Office of Electricity, Department of Energy (DOE).
Request for information.
The United States Government recognizes the immediate imperative to secure our electric infrastructure. The electric power system is vital to the Nation's energy security, supporting national defense, emergency services, critical infrastructure, and the economy. Preventing exploitation and attacks by foreign threats to the U.S. supply chain is the focus of this Request for Information (RFI). On January 20, 2021, Executive Order,
Comments must be received on or before June 7, 2021. If you anticipate difficulty in submitting comments within that period, contact the person listed in
Interested persons are encouraged to submit written comments to
Michael Coe, Director, Energy Resilience Division of the Office of Electricity, U.S. Department of Energy, Mailstop OE–20, Room 8G–042, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585; (202) 287–5166; or
The Nation's energy infrastructure is fundamental to national security, the continuity of our economy, and our way of life. Adversarial nation-state actors are targeting our critical infrastructure, with increasing focus on the energy
The Administration is addressing critical infrastructure security through various actions and considers the protection and resilience of energy infrastructure to be a part of that comprehensive strategy. To strengthen the resilience of America's critical infrastructure, the Administration recently issued Executive Order 14017,
To further secure the Nation's electric grid, the Department is developing recommendations to strengthen requirements and capabilities for supply chain risk management practices by the Nation's electric utilities. These recommendations are intended to enable an approach that builds on, clarifies, and, where appropriate, modifies prior executive and agency actions.
E.O. 13920,
On January 20, 2021, Executive Order 13990,
E.O. 13990 also directed the Secretary and the OMB Director to “jointly consider whether to recommend that a replacement order be issued.”
To ensure that the Department's considerations for a replacement Executive Order appropriately balance national security, economic, and administrability considerations, the Department is seeking information from electric utilities, academia, research laboratories, government agencies, and other stakeholders.
Adversarial nation-state actors are targeting our critical infrastructure, with increasing focus on the energy sector. For example, the government of People's Republic of China is equipped and actively planning to undermine the electric power system in the United States. The growing prevalence of essential electric system equipment being sourced from China presents a significant threat, as Chinese law provides opportunities for China to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in Chinese-manufactured or supplied equipment that are used in U.S. critical infrastructure that rely on these sources. Accordingly, the Department expects that, during the period of time in which further recommendations are being developed, utilities will seek to act in a way that minimizes the risk of installing electric equipment and programmable components that are subject to foreign adversaries' ownership, control, or influence.
Based on the Department's experience implementing E.O. 13920 and feedback from stakeholders, the Department seeks additional public input on several issues set forth below. Please carefully read Section III of this RFI regarding the public nature of submissions. As explained in detail, any information that you do not want to be publicly viewable should not be included in your comment, nor in any document attached to your comment. Instructions regarding how to provide Confidential Business Information are also provided. To the extent possible, please reference the question being addressed in your response. Respondents are not required to address all questions.
While immediate security concerns associated with foreign ownership and control may be addressed through time-limited emergency authorities, addressing pervasive and ongoing grid security risks requires a comprehensive long-term strategy. The Department is interested in recommendations for how to best exercise its role as the Sector Risk Management Agency to inform and coordinate with the utility industry and appropriate regulators at all levels of government, including state Public Utility Commissions and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), to ensure their procurement practices and requirements evolve to match changes in the threat landscape and best protect critical infrastructure. The Department is also interested in how to enable better testing of critical grid equipment, encourage better procurement and risk management practices, and develop a strong domestic
1. What technical assistance would States, Indian Tribes, or units of local government need to enhance their security efforts relative to the electric system?
2. What specific additional actions could be taken by regulators to address the security of critical electric infrastructure and the incorporation of criteria for evaluating foreign ownership, control, and influence into supply chain risk management, and how can the Department of Energy best inform those actions?
3. What actions can the Department take to facilitate responsible and effective procurement practices by the private sector? What are the potential costs and benefits of those actions?
4. Are there particular criteria the Department could issue to inform utility procurement policies, state requirements, or FERC mandatory reliability standards to mitigate foreign ownership, control, and influence risks?
Immediate threats to the Nation's electric grid must be addressed. By declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in E.O. 13920, the President authorized the Secretary to prohibit the acquisition, transfer, or installation of certain bulk-power system equipment sourced from foreign adversary countries. The December 2020 Prohibition Order applied to utilities that own or operate Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI), as defined by section 215A(a)(4) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), that actively serves a “critical defense facility (CDF)”, as designated by the Secretary under section 215A(c) of the FPA, at a service voltage of 69 kilovolts and above, from the point of electrical interconnection with the CDF up to and including the next “upstream” transmission substation (Responsible Utilities).
Due to the interconnected nature of the U.S. transmission and distribution networks across the U.S., the Department is requesting comment on the advisability and feasibility of an expanded approach that would cover distribution facilities that serve CDFs.
Additionally, while threats to electric equipment serving CDFs pose a unique national security risk, the electric system serves numerous types of critical infrastructure and enable the national critical functions.
1. To ensure the national security, should the Secretary seek to issue a Prohibition Order or other action that applies to equipment installed on parts of the electric distribution system,
2. In addition to DCEI, should the Secretary seek to issue a Prohibition Order or other action that covers electric infrastructure serving other critical infrastructure sectors including communications, emergency services, healthcare and public health, information technology, and transportation systems?
3. In addition to critical infrastructure, should the Secretary seek to issue a Prohibition Order or other action that covers electric infrastructure enabling the national critical functions?
4. Are utilities sufficiently able to identify critical infrastructure within their service territory that would enable compliance with such requirements?
DOE invites all interested parties to submit in writing by June 7, 2021, comments and information on matters addressed in this RFI.
Include contact information each time you submit comments, data, documents, and other information to DOE.
Comments, data, and other information submitted to DOE electronically should be provided in PDF (preferred), Microsoft Word or Excel, WordPerfect, or text (ASCII) file format. Provide documents that are not secured, are written in English, and are free of any defects or viruses. Documents should not contain special characters or any form of encryption and, if possible, they should carry the electronic signature of the author.
It is DOE's policy that all comments may be included in the public docket, without change and as received, including any personal information provided in the comments (except information deemed to be exempt from public disclosure).
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on April 19, 2021, by Patricia A. Hoffman, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity, pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document on publication in the