National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.
Notice of issuance of an incidental harassment authorization.
In accordance with provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) as amended, notification is hereby given that an Incidental Harassment Authorization (IHA) to take marine mammals, by harassment, incidental to testing and training during Precision Strike Weapon (PSW) tests in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), a military readiness activity, has been issued to Eglin Air Force Base (Eglin AFB).
Effective from July 28, 2005, through July 27, 2006.
The application, a list of references used in this document, and/or the IHA are available by writing to Steve Leathery, Chief, Permits, Conservation and Education Division, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service, 1315 East-West Highway, Silver Spring, MD 20910–3225, or by telephoning the contact listed here. A copy of the Final Environmental Assessment (Final EA) is available by writing to the Department of the Air Force, AAC/EMSN, Natural Resources Branch, 501 DeLeon St., Suite 101, Eglin AFB, FL 32542–5133. Documents cited in this notice may be viewed, by appointment, during regular business hours, at the aforementioned address.
Kenneth R. Hollingshead, NMFS, 301–713–2055, ext 128.
Sections 101(a)(5)(A) and 101(a)(5)(D) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 1361
An authorization may be granted if NMFS finds that the taking will have a negligible impact on the species or stock(s), will not have an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of the species or stock(s) for subsistence uses, and if the permissible methods of taking and requirements pertaining to the monitoring and reporting of such takings are set forth. NMFS has defined “negligible impact” in 50 CFR 216.103 as ”...an impact resulting from the specified activity that cannot be reasonably expected to, and is not reasonably likely to, adversely affect the species or stock through effects on annual rates of recruitment or survival.z4”
Section 101(a)(5)(D) of the MMPA established an expedited process by which citizens of the United States can apply for an authorization to incidentally take small numbers of marine mammals by harassment. The NDAA amended the definition of “harassment” in section 18(A) of the MMPA as it applies to a “military readiness activity” to read as follows:
(i) any act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild [Level A harassment]; or (ii) any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of natural behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering, to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered [Level B harassment].
On February 4, 2004, Eglin AFB submitted a request for a 1–year IHA under section 101(a)(5)(D) of the MMPA and for an authorization under section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA (to take effect after the expiration of the IHA), for the incidental, but not intentional taking (in the form of noise-related harassment), of marine mammals incidental to PSW testing within the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range (EGTTR) for the next 5 years. The EGTTR is described as the airspace over the GOM that is controlled by Eglin AFB; it is also referred to as the “Eglin Water Range.”
PSW missions involve air-to-surface impacts of two weapons, the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) AGM–158 A and B and the small-diameter bomb (SDB) (GBU–39/B) that result in underwater detonations of up to approximately 300 lbs (136 kg) and 96 lbs (43.5 kg, double SDB) of net explosive weight (NEW), respectively.
The JASSM is a precision cruise missile designed for launch from outside area defenses to kill hard, medium-hard, soft, and area-type targets. The JASSM has a range of more than 200 nautical miles (nm) (370 kilometers (km)) and carries a 1,000–lb (453.6 kg) warhead. The JASSM has approximately 300 lbs (136 kg) of TNT equivalent NEW. The explosive used is AFX–757, a type of plastic bonded explosive (PBX) formulation with higher blast characteristics and less sensitivity to many physical effects that could trigger unwanted explosions. The JASSM would be launched from an aircraft at altitudes greater than 25,000 ft (7620 m). The JASSM would cruise at altitudes greater than 12,000 ft (3658 m)
The SDB is a glide bomb. Because of its capabilities, the SDB system is an important element of the Air Force's Global Strike Task Force. The SDB has a range of up to 50 nm (92.6 km) and carries a 217.4–lb (98.6 kg) warhead. The SDB has approximately 48 lbs (21.7 kg) of TNT equivalent NEW. The explosive used is AFX–757. Launch from an aircraft would occur at altitudes greater than 15,000 ft (4572 m). The SDB would commence a non-powered glide to the intended target. The SDB exercise involves a maximum of six live shots a year, with two of the shots occurring simultaneously, and a maximum of 12 inert shots, with up to two occurring simultaneously. Detonation of the SDBs would occur under one of two scenarios: (1) Detonation of one or two bombs upon impact with the target (about 5 ft (1.5 m)above the GOM surface), or (2) a height of burst (HOB) test: Detonation of one or two bombs 10 to 25 ft (3 to 7.6 m) above the GOM surface. No underwater detonations of the SDB are planned.
The JASSM and SDBs would be launched from B–1, B–2, B–52, F–15, F–16, F–18, or F–117 aircraft. Chase aircraft would include F–15, F–16, and T–38 aircraft. These aircraft would follow the test items during captive carry and free flight but would not follow either item below a predetermined altitude as directed by Flight Safety. Other assets on site may include an E–9 turboprop aircraft or MH–60/53 helicopters circling around the target location. Tanker aircraft including KC–10s and KC–135s would also be used. A second unmanned barge may also be on location to hold instrumentation. Targets include a platform of five containers strapped, braced, and welded together to form a single structure and a hopper barge, typical for transportation of grain.
The proposed Eglin AFB action would occur in the northern GOM in the EGTTR. Targets would be located in water less than 200–ft (61–m) deep and from 15 to 24 nm (27.8 to 44.5 km) offshore, south of Santa Rosa Island and south of Cape San Blas.
A notice of receipt of Eglin AFB's application and proposed IHA was published in the
Given the scientific uncertainty associated with predicting animal presence and behavior in the field, NMFS accords some deference to applicants requesting an MMPA authorization for an activity that might fall slightly below the NDAA definition of harassment, so that they are covered for impacts that may rise to the level of take. Equally important, such an authorization also carries with it responsibilities to implement mitigation
The rationale on why exposure to an SEL of this magnitude would result in only Level B harassment takes (by TTS) and why these takings would have only negligible impacts was discussed in the proposed IHA authorization
Ship strikes of whales by large vessels suggest that at least certain species of large whales do not use vessel sounds to avoid interactions. Also, there is no indication that smaller whales and dolphins with TTS would modify behavior significantly enough to be struck by an approaching vessel. Finally, a hypothesis that marine mammals would be subject to increased predation presumes that the predators would either not be similarly affected by the detonation or would travel from areas outside the impact zone, indicating recognition between the signal of a single detonation at distance and potentially debilitated food sources. Therefore, NMFS does not believe the evidence warrants that all (or an unknown percentage) of the estimated numbers of Level B harassment be considered as Level A harassment or as potential mortalities.
Tympanic membrane (TM) rupture, while not necessarily a serious or life-threatening injury, is a useful index of injury that is well correlated with measures of permanent hearing loss (Ketten, 1995, 1998). The occurrence of 50 percent TM rupture has been correlated to 30 percent permanent threshold shift (PTS) (Ketten, 1995, 1998) and will be considered as the index for permanent auditory system injury. In this response, the criteria will be explained for conservatively estimating the range for occurrence of 50–percent TM rupture (30–percent PTS). Significant occurrence of TM rupture would be expected at “near field” ranges significantly closer to the charge than the ranges for TTS and onset of PTS. For the CHURCHILL EIS injury model, TM rupture criteria were based on a limited number of small charge underwater explosion tests conducted with small terrestrial mammals as reported by both Yelverton
Damage to terrestrial mammal internal organs typically has been referenced to total shock wave impulse (pressure integrated over time) (Richmond
Acoustic energy (proportional to the square of pressure integrated over time) may be one of the appropriate parameters for evaluation of the response of the mammalian ear to the intensities of underwater noise at least sufficient to cause TTS. The shock wave's EFD appears to be at least as good an indicator/predictor of auditory system injury (TM rupture) as impulse and, for the CHURCHILL shock trial conditions, provided a means to include the potential effects of the bottom-reflected pressure wave.
Logarithmic interpolation of the test data for EFDs for 42 percent and 67 percent TM rupture indicates that the calculated EFD required for the occurrence of 50 percent TM rupture (approximately 30 percent PTS) is 1.17 in-lb/in2 (20.44 milli-Joules/cm
Using data from tests with small terrestrial mammals from Yelverton
After correcting for the atmospheric and hydrostatic pressures for the data, the minimum impulse (I) for predicting onset of slight lung hemorrhage in a small mammal is:
where M is the body mass (in kg) of the subject animal. Impulse values from the above equation provide a shallow depth “starting point” for determining the maximum range and the corresponding “at-depth” impulse level for the specific charge weight and marine mammal size. A maximum range should not be calculated using only the above impulse/body mass relationship
The modified Goertner model is very sensitive to mammal weight. By assuming a small mammal weight for an impact analysis, the onset of slight injury range is maximized for conservatism. Injuries from explosions in relatively shallow water (i.e., on the continental shelf) may be exacerbated by strong bottom-reflected pressure pulses.
where p(t) is pressure as a function of time, t. Pmax represents peak pressure at unit distance and t is the characteristic time at unit distance. The waveform and parameters are estimated using the similitude formulas of Weston (1960) (see, e. g., Urick, 1983)(note that this is the Friedlander waveform).
Consistent with NMFS' SEAWOLF and CHURCHILL rulemakings and the Navy's NEPA analyses for those actions, no bubble pulses were included (and are not considered important for near surface shots). The waveforms were 'propagated' using the similitude-based peak pressures and characteristic times as functions of distance. The propagation model was the Navy standard CASS-GRAB model, modified to calculate impulse response of the channel.
At range, the squared pressure for the entire set of arrivals was integrated over time, and normalized by the scalar acoustic impedance, to yield total energy (i.e., the integration was over the duration of all arrivals).
Finneran
It should be noted that the PSW mission includes only a single JASSM detonation in water, all other detonations are in-air detonations. Analyses indicate that the ranges for the 23– psi TTS metric at depths greater than 20 ft (6.1 m) are less conservative than the originally provided ranges for the 182–dB (re 1 microPa
There is a scientific methodology to estimate the probability of detecting marine mammals during vessel assessment surveys, as explained in detail in Buckland
It should be noted that sound propagation in shallow water has been a topic of intense study and measurement for at least 50 years, primarily by the U.S. Navy, but also by other nations and international bodies. Shallow-water bottom effects('reverberant' multipaths, shallow water waveguides, low-frequency cutoff, influence of sea state, etc.) are all covered in most basic underwater-acoustics textbooks (e.g., Urick, 1967).
There are 29 species of marine mammals documented as occurring in Federal waters of the GOM. Information on those species that may be impacted by this activity are discussed in the Eglin AFB application and the Draft EA. A summary of that information is provided in this section.
General information on these species can be found in Wursig
Marine mammal species that potentially occur within the EGTTR include several species of cetaceans and one sirenian, the West Indian manatee. During winter months, manatee distribution in the GOM is generally confined to southern Florida. During summer months, a few may migrate north as far as Louisiana. However, manatees primarily inhabit coastal and inshore waters and rarely venture offshore. PSW missions would be conducted offshore. Therefore, effects on manatees are considered very unlikely.
Cetacean abundance estimates for the study area are derived from GulfCet II (Davis
In order to maximize species conservation and protection, the species density estimate data were adjusted to reflect more realistic encounters of these animals in their natural environment. Refer to “
Bottlenose dolphins are distributed worldwide in tropical and temperate waters. In the GOM, several coastal and offshore stocks have been identified (see Waring et al. 2002) and one stock occurs in the inshore waters of the entire GOM. Waring
The average herd or group size of Atlantic bottlenose dolphins in shelf and slope waters was approximately four and 10 individuals, respectively, per herd as determined by GulfCet II surveys of eastern Gulf waters (Davis
Atlantic spotted dolphins are endemic to the tropical and warm temperate Atlantic Ocean. This species ranges from the latitude of Cape May, NJ, along mainland shores to Venezuela, including the GOM and Lesser Antilles (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1983). Sightings of this species are concentrated along the continental shelf and shelf edge (Fritts
The preferred depth of the spotted dolphin is believed to be associated with food availability and water temperature. The diet of the Atlantic spotted dolphin consists of squid and fish.
Dwarf sperm whales (
Potential impacts to marine mammals from the detonation of the PSWs and SDBs include both lethal and non-lethal injury, as well as Level B behavioral harassment. Although unlikely due to the extensive mitigation measures proposed by Eglin AFB, marine mammals have the potential to be killed or injured as a result of a blast due to the response of air cavities in the body, such as the lungs and bubbles in the intestines. Effects are likely to be most severe in near surface waters where the reflected shock wave creates a region of negative pressure called “cavitation.” This is a region of near total physical trauma within which no animals would be expected to survive. A second criterion used by NMFS for categorizing taking by mortality is the onset of extensive lung hemorrhage. Extensive lung hemorrhage is considered to be debilitating and thereby potentially fatal. Suffocation caused by lung hemorrhage is likely to be the major cause of marine mammal death from underwater shock waves.
For the acoustic analysis, the exploding charge is characterized as a point source. The impact thresholds used for marine mammals relate to potential effects on hearing from underwater noise from detonations. For the explosives in question, actual detonation heights would range from 0 to 25 ft (7.6 m) above the water surface. Detonation depths would range from 0 to 80 ft (73.2 m) below the surface. To bracket the range of possibilities, detonation scenarios just above and below the surface were used to analyze bombs set to detonate on contact with the target barge. Potentially, the barge may interact with the propagation of noise into the water. However, barge effects on the propagation of noise into the water column cannot be determined without in-water noise monitoring at the time of detonation.
Potential exposure of a sensitive species to detonation noise could theoretically occur at the surface or at any number of depths with differing consequences. As a conservative measure a mid-depth scenario was selected to ensure the greatest direct path for the harassment ranges, and to give the greatest impact range for the injury thresholds.
Criteria and thresholds that are the basis of the analysis of PSW noise impacts to cetaceans were initially used in U.S. Navy's environmental impact statements (EISs) for ship shock trials of the SEAWOLF submarine and the USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL vessel (DON, 1998; DON, 2001) and accepted by NMFS as representing the best science available (see 66 FR 22450, May 4, 2001). With a single exception mentioned in this document, NMFS believes that the criteria developed for the shock trials represent the best science available. The following sections summarize the information contained in those actions.
The criterion for mortality for marine mammals used in the CHURCHILL Final EIS is 'onset of severe lung injury.' This is conservative in that it corresponds to a 1 percent chance of mortal injury, and yet any animal experiencing onset severe lung injury is counted as a lethal take. The threshold is stated in terms of the Goertner (1982) modified positive impulse with value “indexed to 31 psi-ms.” Since the Goertner approach depends on propagation, source/animal depths, and animal mass in a complex way, the actual impulse value corresponding to the 31–psi-ms index is a complicated calculation. The acoustic threshold is derived from:
I
where M is animal mass in kg. Again, to be conservative, CHURCHILL used the mass of a calf dolphin (at 12.2 kg), so that the threshold index is 30.5 psi-ms.
Non-lethal injurious impacts are defined in this document as eardrum rupture (i.e., tympanic-membrane (TM) rupture) and the onset of slight lung injury. These are considered indicative of the onset of injury. The threshold for TM rupture corresponds to a 50 percent rate of rupture (i.e., 50 percent of animals exposed to the level are expected to suffer TM rupture); this is stated in terms of an EFD value of 1.17 in-lb/in
Marine mammals may also be harassed due to noise from PSW missions involving high explosive detonations in the EGTTR. The CHURCHILL criterion for non-injurious harassment from detonations, as established through NMFS' incidental take rulemaking (see 66 FR 22450, May 4, 2001), is temporary (auditory) threshold shift (TTS), which is a slight, recoverable loss of hearing sensitivity (DoN, 2001). The criterion for TTS used in this document is 182 dB re 1 microPa
The CHURCHILL rulemaking also established a second criterion for estimating TTS threshold: 12 psi. The appropriate application of this second TTS criterion is currently under debate, as this 12–psi criterion was originally established for estimating the impact of a 10,000–lb (4536–kg) explosive to be employed for the Navy's shock trial. It was introduced to provide a more conservative safety zone for TTS when the explosive or the animal approaches the sea surface (for which cases the explosive energy is reduced but the peak pressure is not).
For large explosives (2000 to 10,000 lbs (907–4536 kg)) and explosives/animals not too close to the surface, the TTS impact zones for these two TTS criteria are approximately the same. However, for small detonations, some acousticians contend the ranges for the two TTS thresholds may be quite different, with ranges for the peak pressure threshold several times greater than those for energy. In its application, Eglin AFB endorsed an approach, currently being developed by the Navy, for appropriately “scaling” the peak pressure threshold, in order to more accurately estimate TTS for small shots while preserving the safety feature provided by the peak pressure threshold. As such, in its application, Eglin AFB requested the energy-based criterion for TTS, 182 dB re 1 microPa2–s (maximum EFD level in any 1/3–octave band), be used alone to conservatively estimate the zone in which non-injurious (Level B) harassment of marine mammals may occur.
NMFS acousticians have reviewed the scientific basis for this proposal and agree, in part, with the statements made by Eglin AFB that the pressure criterion of 12 psi is not fully supportable for small charges or when either the charge or the recipient are at the surface. The model used in CHURCHILL assumed the detonation occurred in deep water with the charge placed below 318 ft (100 m) in depth, and that the bottom depth is at least 20 times the detonation depth. In contrast, in PSW missions, both the detonation and the recipient will be near the surface in relatively shallow water. Therefore, although this issue remains under review by NMFS and the Navy for future rulemaking actions, as an interim criterion for this IHA, NMFS is adopting the experimental findings of Finneran et al. (2002) that TTS can be induced at a pressure level of 23 psi (at least in belugas). As explained here, this is considered conservative since a 23–psi pressure level was below the level that induced TTS in bottlenose dolphins.
Finneran
No strictly sub-TTS behavioral responses (i.e., Level B harassment) are anticipated with the JASSM and SBD test activities because there are no successive detonations (the 2 SBD explosions occur almost simultaneously) which could provide causation for a behavioral disruption rising to the level of a significant alteration or abandonment of behavioral patterns without also causing TTS. Also, repetitive exposures (below TTS) to the same resident animals are highly unlikely due to the infrequent JASSM and SBD test events, the potential variability in target locations, and the continuous movement of marine mammals in the northern GOM.
For Eglin AFB's PSW exercises, three key sources of information are necessary for estimating potential take levels from noise on marine mammals: (1) The zone of influence (ZOI) for noise exposure; (2) The number of distinct firing or test events; and (3) the density of animals that potentially reside within the ZOI.
Noise ZOIs were calculated for depth detonation scenarios of 1 ft (0.3 m) and 20 ft (6.1 m) for lethality and for harassment (both Level A and Level B). To estimate the number of potential “takes” or animals affected, the adjusted data on cetacean population information from ship and aerial surveys were applied to the various impact zones.
Table 2 in this document give the estimated impact ranges for various explosive weights for summer and wintertime scenarios for JASSM and SDB. For example, the JASSM, the range, in winter, extends to 320 m (1050 ft), 590 m (1936 ft) and 3250 m (10663 ft) for potential mortality (31 psi-ms), injury (205 dB re 1 microPa
Applying the lethality (31 psi) and harassment (182 and 205 dB) impact ranges in Eglin AFB's Table 2 to the calculated species densities, the number of animals potentially occurring within the ZOIs without implementation of mitigation was estimated. These results are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 in this document. In summary, without any mitigation, a remote possibility exists for a bottlenose and an Atlantic spotted dolphins to be exposed to blast levels sufficient to cause mortality. Additionally, less than 2 cetaceans could be exposed to injurious Level A harassment noise levels (205 dB re 1 microPa
Eglin will survey the Zone of Influence (ZOI) and a buffer zone around a planned detonation site. The buffer zone will be twice the size of the ZOI. Prior to the planned detonation, trained observers aboard aircraft will survey (visually monitor) the ZOI and buffer area, a very effective method for detecting sea turtles and cetaceans. The aircraft/helicopters will fly approximately 500 ft (152 m) above the sea surface to allow observers to scan a large distance. In addition, trained observers aboard surface support vessels will conduct ship-based monitoring for non-participating vessels as well as protected species. Using 25X power “Big-eye” binoculars, surface observation would be effective out to several kilometers.
Weather that supports the ability to sight small marine life (e.g., sea turtles) is required to effectively mitigate impacts on marine life (DON, 1998). Wind, visibility, and surface conditions in the GOM are the most critical factors affecting mitigation operations. Higher winds typically increase wave height and create “white cap” conditions, both of which limit an observer's ability to locate surfacing marine mammals and sea turtles. PSW missions would be delayed if the Beaufort scale sea state are greater than 3.5. This would maximize detection of marine mammals and sea turtles.
Visibility is also a critical factor for flight safety issues. A minimum ceiling of 305 m (1000 ft) and visibility of 5.6 km (3 nm) is required to support mitigation and safety-of-flight concerns (DON, 2001).
Eglin will complete an aerial survey before each mission and train personnel to conduct aerial surveys for protected species. The aerial survey/monitoring team would consist of two observers. Aircraft provides a preferable viewing platform for detection of protected marine species. Each aerial observer will be experienced in marine mammal and sea turtle surveying and be familiar with species that may occur in the area. Each aircraft would have a data recorder who would be responsible for relaying the location, the species if possible, the direction of movement, and the number of animals sighted. The aerial monitoring team would also identify large schools of fish, jellyfish aggregations, and any large accumulation of
Eglin AFB will conduct shipboard monitoring to reduce impacts to protected species. The monitoring would be staged from the highest point possible on a mission ship. Observers would be familiar with the marine life of the area. The observer on the vessel must be equipped with optical equipment with sufficient magnification (e.g., 25X power “Big-Eye” binoculars, as these have been successfully used in monitoring activities from ships), which should allow the observer to sight surfacing mammals from as far as 11.6 km (6.3 nm) and provide overlapping coverage from the aerial team. A team leader would be responsible for reporting sighting locations, which would be based on bearing and distance.
The aerial and shipboard monitoring teams will have proper lines of communication to avoid communication deficiencies. The observers from the aerial team and operations vessel will have direct communication with the lead scientist aboard the operations vessel. The lead scientist will be a qualified marine biologist familiar with marine surveys. The lead scientist reviews the range conditions and recommends a Go/No-Go decision to the test director. The test director makes the final Go/No-Go decision.
All zones (injury, ZOI and buffer zones) are monitored. Although unexpected, any mission may be delayed or aborted due to technical reasons. Actual delay times depend on the aircraft supporting the test, test assets, and range time. Should a technical delay occur, all mitigation procedures would continue and remain in place until either the test takes place or is canceled. The ZOI and buffer zone around JASSM missions will be effectively monitored by shipboard observers from the highest point of the vessel. Vessels will be positioned as close to the safety zone as allowed without infringing on the missile flight corridor. The SDB has many mission profiles and does not have a flight termination system; therefore, the safety buffer may be quite large (5–10 nm radius (9.3–18.5 km)).
PSW mitigation must be regulated by Air Force safety parameters (pers. comm. Monteith and Nowers, 2004) to ensure personnel safety. Therefore, mitigation effectiveness may be reduced for some missions due to mandatory safety buffers which limit the time and type of mitigation. Even though mitigation may be limited for SDB missions, all detonations are above the water surface (5–25 ft (1.5–7.6 m) above the surface) and of much smaller net explosive weight than JASSM. Table 6 describes safety zones and clearance times for JASSM and SDB missions (time in minutes).
Stepwise mitigation and monitoring procedures for PSW missions are outlined here.
The purposes of pre-mission monitoring are to (1) evaluate the test site for environmental suitability of the mission (e.g., relatively low numbers of marine mammals and turtles, few or no patches of
Approximately 5 hours prior to the mission, or at daybreak, the appropriate vessel(s) would be on-site in the primary test site near the location of the earliest planned mission point. Observers onboard the vessel will assess the suitability of the test site, based on visual observation of marine mammals and sea turtles, the presence of large
Two hours prior to the mission, aerial monitoring would commence within the test site to evaluate the test site for environmental suitability. Evaluation of the entire test site would take approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. Shipboard observers would monitor the ZOI and buffer zone, and the lead scientist would enter all marine mammals and sea turtle sightings, including the time of sighting and the direction of travel, into a marine animal tracking and sighting database. The aerial monitoring team would begin monitoring the ZOI and buffer zone around the target area. The shipboard monitoring team would combine with the aerial team to monitor the area immediately around the
As noted in Table 6 and depending upon the mission, aerial and shipboard viewers would be instructed to leave the area and remain outside the safety area (over 2 nm (3.7 km) from impact for JASSM and 5–10 nm (9.3–18.5 km) for SDB). The aerial team would report all marine animals spotted and the directions of travel to the lead scientist onboard the vessel. The shipboard monitoring team would continue searching the buffer zone for protected species as it leaves. The aircraft will leave the area and land on base. The surface vessels will stay on the outside of the safety area until after impact (5–10 nm for SDB and 2 nm for JASSM).
Visual monitoring from surface vessels outside the safety zone would continue to document any animals that may have gone undetected during the past two hours and track animals moving in the direction of the impact area.
The lead scientist would plot and record sightings and bearing for all marine animals detected. This would depict animal sightings relative to the mission area. The lead scientist would have the authority to declare the range fouled and recommend a hold until monitoring indicates that the ZOI is and will remain clear of detectable animals.
As indicated in the previous table, the ZOI (for preventing TTS (182 dB re 1 microPa
(1) Any marine mammal or sea turtle is visually detected within the ZOI prior to mission launch. The delay would continue until the marine mammal or sea turtle that caused the postponement is confirmed to be outside of the ZOI due to the animal swimming out of the range.
(2) Any marine mammal or sea turtle is detected in the buffer zone and subsequently cannot be reacquired. The mission would not continue until the last verified location is outside of the ZOI and the animal is moving away from the mission area.
(3) Large
(4) Large schools of fish are observed in the water within the ZOI. The delay would continue until the large fish schools are confirmed to be outside the ZOI.
In the event of a postponement, pre-mission monitoring would continue as long as weather and daylight hours allow. Aerial monitoring is limited by fuel and the on-station time of the monitoring aircraft. If a live warhead failed to explode operations would attempt to recognize and solve the problem while continuing with all mitigation measures in place. The probability of this occurring is very remote but does exist. Should a weapon fail to explode, the activity sponsor would attempt to identify the problem and detonate the charge with all marine mammal and sea turtle mitigation measures in place as described. If a live warhead fails to explode the weapon is rendered safe after 15 minutes. The feasibility and practicality of recovering the warhead will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. If at all feasible, the warhead will be recovered.
It should be noted that for economic (costs of testing $2 million per test) and practical (in-air destruction of the missile) reasons, Eglin AFB will not be required to terminate an in-flight missile or bomb due to sighting of a protected species.
Visual monitoring from vessels would continue to survey the ZOI and surrounding buffer zone and track animals moving in the direction of the impact area. The lead scientist would continue to plot and record sightings and bearing for all marine animals detected. This will depict animal sightings relative to the impact area.
Post-mission monitoring is designed to determine the effectiveness of pre-mission mitigation by reporting any sightings of dead or injured marine mammals or sea turtles. Post-detonation monitoring via shipboard surveyors would commence immediately following each detonation; no aerial surveys would be conducted during this monitoring stage. The vessels will move into the ZOI from outside the safety zone and continue monitoring for at least two hours, concentrating on the area down current of the test site.
Although it is highly unlikely that marine mammals or sea turtles would be killed or seriously injured by this activity, marine mammals or sea turtles killed by an explosion would likely suffer lung rupture, which would cause them to float to the surface immediately due to air in the blood stream. Animals that were not killed instantly but were mortally wounded would likely resurface within a few days, though this would depend on the size and type of animal, fat stores, depth, and water temperature (DON, 2001). The monitoring team would attempt to document any marine mammals or turtles that were killed or injured as a result of the test and, if practicable, recover and examine any dead animals. The species, number, location, and behavior of any animals observed by the observation teams would be documented and reported to the lead scientist.
Post-mission monitoring activities include coordination with marine animal stranding networks. NMFS maintains stranding networks along coasts to collect and circulate information about marine mammal and sea turtle standings. Local coordinators report stranding data to state and regional coordinators. Any observed dead or injured marine mammal or sea turtle would be reported to the appropriate coordinator.
The PSW test will be postponed if any human safety concerns arise, protected species are sighted within the ZOI, any protected species is detected in the buffer zone and subsequently cannot be reacquired, or a protected species is moving into the ZOI from the buffer zone. PSW testing would be delayed if definitive indicators of protective species (i.e., large
Avoidance of impacts to pods of cetaceans will most likely be realized through these measures since groups of dolphins are relatively easy to spot with the survey distances and methods that will be employed. Typically solitary marine mammals such as dwarf/pygmy sperm whales and sea turtles, while more challenging to detect, will also be afforded substantial protection through pre-test monitoring.
The safety vessels would conduct post-mission monitoring for two hours after each mission. The monitoring team would attempt to document any marine mammals or turtles that were killed or injured as a result of the test and, if practicable, recover and examine any dead animals.
Hard-bottom habitats and artificial reefs will be avoided to alleviate any potential impacts to protected habitat. PSW testing will be delayed if large Sargassum mats are found in the ZOI.
By using conservative mathematic calculations, conservative density estimates can serve as a respectable mitigation technique for take estimates. Marine mammal densities used to calculate takes were based on the most current and comprehensive GOM surveys available (GulfCet II). The densities are adjusted for the time the animals are submerged, and further adjusted by applying standard deviations to provide an approximately 99 percent confidence level. As an example, the density estimates for bottlenose dolphins range from 0.06 to 0.15 animals/km
NMFS will require Eglin AFB to submit an annual report on the results of the monitoring requirements. This annual report will be due within 120 days of the expiration of the IHA. This report will include a discussion on the effectiveness of the mitigation in addition to the following information: (1) date and time of each of the detonations; (2) a detailed description of the pre-test and post-test activities related to mitigating and monitoring the effects of explosives detonation on marine mammals and their populations; (3) the results of the monitoring program, including numbers by species/stock of any marine mammals noted injured or killed as a result of the detonations and numbers that may have been harassed due to undetected presence within the safety zone; and (4) results of coordination with coastal marine mammal/sea turtle stranding networks.
Although Eglin AFB does not currently conduct independent Air Force monitoring efforts, Eglin AFB's Natural Resources Branch does participate in marine animal tagging and monitoring programs lead by other agencies. Additionally, the Natural Resources Branch also supports participation in annual surveys of marine mammals in the GOM with NOAA Fisheries. From 1999 to 2002, Eglin AFB's Natural Resources Branch has, through a contract representative, participated in summer cetacean monitoring and research opportunities. The contractor participated in visual surveys in 1999 for cetaceans in GOM, photographic identification of sperm whales in the northeastern Gulf in 2001, and as a visual observer during the 2000 Sperm Whale Pilot Study and the 2002 sperm whale Satellite-tag (S-tag) cruise. Support for these research efforts is anticipated to continue.
Eglin AFB conducts other research efforts that utilize marine mammal stranding information as a means of ascertaining the effectiveness of mitigation techniques. Stranding data is collected and maintained for the Florida panhandle and Gulf-wide areas. This is undertaken through the establishment and maintenance of contacts with local, state, and regional stranding networks. Eglin AFB assists with stranding data collection by maintaining its own team of stranding personnel. In addition to simply collecting stranding data, various analyses are performed. Stranding events are tracked by year, season, and NOAA Fisheries statistical zone, both Gulf-wide and on the coastline in proximity to Eglin AFB. Stranding data is combined with records of EGTTR mission activity in each water range and analyzed for any possible correlation. In addition to being used as a measure of the effectiveness of mission mitigation, stranding data can yield insight into the species composition of cetaceans in the region.
NMFS has issued a biological opinion regarding the effects of this action on ESA-listed species and critical habitat under the jurisdiction of NMFS. That biological opinion concluded that this action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. A copy of the Biological Opinion is available upon request (see
In December, 2003, Eglin AFB released a Draft EA on this proposed activity. On April 22, 2004 (69 FR 21816), NMFS noted that Eglin AFB had prepared an EA for PSW activities and made this EA was available upon request. Eglin AFB has updated that draft EA.
In accordance with NOAA Administrative Order 216–6 (Environmental Review Procedures for Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, May 20, 1999), NMFS has reviewed the information contained in Eglin's draft Final EA and determined that the Eglin AFB EA accurately and completely describes the proposed action alternative, reasonable additional alternatives, and the potential impacts on marine mammals, endangered species, and other marine life that could be impacted by the preferred alternative and the other alternatives. Based on this review and analysis, NMFS is adopting Eglin's EA under 40 CFR 1506.3 and has made its own FONSI. Therefore, NMFS has determined it is not necessary to issue a new EA, supplemental EA or an environmental impact statement for the issuance of an IHA to Eglin AFB for this activity. A copy of NMFS' FONSI for this activity is available upon request (see
NMFS has determined that this action is expected to have a negligible impact on the affected species or stocks of marine mammals in the GOM. No take by serious injury and/or death is anticipated, and the potential for temporary or permanent hearing impairment is low and will be avoided through the incorporation of the mitigation measures mentioned in this document. The information contained in Eglin's EA and incidental take application support NMFS' finding that impacts will be mitigated by implementation of a conservative safety range for marine mammal exclusion, incorporation of aerial and shipboard survey monitoring efforts in the program both prior to, and after, detonation of explosives, and delay/postponement/cancellation of detonations whenever marine mammals are either detected within the safety zone or may enter the safety zone at the time of detonation or if weather and sea conditions preclude adequate aerial surveillance. Since the taking will not result in more than the incidental harassment of certain species of marine mammals, will have only a negligible impact on these stocks, will not have an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of these stocks for subsistence uses, and, through implementation of required mitigation and monitoring measures, will result in the least practicable adverse impact on the affected marine mammal stocks, NMFS has determined that the requirements of section 101(a)(5)(D) of the MMPA have been met and the IHA can be issued.
NMFS has issued an IHA to take marine mammals, by harassment, incidental to testing and training during Precision Strike Weapons (PSW) tests in the Gulf of Mexico for a 1–year period, provided the mitigation, monitoring,