report and Order and FNPRM must contain a certification
that the assignee or the licensee subject to the transfer of control
will not use any equipment in the operation of the submarine cable
system that is produced by any entity owned by, controlled by, or
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as
defined in Sec. 1.70001(g). As the Committee notes, in its
``experience, foreign adversaries use a host of seemingly innocuous
corporate entities to advance their strategic goals,'' while ``[t]he
FCC's `Covered List' is limited and identifies only a handful of those
entities.'' The Committee therefore offers an option, which we propose
to adopt, ``going beyond lists [of entities], and instead requir[ing]
licensees to certify that they will not use vendors for equipment or
services who meet certain qualifications found in other existing
national security related regulations.'' After all, ``static lists can
be too rigid to account for the full spectrum of actors that may pose
risks.'' As the Committee suggests, ``the Commission could require
licensees to certify that they will not use vendors for equipment or
services who meet the definition of a `person owned by, controlled by,
or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary'
found in the Department of Commerce's Information and Communications
Technology Services rule, 15 CFR 791.2.'' Given our reliance on this
definition in this Report and Order and in related contexts, we propose
to adopt this proposal as to equipment. We seek comment on this
proposal.
40. We also seek comment on whether we should apply this
certification requirement solely to (1) all equipment; (2) only logic-
bearing hardware or software; or (3) only ``communications equipment''
as defined in Sec. 1.50001(d) of the Commission's rules, which
includes most equipment with Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connectivity, as
reflected in the 2022 Equipment Authorization Program Report and Order.
This proposed certification could provide the Commission with
flexibility to mitigate against evolving or unseen threats from foreign
adversaries. In addition, we seek comment on whether to codify this
requirement as a routine condition of any cable landing license. Should
we apply this routine condition to cable landing licenses held by all
licensees, or only those licenses that are granted after the effective
date of any new applicable rules we adopt in this proceeding? The Cable
Landing License Act authorizes the Commission to ``withhold or revoke''
a license or attach terms and conditions as necessary to serve the
statutory purposes, which include promoting national security.
Furthermore, the Commission may ``grant such license upon such terms as
shall be necessary to assure just and reasonable rates and service in
the operation and use of cables so licensed,'' and we believe that all
cable landing licenses granted to date have been understood as being
subject to the Commission's reservation of regulatory authority. The
Commission tentatively concludes that it would have the legal authority
to apply such requirements to all licenses, even those granted prior to
the adoption of new rules. We seek comment on this tentative
conclusion.
2. Prohibition on the Use of Foreign Adversary Entity or Entity
Identified on the Covered List as Third-Party Service Providers
41. We propose to adopt a routine condition prohibiting the use of
certain third-party service providers to ensure the security,
integrity, and resilience of submarine cable systems. The operation of
a submarine cable system involves many vendors and contractors, and
supply chain integrity is an important priority. We propose to prohibit
cable landing licensees from using any third-party service provider in
the operation of the submarine cable that is (1) an entity owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules,
as suggested by the Committee; (2) an entity identified on the Covered
List; and/or (3) an entity that can access the submarine cable system
from a foreign adversary country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f) of our
newly adopted rules. We do not apply a strict liability standard, but
we expect licensees to conduct substantial due diligence to ensure
compliance with FCC requirements. To the extent a licensee conducts
substantial due diligence to verify all relevant information and
reasonably believes the entity is not owned by, controlled by, or
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as
defined herein, such licensee would not be subject to enforcement
sanctions. We would consider all of the facts and circumstances raised
in an individual case and take into consideration the steps a licensee
took in conducting substantial due diligence to ensure compliance with
the rule. We believe these measures will further protect critical
submarine cable infrastructure from vulnerabilities presented by
national security threats. We also propose to require applicants for a
cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control,
or renewal or extension of a cable landing
[[Page 48565]]
license, to certify in the application that they will not use the
aforementioned third-party service providers in the operation of the
submarine cable. We also propose that notifications of pro forma
assignments and transfers of control involving cable landing licenses
that are granted after the effective date of this Report and Order and
FNPRM must contain this certification for the assignee or the licensee
subject to the transfer of control. We also propose to exempt licensees
that are themselves owned by, controlled by, or operated by an entity
identified on the Covered List, because the Commission assesses that
there are few national security benefits in applying this condition to
such licensees, given that such entities have themselves already been
determined to produce or provide equipment or services that pose an
unacceptable risk to national security.
42. We seek comment on these proposals. What would be the potential
impact on licensees that currently use the aforementioned third-party
service providers? Will this increase costs for licensees
significantly? What is the length of time that licensees would need to
choose alternative third-party service providers? Should the Commission
provide additional guidance on how licensees can verify whether third-
party service providers are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary? For example, should
the Commission merely require that licensees exercise their reasonable
due diligence in detecting whether third-party service providers meet
the definition? If so, what actions by licensees would be necessary and
sufficient to support their verification? How would the Commission
monitor to ensure that licensees will not use prohibited third-party
service providers? Should the Commission adopt specific monitoring,
auditing, or verification procedures? What should these look like? For
example, should the Commission require third-party auditing of
licensees? Should the Commission require annual reporting on all of
licensees' contracts with third-party service providers? How can the
Commission best ensure compliance while minimizing burdens. Does
mitigating the risks presented by untrustworthy third-party service
providers outweigh any burdens involved in complying with this
prohibition? Should we solely prohibit licensees from entering into new
or an extension of existing contracts with the aforementioned third-
party service providers, or should we also apply this prohibition to
existing contracts that licensees currently may have with such third-
party service providers? We seek comment on the costs and benefits of
implementing this proposal.
43. In the alternative, should we only prohibit licensees from
using a narrower category of third-party service providers, and require
licensees to report whether or not they use other third-party service
providers, including any of the entities discussed above, in the
operation of the submarine cable system? Would this approach strike a
balance between our objective to mitigate foreign adversary control and
interference in critical submarine cable infrastructure and the burdens
on licensees? We seek detailed comments on which third-party service
providers we should prohibit or which third-party service providers we
should allow licensees to simply disclose to the Commission, as well as
justification for any proposed approaches. To the extent we incorporate
a reporting requirement under this approach, how frequently should we
require licensees to disclose their third-party service providers and
what additional information should we require licensees to provide so
that we have the necessary visibility into potential threats to
submarine cable systems? We seek comment on the costs and benefits of
any approaches.
44. Exception for Repair and Maintenance. Additionally, we propose
an exception to this prohibition where third-party services involve
providing repair and maintenance to the wet segment of submarine
cables. The Committee noted that if the Commission adopts a broad
prohibition on equipment or services produced or provided by entities
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
a foreign adversary, ``the Committee acknowledges that the Commission
might need to allow carve-outs or waivers to address certain
circumstances, such as to allow for timely maintenance or restoration
of service in the event of outage.'' We propose to simply exempt third-
party repair and maintenance services for the wet segment of the cable
from the types of third-party services that would be included in this
prohibition. We seek comment on this approach. The Commission
understands there is heavy industry reliance on Chinese repair and
maintenance ships, so not allowing this exception may impose risks of
long-term outages. Is this exception necessary, or can industry find
vendors for third-party repair and maintenance services without
substantial delay, even without this exception? We seek comment on how
we should define repair and maintenance services for the wet segment of
the cable for the purposes of this exception. Additionally, we seek
comment on whether there are other third-party services that we should
exempt from the prohibition.
45. Incentivizing the Use of Non-Foreign Adversary Ships and Repair
and Maintenance Services. In the event that the Commission adopts this
exception, or does not adopt the prohibition at all, we seek comment on
ways that the Commission can incentivize the use of non-foreign
adversary ships and repair and maintenance services. How can the
Commission incentivize use of U.S./non-foreign adversary flagged or
crewed repair ships, in lieu of reliance on repair ships flagged or
crewed by foreign adversaries? Submarine cables, no matter where they
are deployed, ``face complex and challenging risks from natural,
accidental, and malicious threats.'' When a submarine cable experiences
a fault, this causes a disruption that can have ``immediate and far-
reaching effects, given the overwhelming reliance our global
communication network has on these systems.'' One way to reduce
disruption from a cable fault is to increase resiliency to ensure there
are many submarine cables deployed that can be used to reroute the
traffic to ensure it arrives at its intended destination. Regardless of
location, the repairs needed to restore submarine cable service usually
require the availability of a specialized repair ship, a cable repair
crew that is typically diverse in skill and nationality and may
therefore require numerous visas and/or permits due to national
cabotage laws, and a window of good weather for the repair work period
to ensure safety of the vessel and crew.
46. Submarine cable repair and maintenance services, when conducted
by entities subject to the exploitation of foreign adversaries, also
present potential opportunities for foreign adversary sabotage,
interference, or surveillance of U.S. submarine cables. A recent report
from the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted, ``the
overreliance on Chinese repair ships due to limited alternatives in the
marketplace is another vulnerability if, during a time of military
conflict, the Chinese government prohibits access to its repair ships
and subsea cables are left damaged without timely repair.'' Cable
repair ships are in limited supply, and as a result, this is a growing
stressor to the submarine cable industry. Approximately 22 such ships
in the
[[Page 48566]]
world are dedicated solely to repair, of which only two are U.S.-
flagged, and that fleet is aging. If the two U.S.-flagged vessels are
unavailable, ``the United States may have to rely on ships outside of
its trusted vendor networks, which could introduce security concerns if
the ship operators are'' owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction of direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec.
1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules. We seek further information
regarding how many existing repair ships are in the trusted vendor
network, i.e., outside the ownership, control, jurisdiction, or
direction of a foreign adversary.
47. We also seek comment on how the Commission may support or
promote the expansion of additional U.S./non-foreign adversary repair
ships. Should the Commission also use its submarine cable licensing
authority to promote the restoration of U.S. shipbuilding capacity,
thus helping to facilitate the recently-announced ``policy of the
United States to revitalize and rebuild domestic maritime industries
and workforce to promote national security and economic prosperity''?
Should the Commission, for example, impose similar requirements for
ships that engage in cable repair and maintenance as the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, better known as the Jones Act, imposes on ships
that transport cargo between American ports? Should the Commission also
give priority to allied-built or owned ships? If so, how should the
Commission define ``allied''? Should the Commission rely on the State
Department's list of U.S. treaty allies? Should the Commission rely on
some combination of ownership, location of the ship was built in, and
citizenship of the crew members? Should the Commission instead simply
distinguish between those ships owned by, controlled by, or subject to
the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary as defined in
Sec. 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, and those ships that are
not? To what extent should the Commission consider broader industrial
policy goals, alongside its traditional role in protecting the security
of submarine cable infrastructure?
3. Prohibition From Entering Into IRU and Leasing Capacity Arrangements
With Entities Identified on the Covered List
48. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national
security and law enforcement threats, and consistent with our actions
today, we seek comment on adopting a routine condition that would
prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into new or an extension
of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity on submarine
cable systems landing in the United States, with any entity identified
on the Covered List. In the Report and Order, we adopt a routine
condition that prohibits licensees from entering into new or an
extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity on
submarine cable systems landing in the United States, where such
arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity would give an entity that is
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g), the ability to
install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable landing in the United
States. We believe there are additional national security and law
enforcement risks if cable landing licensees enter into such
arrangements with entities identified on the Covered List. The entities
identified on the Covered List have been found to produce or provide
equipment and services that have been deemed to pose an unacceptable
risk to the national security of the United States or the security and
safety of United States persons. We also seek comment on whether to
require applicants for a cable landing license or modification,
assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable
landing license, to certify in the application that they will not enter
into new or extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for
capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States, with
any entity identified on the Covered List.
49. This approach is consistent with the actions taken today to
prohibit the use of covered equipment and services in new submarine
cable systems, to apply a disqualifying condition that will
presumptively preclude the grant of a cable landing license filed by
any applicant that is identified on the Covered List, and to require
existing licensees to certify they will not add in their submarine
cable systems any equipment or services currently included on the
Covered List or any equipment or services subsequently added to the
Covered List. We seek comment on whether this routine condition should
be subject to any exception granted by the Commission. Should we allow
a licensee to petition the Commission for waiver of the condition? To
the extent we allow a licensee to petition for a waiver, we propose
that any waiver would be granted only to the extent the licensee
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that a new or extension
of an existing arrangement with an entity identified on the Covered
List presents no national security nor other threats and would serve
the public interest.
4. Notification of Change of Address or Coordinates
50. We also propose to require licensees to notify the Commission
of any change of address or geographic coordinates concerning
information provided under Sec. 1.70005(e)(7) and (f), within thirty
(30) days of the change. In the Report and Order, we adopt Sec.
1.70005(e)(7) and (f) requiring an applicant for a cable landing
license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, and renewal
or extension of a license to provide detailed geographic information
about the submarine cable system in the application, including a map
and geographic data in generally accepted GIS formats that specifies
the location of information described under 1.70005(e)(7) such as each
beach manhole, cable landing station, PFE, SLTE, NOC and backup NOC,
and SOC and backup SOC, if distinct from the NOC, and the route
position list including the wet segment of the submarine cable system.
Consistent with this application requirement, we propose to adopt a
routine condition requiring a cable landing licensee to notify the
Commission within thirty (30) days of any change with respect to any of
the information required under Sec. 1.70005(e)(7) and (f). We propose
to require licensees to submit a specific description of the updated
information, including an updated map and geographic data in generally
accepted GIS formats. We propose to delegate authority to OIA, in
coordination with OEA, to determine the specific file formats and data
fields which will be collected. Consistent with our action in the
Report and Order, we will provide confidential treatment of the exact
location information.
5. Notification of Intent of Non-Renewal of License
51. The Commission currently does not have a formal process, other
than outreach to individual licensees, to confirm whether a licensee
intends to renew a cable landing license that is nearing the date of
expiration. We propose to adopt a routine condition requiring a
licensee to notify the Commission within sixty (60) days prior to the
date of license expiration if the licensee does not intend to renew or
extend the license. If a licensee has already submitted an application
to renew or extend the license or requested an STA to continue
operating a
[[Page 48567]]
submarine cable system, this routine condition will not be applicable
as such licensee has expressed an intent to renew or extend the
license. Regardless of the timing of any notice of intent not to renew
a license, all rights under the license shall terminate upon expiration
of the license term unless the licensee has previously filed a renewal
application or request for an STA.
6. Notification of Submarine Cable System Retirement
52. We propose to adopt a routine condition requiring a cable
landing licensee to notify the Commission within sixty (60) days prior
to any retirement of its submarine cable system. Our rules require a
licensee to notify the Commission within 30 days of the date the cable
is placed into service, whereupon the license will expire 25 years from
the in-service date. However, the Commission's rules do not require a
licensee to notify the Commission if the submarine cable will be
retired and taken out of service. It is important that the Commission
maintain up-to-date records of the operational status of licensed
submarine cable systems for national security and emergency
preparedness and response purposes (for example, in the event of a
natural disaster or conflict) and to verify that a licensee is in
compliance with Commission rules and the terms of its license. We seek
comment on this proposal and whether we should require a licensee to
provide any additional information in such notification.
7. Change in Foreign Adversary Ownership
53. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a routine condition
requiring cable landing licensees to submit a certification within
thirty (30) days of any changes in the licensee's status (e.g.,
ownership, change in board seats, etc.) that results in the licensee
becoming owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g), to
the extent such change does not require prior Commission approval under
our rules.
8. Change to List of Foreign Adversary Countries
54. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a routine condition
requiring cable landing licensees to submit a foreign adversary
certification within thirty (30) days of any new additions to the list
of foreign adversaries identified in the Department of Commerce's rule,
15 CFR 791.4, or the removal of any countries from this list.
Specifically, we seek comment on whether to require licensees to submit
a certification that they are or are not owned by controlled by, or
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the foreign adversary newly
identified in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4.
Alternatively, should we only require licensees to submit a
certification acknowledging the new addition to the list of foreign
adversaries identified in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR
791.4?
9. Change to the Commission's Covered List
55. We propose to adopt a routine condition that requires
licensees, irrespective of when the license was granted, to certify,
within sixty (60) days of a Federal Register publication announcing any
new addition of equipment or services to the Covered List, if they use
such Covered List equipment or services in their respective submarine
cable system and a brief description of how such equipment or services
are used. Is 60 days the right length of time? Should we instead adopt
a longer or shorter time length? In the Report and Order, we adopt a
routine condition for Covered List equipment and services for licenses
granted after the effective date of the new rules. In this FNPRM, we
believe that this proposed routine condition for all licensees,
irrespective of when the license was granted, would enable the
Commission to account for circumstances where the Covered List evolves
and is updated to protect against national security threats and to
verify the extent to which such threats exist in critical submarine
cable infrastructure. In the alternative, should we require all
licensees to report annually if they use any Covered List equipment or
services, including any equipment or services newly added prior to the
annual reporting deadline? For example, would changes to the
Commission's Covered List published in the Federal Register before the
annual reporting deadline be an appropriate way to define newly added
Covered List equipment or services? Should we consider a fixed annual
reporting deadline? We seek comment on this approach. To the extent we
adopt a certification requirement or an annual reporting requirement,
we seek comment on whether to also require licensees to disclose each
covered equipment or services that they use in the submarine cable
system. What type of information disclosure should we require about the
Covered List equipment or service from licensees? Should we require
more detailed information? We seek comment on these approaches.
56. This is a continuation of the Report and Order adopted today to
collect from licensees information about Covered List equipment or
services on their respective submarine cable and to certify as to their
use of Covered List equipment or services on their respective cable
system. Because the information collection or certification will be
based on known information as of the time licensees submit these
materials, here, we seek comment on our approach to maintain visibility
and awareness of Covered List equipment or services used in the
licensed submarine cables after there are changes to the Covered List.
The potential for a national security risk or threat from newly added
entries to the Commission's Covered List in the future may be great and
we seek comment on this approach or other approaches to mitigate
against these potential risks or threats. Moreover, we seek comment on
whether the routine condition should require a licensee to disclose if
the licensee does not use the equipment or service that is newly added
to the Covered List and if so, whether the licensee should be required
to certify that it will not use the equipment or service in the future.
10. Sharing Information From Applications With Federal Agencies
57. We seek comment on adopting a rule which would allow the
Commission to share with relevant federal government agencies,
including the Committee, information submitted in an application for a
cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control,
or renewal or extension of a license on a confidential basis without
the pre-notification requirements of Sec. 0.442(d) of the Commission's
rules. We seek comment, for example, on sharing such information
required in Sec. 1.70005 and other rules that reference Sec. 1.70005.
Under this approach, the Commission would be able to share the
confidential information with federal agencies that have a legitimate
need for the information consistent with their functions without the
delay attendant to providing parties an opportunity to object to the
sharing. The sharing of confidential information would, however,
continue to be subject to the requirement that each of the other
federal agencies comply with the confidentiality protections applicable
both to the Commission and the other agencies relating to the unlawful
disclosure of information, and we
[[Page 48568]]
would provide notice to the parties whose information is being shared.
58. We tentatively find that Executive Order 13913 provides a basis
to share such information with the Committee by establishing that the
members and advisors of the Committee have a legitimate need for such
information. The policy of Executive Order 13913 is to ensure the
``[t]he security, integrity, and availability of the United States
telecommunications networks [that] are vital to United States national
security and law enforcement interests.'' Further, in this regard,
Executive Order 13913 authorizes the Committee to review not only
license applications but also existing licenses. We seek comment on
this tentative conclusion.
C. Presumptively Exempting Applications From Referral to the Executive
Branch Agencies
59. We propose adopting a national security standard that would
exclude a submarine cable application from Commission referral to the
Executive Branch agencies, if all of the qualifications are met that
will ensure the security, integrity, and resilience of the submarine
cable system. We also note that the Commission would retain the
discretion to refer a submarine cable application to the Executive
Branch agencies for review for national security, law enforcement,
foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns as circumstances warrant.
We seek comment on whether we should establish further guidance on when
we will exercise such discretion. We believe that reducing the number
of applications that are referred to the Committee would reduce burdens
on applicants and enable the Commission and the Committee to prioritize
resources on reviewing foreign adversary applications that present
significant national security and law enforcement risks warranting
closer scrutiny and will allow for expedited review of applications
generally. We will continue to work closely with the Committee to
assess how we can reduce the number of applications that are referred
to the Committee and to streamline the review of those applications
that are referred to the Committee, while taking into consideration the
U.S. government's equities in national security and law enforcement.
60. Currently, Sec. 1.40001 of the rules states that ``[t]he
Commission will generally refer to the [Executive Branch] applications
filed for . . . submarine cable landing license[s] as well as an
application[s] to assign, transfer control of, or modify those
authorizations and licenses where the applicant has reportable foreign
ownership . . . .'' Subject to certain exceptions, including the
presumptive disqualifications that we adopt today, we currently refer
submarine cable applications where an applicant has a foreign owner
that directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of the equity interests
and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, of the applicant.
The Commission received several comments raising concerns about the
lengthy duration of the submarine cable licensing process and
encouraging the Commission to use the existing streamlining process and
to exercise its discretion in determining which applications to refer
to the Committee.
61. The Commission tentatively concludes that extensive delays to
submarine cable applications that do not threaten national security or
law enforcement interests are not in the public interest. Such delays
impose economic costs without national security benefits. Furthermore,
not only do such delays not benefit national security; in fact, they
may undermine national security by deterring investment in submarine
cables and thus reducing the resilience of America's submarine cable
network. This is not consistent with the America First Investment
Policy or the goals of the Commission. We seek comment on whether this
analysis is correct.
62. Specifically, we propose to adopt a national security standard
that is a list of qualifications for a submarine cable application--
including an application for a cable landing license or modification,
assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of such
license--to qualify the applicant for exemption from Commission
referral to the Committee. We seek comment on the list of
qualifications and whether there are other standards that we should
adopt to ensure the applicant has met qualifications to ensure the
national security of the United States if its application is granted.
We propose to require applicants to certify to all of the
qualifications below to enable the Commission to verify whether or not
the application qualifies for exclusion from Commission referral to the
Committee. We propose that our determination of whether an applicant
meets each qualification would be considered on a case-by-case basis
and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances. We are
particularly interested in comments from both the affected industry and
the Committee on what qualifications would serve the public interest
and protect national security. Additionally, we seek comment on the
impact of the Committee's application and license review prioritization
based on section 3(a) of Executive Order 14117 on our proposed rules
and interaction with the Committee.
1. Recurring Applicants in Good Standing
63. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an
applicant must be a licensee of a submarine cable licensed by the
Commission and has operated its licensed submarine cable(s) without any
incident. An applicant in good standing would be, for example, one that
has complied with the terms of the license(s) and has no pending or
adjudicated enforcement action by the Commission and/or national
security, law enforcement, or other concerns brought to the
Commission's attention in the course of operating the submarine
cable(s) and has no history of false statements or certifications in
its dealings before the Commission related to its cable landing
license(s). For instance, should we consider that an application meets
this qualification if there was no referral of any issue to the
Commission's Enforcement Bureau and/or no issuance of a Letter of
Inquiry or subpoena at any point in the history of the cable landing
license(s) or within a certain timeframe? What would be an appropriate
standard or timeframe to ensure that the applicant has demonstrated
good standing with the Commission with respect to its licensing
obligations in the past? We seek comment on an appropriate timeframe in
assessing any history of incidents involving a licensee's operation of
its submarine cable.
64. We also seek comment on other incidents, or lack thereof, that
we should consider for purposes of assessing an applicant's
qualification for exclusion from referral. We note that several
commenters support expediting review for applicants whose prior
applications were approved, and propose relying on certifications in
conjunction with a streamlined process for a ``frequent filer.'' In
considering the record, we seek further comment on whether an
application should qualify for exclusion from referral if a prior
submarine cable application filed by the applicant was recently cleared
by the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, and granted
by the Commission. For instance, should we consider whether a prior
application that was filed by the same applicant was cleared by the
Executive Branch agencies, with or without mitigation, within the past
18 months from the filing of a new application? Does the timeframe of
18 months following any clearance by the Executive Branch
[[Page 48569]]
agencies of such prior application sufficiently account for changed
circumstances and an evolving national security and law enforcement
environment? Should the timeframe be shorter or longer than 18 months?
Should we also consider whether the applicant and/or its existing
submarine cable system have no reportable foreign ownership, or no new
reportable foreign ownership, as of the Executive Branch agencies' most
recent review? We seek comment on these and any other considerations.
65. We seek comment on how we should apply this qualification for
recurring applicants in good standing where an applicant is or has
previously been a part of a consortium. For example, if multiple joint
licensees on a cable landing license hold equal ownership and
controlling interests in the submarine cable and operated it without
any incident, and one of the licensees files an application for a new
cable landing license, should we consider that the applicant has met
this standard? Should we require that a licensee must hold a specific
threshold of ownership and/or controlling interests in its licensed
submarine cable to meet this standard for any submarine cable
application it subsequently files? How should we apply this standard if
an applicant(s) is a joint licensee of another submarine cable where
one of the joint licensees holding less than a majority of the
ownership and controlling interests violated the Commission's rules or
a condition of the license in the course of operating the submarine
cable? We seek comment generally on how we should apply a ``in good
standing'' standard where an application is filed by multiple parties,
such as an application for a new cable landing license filed by joint
applicants or an application filed by any or all of the joint licensees
of a submarine cable. To the extent multiple parties file an
application, if one applicant meets the qualification but others do
not, how should we apply the ``in good standing'' standard with respect
to those other applicants? Are there other combinations of scenarios
that we should consider?
2. No History of Character Condition Violations
66. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an
applicant must have consistently demonstrated the requisite character
qualifications. Specifically, should we consider an applicant qualifies
for the exclusion if in the last 20 years it has not (1) materially
violated the Cable Landing License Act where the violation (a) was not
remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or
compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or
authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional;
(2) committed national security-related violations of the
Communications Act or Commission rules as identified in Commission
orders, including but not limited to violations of rules concerning the
Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure
Networks Act; (3) made materially false statements or engaged in
fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing
License Act; (4) been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false
statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national
security before another U.S. government agency; or (5) materially
failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license, including
but not limited to a condition requiring compliance with a mitigation
agreement with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee,
where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication
involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a
loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the
Commission to be intentional? We seek comment on this approach.
3. Enhanced Cybersecurity Standards
67. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an
applicant must submit a cybersecurity certification consistent with
Sec. Sec. 1.70005(m) and 1.70006(c) of our newly adopted rules, which
sets out the requirements of an initial applications for a cable
landing license, if such applicant is to qualify for exclusion from
Commission referral to the Committee. Should we require a more
stringent standard in order to meet this presumptive qualification?
Should a requirement of this qualification involve the structuring of a
licensee's cybersecurity and physical risk management plans in
accordance with higher cybersecurity standards such as the NIST CSF,
and a set of established cybersecurity best practices, such as the
standards and controls set forth in the CISA CPGs or the CIS Controls?
We seek comment on what other cybersecurity standards would be
reasonable to require that a licensee implement, if any submarine cable
application that it subsequently files is to qualify for exclusion from
referral.
4. Physical Security Standards
68. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an
applicant must certify that it will meet appropriate physical security
standards, such as taking all practicable measures to physically secure
the submarine cable system (including the cable landing stations, beach
manholes and related sites, and SLTEs), if such applicant is to qualify
for exclusion from Commission referral to the Committee. We also
propose that, in order to qualify for exclusion from referral,
applicants must certify they will ensure that individuals who have
access to the submarine cable system (including cable landing stations,
beach manholes and related sites, and SLTEs) will be screened in
accordance with the applicant's security policies. In addition, we
propose that, in order to qualify for exclusion from referral, the
applicant must certify that it will exclude any company personnel,
including contractors, that is a citizen of a foreign adversary
country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules,
from physical or logical access to the submarine cable system. Finally,
we seek comment on the physical security requirements and best
practices (e.g., perimeter security, physical barriers, surveillance,
environmental controls, security personnel, audit and vulnerability
assessments, security awareness training, etc.) that should be required
in order for an applicant to meet this presumptive qualification. What
other physical security standards should we require in order for an
application to qualify for exclusion from referral?
5. No Logic-Bearing Hardware or Software Component Produced by Persons
Owned by, Controlled by, or Subject to the Jurisdiction or Direction of
a Foreign Adversary
69. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an
applicant must certify that it will not include any logic-bearing
hardware (e.g., readable, writable, and/or programable hardware
components) or software in the submarine cable system that is produced
by any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001 of our
newly adopted rules, in order to qualify for exclusion from Commission
referral to the Committee. We seek comment on whether we should define
what constitutes logic-bearing hardware or software, and if so, what
components deployed in a submarine cable system would constitute logic-
bearing hardware or software. Alternatively, should we use a slightly
narrower definition of ``communications equipment or services,'' as
proposed above?
[[Page 48570]]
6. No Ownership Below 5% Is Held by Persons Owned, Controlled by, or
Subject to the Jurisdiction or Direction of a Foreign Adversary
70. In the Report and Order, we retain the requirement that an
entity owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the submarine
cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system, and any
entity that controls a U.S. cable landing station, must be an applicant
for a cable landing license. We propose that, to presumptively qualify
for exemption, an applicant must certify that no entity holding less
than 5% interest in the cable system is owned by, controlled by, or
subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as
defined in Sec. 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules. An applicant
would meet this standard if no owner of the submarine cable is owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a
foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g). We seek comment on
this proposal. Should we also require that an applicant meets this
qualification if any entity that owns the U.S. cable landing station
also is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g)? What
other qualifications should we adopt to ensure the cables do not have
foreign adversary ownership or control of the infrastructure?
7. Expansion of IRUs and/or Leases of Capacity Prohibitions
71. In the Report and Order, we adopt a routine condition that
prohibits cable landing licensees from entering into new or an
extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity on
submarine cable systems landing in the United States, where such
arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity would give an entity that is
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g) of our newly
adopted rules, the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on a
submarine cable landing in the United States. We propose that, to
presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant would need to certify
that it will prohibit its customers from entering into new arrangements
or extending existing arrangements that would be prohibited for the
applicant itself. The applicant would have to adopt contractual
provisions that prohibit its buyers or lessors from selling to, leasing
out, or swapping the capacity with an entity that is owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g). We seek comment on this
standard.
72. To what extent should we consider whether the capacity sold or
leased out by an applicant to another entity is, in turn, sold to,
leased out, or swapped with an entity that is owned by, controlled by,
or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as
defined in Sec. 1.70001(g)? Instead of relying solely on contract
terms, should we assess whether applicants have taken measures to
enforce any such contractual provisions? Should we also require
applicants to file with the Commission copies of any arrangements for
IRUs or leases of capacity, and if so, should we treat this information
as presumptively confidential?
8. No Interconnection With Foreign Adversary Cables
73. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an
applicant must certify that the submarine cable system will not connect
directly or via a branching unit with a submarine cable owned or
operated by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to
the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in
Sec. 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, or that lands in a foreign
adversary country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f). We seek comment on
whether this qualification should include other types of connections to
submarine cable systems that could present national security risks.
9. No Submarine Cable Repair Ships Operated by Foreign Adversaries
74. We propose to require that, in order to qualify for exclusion
from Commission referral to the Committee, an applicant must certify
that it will not use a ship for submarine cable installation or repair
and maintenance of the submarine cable system that is owned or operated
by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec.
1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, or that is flagged in a foreign
adversary country, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(f). We seek comment on
whether it is reasonable to require that applicants must meet this
qualification in order to qualify for exclusion from referral, or
whether restricting the use of such cable installation or repair and
maintenance ships would have any adverse impact on owners and operators
of submarine cable systems as well as the submarine cable system
itself. Alternatively, rather than a prohibition, should we merely
require that, an applicant certify that it will implement adequate
security measures if it uses any such cable installation or repair and
maintenance ships, regardless of whether the ship is operated by an
entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction
or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g)? We
seek comment on how applicants will know if a given ship is restricted.
Should we rely on applicants' due diligence, require the Commission
publish a white list of permissible ships, or use some other method? We
seek comment on ways to ensure that this qualification would not
curtail or otherwise adversely impact the ability of submarine cable
owners and operators to quickly deploy or repair submarine cable
systems connecting to the United States.
10. No Senior Officials Owned by, Controlled by, or Subject to the
Jurisdiction or Direction of a Foreign Adversary
75. We propose to require that, to presumptively qualify for
exemption, an applicant must certify that no senior official of the
applicant or the applicant's parent company(ies) is owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary, as defined in Sec. 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules.
For purposes of such requirement, we propose to define a senior
official as a board member or executive-level management, such as a
Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer. We seek comment on
this proposal. Should we adopt a different definition of ``senior
official'' for purposes of the proposed requirement? Should we only
apply this proposed requirement with respect to the board members or
executives of the applicant or the applicant's parent company(ies)?
11. Other Standards
76. We seek comment on whether we should also require that, to
presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify to other
measures that are common features of national security agreements with
the Committee that concern submarine cables. For example, national
security agreements often require that licensees provide the Committee
with notice for certain third party access to the submarine cable
infrastructure. Should we require that, to presumptively qualify for
exemption, an applicant must certify that it will not provide any
individual or entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in Sec.
1.70001(g), or that is identified on the Covered List
[[Page 48571]]
with access to certain parts of the submarine cable system, such as the
cable landing station(s), NOC(s), and beach manhole(s)? Which parts of
the submarine cable system should we include in such a certification?
Should we similarly require certification as to access to sensitive
U.S. data or domestic communications? How would we define the data that
licensees would be prohibited from sharing? Should we also require
applicants to certify that they will adopt personnel screening measures
to ensure adherence to these requirements? If we required personnel
screening measures, what would such a requirement consist of? National
security agreements also often contain requirements around incident and
breach reporting. Should we require that, to presumptively qualify for
exemption, an applicant must certify that it will report certain
incidents or breaches to the Commission, such as cyberattacks,
unauthorized access, or service disruptions to the Commission? If we
adopted such a standard, how would we define the universe of incidents
and breaches that would need to be reported? What would be the deadline
for incident or breach reporting? 48 hours? More? Fewer? Would the
national security benefits of such a reporting requirement outweigh any
burden to licensees of providing these reports? What would be the costs
and benefits of all of these proposals?
77. We seek comment generally on whether there are any other
standards that the Commission should consider to qualify an application
for exemption from Commission referral to the Executive Branch
agencies. In the alternative, we seek comment on whether we should not
refer any applications to the Executive Branch in light of the strong
national security measures we adopt in the Report and Order and further
propose in this FNPRM, and whether we should revise Sec. 1.40001 of
the rules accordingly.
D. Timeframe for Removing Covered Equipment and Services From Submarine
Cable System
78. To further protect U.S. submarine cable networks from national
security and law enforcement threats, we seek comment on whether to
require existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system
any and all covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe
prior to the expiration of the license. In the Report and Order, we
find that covered equipment and services that have been deemed to pose
an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or
the security and safety of United States persons. Accordingly, we take
action to prohibit the use of covered equipment and services identified
on the Covered List in new submarine cable systems. We also apply a
disqualifying condition that will presumptively preclude the grant of a
cable landing license filed by any applicant that is identified on the
Covered List. Moreover, we require existing licensees to certify that
they will not add to their submarine cable systems any current covered
equipment or services. However, we believe there remains a critical
vulnerability where existing licensees use covered equipment and
services in current or future operations of existing submarine cable
systems. While we recognize that removal of covered equipment and
services from these submarine cable systems may be burdensome to
licensees, we believe that allowing the continued use of equipment and
services that present unacceptable national security risks is contrary
to our objectives to protect this critical U.S. submarine cable
networks. We seek comment on this analysis.
79. We seek comment on whether to require a gradual transition away
from the use of covered equipment and services in current submarine
cable infrastructure, and if so, we seek comment on the appropriate
timeframe for the transition. For example, should a requirement to
implement a gradual transition away from using covered equipment or
services track the remaining term of a cable landing license held by an
existing licensee? To the extent an existing licensee seeks to renew or
extend a cable landing license upon expiration, we seek comment on
whether to require that the licensee must certify that it has removed
from the submarine cable system any and all covered equipment or
services. In the alternative, should we require such existing licensee
to certify that it has a credible plan to remove covered equipment and
services within a certain timeframe (e.g., 5 years) and to submit the
plan to the Commission? We seek comment on this approach.
80. As an alternative to requiring a transition based on the
remaining term of a cable landing license, should we require existing
licensees to remove any and all covered equipment or services within a
set number of years as of the effective date of any new rule? Is 5
years an appropriate timeframe? Should we adopt a longer or shorter
timeframe? What considerations should we review in making a
determination about how long to provide for the transition?
81. Foreign Adversary Annual Report. Regardless of whether a
transition period or a date certain is employed for removing any and
all covered equipment or services from an existing submarine cable
system, should we in the meantime require such licensees to file a
Foreign Adversary Annual Report until such covered equipment or
services have been removed? Specifically, should we add a new criterion
to newly-adopted rule, Sec. 1.70017(b), to require an existing
licensee ``that has purchased, rented, leased, or otherwise obtained
equipment or services on the Commission's Covered List and is using in
the submarine cable infrastructure'' to file a Foreign Adversary Annual
Report consistent with Sec. 1.70017? Would this, in addition to
ensuring the Commission has the requisite information, create
incentives to remove covered equipment? We seek comment on this
approach or if there is another manner in which we can monitor
licensees that use covered equipment or services.
E. Prioritizing Trusted Technology in Submarine Cable Systems
82. We seek comment on how the Commission can use its authority
pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, to
incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted
technologies produced and provided by the United States and its allies,
such that ``American AI technologies, standards, and governance models
are adopted worldwide . . .'' How can the Commission leverage the
submarine cable licensing regime to ``make [the U.S.] the global
partner of choice and the standards setter'' by ``enabl[ing] and
encourag[ing] American companies to distribute the American tech stack
around the world''? Are there ways we can encourage foreign countries
and companies to adopt and use technologies produced and provided by
the United States and its allies, as opposed to adopting and using the
technologies and produced and provided by foreign adversaries? For
example, should the Commission prioritize grants of licenses for
submarine cables that land in countries aligned with U.S.-trusted
technology standards? Should the Commission prioritize grants of
licenses for submarine cables that interconnect to data centers, or
other facilities with the necessary infrastructure to support internet
traffic exchange, that use trusted technologies, as opposed to
technologies produced and provided by foreign adversaries? How should
the Commission develop definitions and standards for such a policy?
[[Page 48572]]
F. Artificial Intelligence and Submarine Cable Systems
83. We seek comment on the use of artificial intelligence in SLTEs
in particular, as well as the use of artificial intelligence generally
in the submarine cable system as a whole. According to market
forecasts, submarine cable operators will likely incorporate artificial
intelligence into SLTEs and submarine cables for various reasons.
Artificial intelligence, for example, may play a role in improving the
function of the submarine cable, such as improving network planning,
intelligent traffic routing, and capacity optimization. Artificial
intelligence can also safeguard the submarine cable system through
predictive maintenance, physical threat detection, and cybersecurity
threat detection. While artificial intelligence brings positive
attributes to submarine cable operations, we believe that there are
significant national security concerns when artificial intelligence
technologies involve foreign adversaries. We seek comment on any
national security concerns regarding use of artificial intelligence in
submarine cable systems. What are the national security impacts and
potential threats posed by incorporating artificial intelligence owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the direction or jurisdiction of
foreign adversaries? Given that submarine cables are critical
infrastructure, should we refer assessment of any national security
concerns regarding the use of artificial intelligence in submarine
cable systems to the Commission's Communications Security, Reliability,
and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) for consideration and
recommendations?
G. Additional Measures To Reform and Streamline Rules and Processes
1. Domestic Cables
84. We seek comment on whether under certain circumstances to
streamline approval of domestic cables (i.e., those cables that connect
one portion of the United States to another portion of the United
States, such as a cable connecting the continental United States to the
U.S. Virgin Islands). The Commission currently does not evaluate
applications--including applications for a cable landing license or
modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension
of a cable landing license, involving domestic cables (domestic cable
applications)--differently than those involving international cables.
For cables that connect points solely within the United States and its
territories and possessions, NCTA endorsed streamlined review for such
cable systems and the Alaska Telecom Association proposed ``streamlined
blanket licensing.''
85. A domestic cable application can present national security
concerns even if a domestic cable would only connect points within the
United States and would not have foreign landing points. For example, a
domestic cable application may involve applicants with foreign
ownership or propose to use foreign equipment in the cable system.
Indeed, several existing domestic cable systems are subject to
mitigation agreements with the Committee. We seek comment on whether
the certifications we adopt in the Report and Order are sufficient to
resolve any potential national security or law enforcement concerns and
obviate the need for review by the Committee. We seek comment on any
national security or law enforcement risks posed by domestic cables
that the certifications we adopt in the Report and Order may not
adequately address.
86. Domestic cable applications are often reviewed by the
Committee. We seek comment on reasons why domestic cable applications
should undergo review by the Committee and whether the reasons are
different than for review of applications involving international
cables. If there are national security and law enforcement reasons
warranting review by the Committee, are there any mechanisms the
Commission and Committee could employ to reduce the time for review of
a domestic cable application? Are there any other methods we should
consider to streamline review of domestic cable applications in light
of the policies adopted in the Report and Order and contemplated
elsewhere in this FNPRM? Are there any other submarine cable rules that
the Commission should consider modifying or eliminating in the context
of domestic cables?
2. Mitigation Agreements
87. We seek comment on how the Commission can and should modify and
streamline any existing cable license conditions that were based on
previous mitigation agreements once our rules are in effect. We have
made significant regulatory changes to address national security
concerns and prior mitigation agreements may not have consistent
requirements to ensure the safety and security of submarine cables.
Should we, for example, modify and streamline any existing license
terms that were based on mitigation agreements, which include Letters
of Agreements (LOAs) and National Security Agreements (NSAs), to ensure
they are in line with the principles behind our new rules adopted in
the Report and Order? Should we focus our efforts on modifying license
terms based on domestic cable mitigation agreements, such as focusing
first on those entered into prior to the effective date of the rules?
Should the Commission adopt a procedure that permits licensees of
domestic cable systems to attest to the certifications we adopt in the
Report and Order in order for the Commission to remove license
conditions requiring compliance with a mitigation agreement? Can and
should the Commission consider modifying or streamlining all license
conditions that were based on mitigation agreements generally? What
methods could the Commission employ to provide all licensees the
intended benefit of consistent national security requirements? We seek
comment on how the Commission can and should modify and streamline any
existing license terms based on prior mitigation agreements consistent
with the principles articulated in the Report and Order.
3. Other Agencies and Processes That Address Submarine Cables
88. We recognize that the Commission is not the only agency in the
Federal Government that interfaces with submarine cable systems. There
are other agencies and regulatory processes that rely on submarine
cables for many uses, including government contracts, use of submarine
cables for commercial service, and/or reliance on submarine cables for
critical missions. Some agencies outside of the Commission include
those agency members of the Committee, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and the Defense Priorities and
Allocations System (DPAS), among others. We seek comment on what
impacts, if any, the Commission's adopted rules in the Report and Order
and proposed rules in this FNPRM have on these other agencies,
government contracts, and processes generally. We seek comment on
whether the Commission should reconsider any proposals to better
address the interrelationships among the various agencies and processes
that affect submarine cables. Additionally, should we reconsider or
revise Sec. 1.70007(c) of our newly adopted rules, which requires that
licensees shall at all times comply with any requirements of U.S.
government authorities regarding the location and concealment of the
cable facilities, buildings, and apparatus for the purpose of
protecting and safeguarding the cables from injury or
[[Page 48573]]
destruction by enemies of the United States? Do the costs of the
requirement outweigh the national security and law enforcement
benefits?
H. Alternative Definition of ``Foreign Adversary'' and ``Foreign
Adversary Country''
89. Subsequent to the issuance of the 2024 Cable NPRM, the
Department of Justice issued rules pursuant to Executive Order 14117
(``Preventing Access to Americans' Bulk Sensitive Personal Data and
United States Government-Related Data by Countries of Concern''). Those
rules defined ``country of concern'' as, ``any foreign government that,
as determined by the Attorney General with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce: (a) Has engaged in a
long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse
to the national security of the United States or security and safety of
United States persons; and (b) Poses a significant risk of exploiting
government-related data or bulk U.S. sensitive personal data to the
detriment of the national security of the United States or security and
safety of U.S. persons.'' Furthermore, the rules listed ``countries of
concern'' as China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela,
identical to the list of foreign adversary countries in our rule, 47
CFR 1.70001(g). Given the relevance of these rules to our efforts to
safeguard submarine cables against threats from foreign adversaries, we
seek comment on whether we should incorporate this definition and these
determinations into our rules. If so, how? For example, should we
include in the definition of ``foreign adversary country'' any country
that in the Commerce Department or Justice Department lists? We seek
comment on alternative approaches.
I. Costs and Benefits
90. We seek comment on the potential benefits and costs of the
proposals discussed throughout this FNPRM. We believe that the rule
changes identified in the FNPRM would advance the United States'
national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy.
We expect that these proposals will streamline our rules and processes,
and strengthen our oversight of submarine cable systems that reach the
United States by increasing the quality and granularity of data and
information about these cable systems, including the identity of
entities with ownership interests or control of this critical
infrastructure.
91. Among the proposals in the FNPRM, we propose concrete steps to
build upon the Report and Order and recent proceedings to prevent
national security risks from current and potential foreign adversaries,
while encouraging the use of trusted technology and measures to further
accelerate the buildout of submarine cables. We propose and seek
comment on a regulatory framework that would require entities that own
or operate SLTEs to become licensees. We propose granting SLTE owners
and operators a blanket license, subject to certain exclusions and
routine conditions, to reduce burdens to industry and encourage the
investment and deployment of submarine cable systems. As a condition of
any grant of a blanket license, in addition to the conditions for all
licensees, we also propose to require existing SLTE owners and
operators that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, or other relevant
criteria, to submit a tailored SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report to
ensure that the Commission maintains consistent oversight over their
operations. In addition, we propose new certifications and routine
conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine
cables from national security risks. Moreover, we propose an approach
to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United
States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from
referral to the Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain
standards. Finally, we propose and broadly seek comment on additional
measures to reform and streamline the submarine cable licensing rules
and processes, with the goal of accelerating and enhancing the buildout
of submarine cable infrastructure, and seek comment on the costs and
benefits of the proposed rules and any alternatives.
92. The benefits of the proposed rules are difficult to quantify,
as they extend to our national security and public interest
responsibilities. We expect that the rules we propose will allow us to
build upon the Report and Order and recent proceedings to prevent
current and potential foreign adversary control and interference in
submarine cables. Furthermore, our proposals to develop a framework for
SLTEs will allow us to mitigate physical and logical access risks to
U.S. submarine cable systems. Moreover, we expect our proposed rules to
reform and streamline the application process, saving valuable time and
resources for licensees who meet national security conditions. We seek
comment on the expected benefits of the proposals in the FNPRM.
93. Our estimate of costs should include all of the expected costs
that would be incurred as a result of the rules proposed in the FNPRM,
including the costs of additional data collection concerning SLTEs,
reporting costs, and the costs of enforcing our additional
requirements. We note that the annual aggregate cost of the proposed
rules described above could vary, depending on the rules adopted. We
tentatively conclude that the benefits of establishing the proposed
rules--which include the safety and reliability of the submarine cable
systems and the protection of national security and law enforcement
interests--will be in excess of these costs.
94. We seek comment on the costs that applicants will incur from
the new requirements detailed above. We expect that our proposal to
expedite applications that meet national security conditions will
result in significant cost savings for licensees by reducing the time
and resources required to prepare these applications. We seek comment
on the estimated cost savings that would accrue if these rules are
adopted. We also seek comment on any additional costs on licensees,
including on small entities.
IV. Procedural Matters
95. The Commission has also prepared an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning the potential impact of rule and
policy change proposals on small entities in the FNPRM. The IRFA is set
forth in Appendix D. The Commission invites the general public, in
particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA. Comments must be
filed by the deadlines for comments on the FNPRM indicated on the first
page of this document and must have a separate and distinct heading
designating them as responses to the IRFA.
96. Paperwork Reduction Act. The FNPRM may contain proposed new or
modified information collections. The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general
public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on any
information collections contained in this document, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521. In addition,
pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer
than 25 employees.
97. Ex Parte Presentations-Permit-But-Disclose. The proceeding this
FNPRM
[[Page 48574]]
initiates shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in
accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex
parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at
which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data
presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data
or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments,
memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide
citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments,
memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or
paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of
summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to
Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex
parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).
In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has
made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte
presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations,
and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic
comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed
in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).
Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the
Commission's ex parte rules.
98. Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act. Consistent
with the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law
1189, a summary of this FNPRM will be available on https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings.
99. OPEN Government Data Act. The OPEN Government Data Act requires
agencies to make ``public data assets'' available under an open license
and as ``open Government data assets,'' i.e., in machine-readable, open
format, unencumbered by use restrictions other than intellectual
property rights, and based on an open standard that is maintained by a
standards organization. This requirement is to be implemented ``in
accordance with guidance by the Director'' of the OMB. The term
``public data asset'' means ``a data asset, or part thereof, maintained
by the Federal Government that has been, or may be, released to the
public, including any data asset, or part thereof, subject to
disclosure under [the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)].'' A ``data
asset'' is ``a collection of data elements or data sets that may be
grouped together,'' and ``data'' is ``recorded information, regardless
of form or the media on which the data is recorded.''
100. Filing Requirements--Comments and Replies. Pursuant to
Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415,
1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments in
response to the FNPRM on or before the dates indicated on the first
page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of
Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
101. Availability of Documents. Comments, reply comments, and ex
parte submissions will be publicly available online via ECFS. When the
FCC Headquarters reopens to the public, these documents will also be
available for public inspection during regular business hours in the
FCC Reference Center, Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street
NE, Washington, DC 20554.
102. Further Information. For further information, contact Desiree
Hanssen of the Office of International Affairs, at 202-418-0887 or
[email protected].
V. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
103. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has
prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the
policies and rules proposed in the FNPRM assessing the possible
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The Commission requests written public comments on this IRFA. Comments
must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the
deadlines for comments specified on the first page of the FNPRM. The
Commission will send a copy of the FNPRM, including this IRFA, to the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA).
In addition, the FNPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be
published in the Federal Register.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
104. In this FNPRM, we propose to build upon the efforts adopted in
the Report and Order to prevent national security risks from current
and potential foreign adversaries, while encouraging the use of trusted
technology and measures to further accelerate the buildout of submarine
cables. We propose to and seek comment on a regulatory framework that
would require entities that own or operate submarine line terminal
equipment (SLTE), including any that may be small business entities, to
become licensees. We propose granting SLTE owners and operators a
blanket license, subject to certain exclusions and routine conditions,
to reduce burdens to industry and encourage the investment in and
deployment of submarine cable systems. As a condition of any grant of a
blanket license, in addition to the conditions for all licensees, we
also propose to require SLTE owners and operators that are owned by,
controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign
adversary, or other relevant criteria, to submit a tailored annual
report (SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report) to ensure that the
Commission maintains consistent oversight over their operations.
105. We propose new certifications and routine conditions related
to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from
national security risks as explained in detail in the FNPRM. For
example, we seek comment on whether to require an applicant for a cable
landing license to certify, as a condition of the potential grant of an
application, that it will not use any equipment in the operation of the
submarine cable system that are produced by entities that are ``owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a
foreign adversary'' as defined in the Report and Order. Another
example, we propose to adopt a routine condition prohibiting the use of
certain third-party service providers and propose to adopt related
certifications, to ensure the security, integrity, and resiliency of
submarine cable systems. We also seek comment on adopting a routine
condition that would prohibit cable landing licensees from entering
into new or an extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases
for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States,
with any entity identified on the Covered List. We propose routine
conditions that would require licensees to submit notifications of
important changes to the submarine cable system, and seek comment on
adopting routine
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conditions that would require cable landing licensees to submit
certifications in the event of changes that result in a licensee
becoming owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or
direction of a foreign adversary, or changes to the Department of
Commerce's list of foreign adversary countries, or changes to the
Covered List.
106. We propose an approach to expedite deployment of submarine
cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding
submarine cable applications from referral to the Executive Branch
agencies if they meet certain standards. To further protect U.S.
submarine cable networks from national security and law enforcement
threats, we seek comment on whether to require existing licensees to
remove from their submarine cable system any and all covered equipment
or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of
the license. We also seek comment on how the Commission can use its
authority pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order
10530, to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted
technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign
allies. We seek comment on whether under certain circumstances to
streamline approval of domestic cables. Finally, we seek comment on the
costs and benefits of the proposed rules and any alternatives,
including the impact of the proposed rules on small entities and
alternative approaches.
B. Legal Basis
107. The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1,
4(i), 4(j), 201-255, 303(r), 403, and 413 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-255, 303(r), 403,
and 413, and the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 34-39, and
Executive Order No. 10530, section 5(a), (May 12, 1954) reprinted as
amended in 3 U.S.C. 301.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply
108. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and,
where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines
the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms
``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act.'' A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
109. All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of
establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of
internet services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are
also included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard
for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million
or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were
1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of
those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on this
data, the Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other
Telecommunications'' firms can be considered small.
110. Computer Infrastructure Providers, Data Processing, Web
Hosting, and Related Services. This industry comprises establishments
primarily engaged in providing computing infrastructure, data
processing services, Web hosting services (except software publishing),
and related services, including streaming support services (except
streaming distribution services). Cloud storage services, computer data
storage services, computing platform infrastructure provision
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), optical scanning services, Platform
as a service (PaaS), and video and audio technical streaming support
services are included in this industry. Data processing establishments
provide complete processing and specialized reports from data supplied
by clients or provide automated data processing and data entry
services. The SBA small business size standard for this industry
classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million or less as small.
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 indicate that 9,058 firms in this
industry were operational for the entire year. Of this total, 8,345
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Thus, under the SBA size
standard the majority of firms in this industry are small.
111. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small
businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services.
Providers of these services include several types of competitive local
exchange service providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021,
there were 3,378 providers that reported they were competitive local
service providers. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that
3,230 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the
SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be
considered small entities.
112. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the
SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for
Interexchange Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021,
there were 127 providers that reported they were engaged in the
provision of interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 109 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority of providers in this industry
can be considered small entities.
113. Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals.
This industry comprises establishments primarily engaged in (1)
publishing and/or broadcasting content on the internet exclusively or
(2) operating websites
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that use a search engine to generate and maintain extensive databases
of internet addresses and content in an easily searchable format (and
known as Web search portals). The publishing and broadcasting
establishments in this industry do not provide traditional (non-
internet) versions of the content that they publish or broadcast. They
provide textual, audio, and/or video content of general or specific
interest on the internet exclusively. Establishments known as web
search portals often provide additional internet services, such as
email, connections to other websites, auctions, news, and other limited
content, and serve as a home base for internet users. The SBA small
business size standard for this industry classifies firms having 1,000
or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
there were firms that 5,117 operated for the entire year. Of this
total, 5,002 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Thus, under
this size standard the majority of firms in this industry can be
considered small.
114. Internet Service Providers (Non-Broadband). Internet access
service providers using client-supplied telecommunications connections
(e.g., dial-up ISPs) as well as VoIP service providers using client-
supplied telecommunications connections fall in the industry
classification of All Other Telecommunications. The SBA small business
size standard for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts
of $40 million or less as small. For this industry, U.S. Census Bureau
data for 2017 show that there were 1,079 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year. Of those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less
than $25 million. Consequently, under the SBA size standard a majority
of firms in this industry can be considered small.
115. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental
Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that
are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three
broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected by our
actions. First, while there are industry specific size standards for
small businesses that are used in the regulatory flexibility analysis,
in general, a small business is an independent business having fewer
than 500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of
all businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75 million
businesses. Next, ``small organizations'' are not-for-profit
enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant
their field. While we do not have data regarding the number of non-
profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have
fewer than 500 employees. Finally, ``small governmental jurisdictions''
are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty
thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government
jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.
116. Wired Broadband Internet Access Service Providers (Wired
ISPs). Providers of wired broadband internet access service include
various types of providers except dial-up internet access providers.
Wireline service that terminates at an end user location or mobile
device and enables the end user to receive information from and/or send
information to the internet at information transfer rates exceeding 200
kilobits per second (kbps) in at least one direction is classified as a
broadband connection under the Commission's rules. Wired broadband
internet services fall in the Wired Telecommunications Carriers
industry. The SBA small business size standard for this industry
classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census
Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in
this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated
with fewer than 250 employees.
117. Additionally, according to Commission data on internet access
services as of June 30, 2024, nationwide there were approximately 2,204
providers of connections over 200 kbps in at least one direction using
various wireline technologies. The Commission does not collect data on
the number of employees for providers of these services, therefore, at
this time we are not able to estimate the number of providers that
would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.
However, in light of the general data on fixed technology service
providers in the Commission's 2024 Communications Marketplace Report,
we believe that the majority of wireline internet access service
providers can be considered small entities.
118. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau
defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text,
sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of
technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired
telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a
variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP
services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and
wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments
providing satellite television distribution services using facilities
and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry.
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline
carriers or fixed local service providers.
119. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers
that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities.
D. Description of Economic Impact and Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
120. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of
proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate
of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the
requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record.
121. The FNPRM proposes rules that would impose new, additional
reporting, recordkeeping, or other compliance obligations on small
entities. The proposed rule changes identified in the FNPRM would
advance United States' national security and economic security through
protecting submarine cable infrastructure and promoting U.S. trusted
technologies. We expect that these proposals will streamline our rules
and processes, including for any small entities, and strengthen
oversight of submarine cable systems that reach the United States. The
FNPRM propose to presumptively
[[Page 48577]]
exclude submarine cable applications from referral to the Executive
Branch agencies if they meet certain standards, which could potentially
assist small entities. The FNPRM seeks comment on additional
approaches, such as a requirement for existing licensees to remove from
their submarine cable system equipment and services identified on the
Covered List within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of
the license and streamlined approval of submarine cables that connect
one portion of the United States to another portion, i.e., domestic
cables. We seek comment on ways the Commission can incentivize adoption
and use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United
States and its foreign allies. The FNPRM proposes rules requiring
applicants to certify that they will not use equipment or services on
the submarine cable produced or provided by entities that are ``owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a
foreign adversary,'' as defined in rules adopted in the Report and
Order. The FNPRM seeks comment on prohibiting licensees from using
third-party service providers owned by, controlled by, or subject to
the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, identified in the
Covered List, or that can access the submarine cable system from a
foreign adversary country. We propose requiring applicants to provide
cable installation, maintenance and repair plans with their
application, recognizing that this rule proposal may ultimately affect
small entities. Finally, we propose and seek comment on additional
measures to reform and streamline the submarine cable licensing rules
and processes and seek comment on the costs and benefits of the
proposed rules and any alternatives.
122. The FNPRM proposes requiring SLTE owners and operators to
become licenses but, to reduce burdens, proposes to grant these
entities blanket licenses. The blanket licensing proposal would prevent
any SLTE owner from having to apply for a license or for a modification
to the license they already possess, making the licensing requirement
cost-free for licensees. The FNPRM seeks comment on requiring SLTE
owners and operators to comply with the routine conditions required of
existing licensees, which may include filing annual circuit capacity
reports. We seek comment on requiring SLTE owners and operators who
meet the criteria for filing a Foreign Adversary Annual Report to file
such a report. At this time, it is difficult to determine the number of
SLTE owners and operators that this would impact. Additionally, we seek
comment on whether to apply prior approval and/or post-consummation
transaction requirements to SLTE owners and operators. Such a
requirement, if adopted, would impose the cost of reporting pro forma
transfers of control or assignments of licenses on SLTE owners, and of
seeking Commission approval for substantive transfers of control or
assignments prior to the transaction.
123. We also seek comment on a requirement to provide submarine
cable installation, maintenance, and repair plans to the Commission
upon request, which we do not anticipate to be costly as the licensee
will likely already produce such plans in the ordinary course of
business.
124. We seek comment on new routine conditions for all licensees,
including requiring licensees to notify the Commission for changes to
the coordinates or addresses for each beach manhole, cable landing
station, or network operations center (NOC); notification of a
licensee's license expiration and intent of non-renewal or non-
extension of the license; notification of a system retirement;
certification for changes to foreign adversary ownership of a licensee;
and certification for changes to the foreign adversary country list. We
propose to require a certification of changes to the Covered List. The
cost of compliance for a licensee would vary depending on how often the
licensee undergoes any of the experiences that would trigger a
notification or certification to the Commission. We anticipate that the
information the Commission seeks would be information licensees would
already possess in the ordinary course of business.
125. The FNPRM seeks comment on whether to require licensees to
gradually transition away from use of equipment and services identified
on the Covered List in their submarine cable system. We anticipate such
a requirement may be burdensome to licensees, including any small
business or small entity licensees, and seek comment on minimizing
those burdens.
126. Our estimate of costs should include all of the expected costs
that would be incurred as a result of the rules proposed in the FNPRM,
including the costs of additional data collection concerning SLTEs,
reporting costs, and the costs of enforcing our additional
requirements. We note that the annual aggregate cost of the proposed
rules described above will vary, depending on the rules adopted. We
estimate that our proposal to require SLTE owners and operators to be
licensees in new submarine cable system applications will increase
costs for applicants by approximately $18,200 per SLTE owner and
operator. We seek comment on the number of SLTE owners and operators
that will be added as licensees to each new application. Moreover, we
expect that our proposal to expedite applications that meet national
security conditions will result in significant cost savings for
licensees by reducing the time and resources required to prepare these
applications. We seek comment on the estimated cost savings that would
accrue if these rules are adopted. We also seek comment on any
additional costs on licensees, including on small entities.
127. We are especially interested in estimates that address
alternative means to provide the same benefits, in terms of protecting
submarine cable infrastructure from national security risks, at lower
costs. The Commission expects the information we receive in comments
including, where requested, cost and benefit analyses, will help to
identify and evaluate relevant compliance matters for small entities,
including compliance costs and other burdens that may result if the
proposals and associated requirements discussed in the FNPRM are
adopted.
E. Discussion of Significant Alternatives Considered That Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities
128. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any
significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any
significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is
required to include alternatives such as: ``(1) the establishment of
differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take
into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.''
129. As described in the FNPRM, we consider and seek comment on the
potential impact and burdens our proposed rules would generally have on
submarine cable applicants and licensees, including owners of SLTE,
some of whom may be small entities. As part of our proposals, we
discuss alternative options that could potentially reduce the impacts
and burdens with respect to small entities
[[Page 48578]]
and more generally for entities subject to the Commission's submarine
cable rules.
130. We considered the burdens on SLTE owners in our proposal to
extend licensing requirements to SLTE owners, by proposing blanket
licensing that would prevent SLTE owners from having to apply for a
license or for a modification to an existing license. We do not know
how many SLTE owners are small businesses, but our proposal to minimize
the burden on SLTE owners of proposed licensing would also lighten the
burden on small business SLTE owners.
131. We seek comment on the burdens of applicants submitting cable
installation and maintenance and repair plans with their application,
and on licensees if a routine condition were imposed requiring their
cable installation and repair plans. The major alternative to these
proposals is opting not to impose them if the burdens are too onerous
and outweigh the benefits.
132. We propose additional requirements on licensees' cybersecurity
and physical security risk management plans. We seek comment which
standards and best practices to use, proposing alternatives such as
National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework,
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Cybersecurity Cross
sector Performance Goals and Objectives, or the Center for Internet
Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls).
133. We seek comment on whether to impose routine conditions
tailored to SLTE owners and operators who may become licensees, and in
doing so seek comment on which routine conditions are warranted; the
contemplated alternatives include refraining from imposing any or all
of them.
134. We seek comment on a broad range of timelines for
transitioning licensees away from use of equipment and services on the
Covered List, and seek comment on alternatives such as having licensees
submit their own plan for removal of covered equipment and services
within a specified timeframe.
135. We also contemplate a number of proposals to expedite or
streamline submarine cable applications, including expediting review of
domestic U.S. cables and excluding from referral to the Executive
Branch applicants which meet certain requirements, which could benefit
any submarine cable licensees who are small businesses.
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
136. None.
VI. Ordering Clauses
137. It is ordered that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201-
255, 303(r), 403, 413 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-255, 303(r), 403, 413, and the Cable
Landing License Act of 1921, 47 U.S.C. 34-39, and Executive Order No.
10530, section 5(a) (May 12, 1954) reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C.
301, this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is hereby adopted.
138. It is further ordered that the Office of the Managing
Director, Performance Program Management, shall send a copy of this
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in a report to be sent to
Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
139. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the
Secretary shall send a copy of this Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analyses, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
Federal Communications Commission.
Aleta Bowers,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2025-19657 Filed 10-24-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P