Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense proposes to exempt records maintained in DUSDI 01-DoD “Department of Defense (DoD) Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System,” from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G), (H), and (I), (5), and (8); (f); and (g) of the Privacy Act. A system of records notice for this system has been published today in the Federal Register.
In addition, in the course of carrying out collections and analysis of information in connection with the operations of the DITMAC and DoD Component insider threat programs, exempt records received from other systems of records may become part of this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those other systems of records are maintained in this system, the Department also claims the same exemptions for the records from those other systems that are maintained in this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part.
In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4) and (11), the public is given a 30-day period in which to comment. Therefore, please submit any comments by June 20, 2016.
You may submit comments, identified by docket number and title, by any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Mail: Department of Defense, Deputy Chief Management Officer, Directorate for Oversight and Compliance, 4800 Mark Center Drive, ATTN: Box 24, Alexandria, VA 22350-1700.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number for this Federal Register document. The general policy for comments and other submissions from members of the public is to make these submissions available for public viewing on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov as they are received without change, including any personal identifiers or contact information.
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Cindy Allard, Director of the Defense Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Division, 703-571-0070.
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The DITMAC was established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in order to consolidate and analyze insider threat information reported by the DoD Component insider threat programs Start Printed Page 31562mandated by Presidential Executive Order 13587, issued October 7, 2011, which required Federal agencies to establish an insider threat detection and prevention program to ensure the security of classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information consistent with appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties. For purposes of this system of records, the term “insider threat” is defined in the Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Task Force based on direction provided in Section 6.3(b) of Executive Order 13587. The DITMAC helps prevent, deter, detect, and/or mitigate the potential threat that personnel, including DoD military personnel, civilian employees, and contractor personnel, who have or had been granted eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position may harm the security of the United States. This threat can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.
The system of records will be used to analyze, monitor, and audit insider threat information for insider threat detection and mitigation within DoD on threats that persons who have or had been granted eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive positions may pose to DoD and U.S. Government installations, facilities, personnel, missions, or resources. The system of records will support the DITMAC and DoD Component insider threat programs, enable the identification of systemic insider threat issues and challenges, and provide a basis for the development and recommendation of solutions to deter, detect, and/or mitigate potential insider threats. It will assist in identifying best practices among other Federal Government insider threat programs, through the use of existing DoD resources and functions and by leveraging existing authorities, policies, programs, systems, and architectures.
Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review” and Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review”
It has been determined that this rule is not a significant rule. This rule does not (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy; a sector of the economy; productivity; competition; jobs; the environment; public health or safety; or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another Agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in these Executive orders.
Public Law 96-354, “Regulatory Flexibility Act” (5 U.S.C Chapter 6)
It has been certified that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities because it is concerned only with the administration of Privacy Act systems of records within DoD. A Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not required.
Public Law 96-511, “Paperwork Reduction Act” (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)
It has been determined that this rule does not impose additional information collection requirements on the public under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
Section 202, Public Law 104-4, “Unfunded Mandates Reform Act”
It has been determined that this rule does not involve a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more and that it will not significantly or uniquely affect small governments.
It has been determined that this rule does not have federalism implications. This rule does not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
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Accordingly, 32 CFR part 310 is proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 310 [Amended]
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1. The authority citation for 32 CFR part 310 continues to read as follows:End Amendment Part
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through 310.53 [Redesignated as §§ 310.31 through 310.54]
2. Redesignate § 310.30 through § 310.53 as § 310.31 through § 310.54. End Amendment Part
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3. In Subpart F, add a new § 310.30 to read as follows: End Amendment Part
(a) Use of DoD-wide exemptions. DoD-wide exemptions for DOD-wide systems of records are established pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.
(b) Promises of confidentiality. (1) Only the identity of sources that have been given an express promise of confidentiality may be protected from disclosure under paragraphs (d)(3)(i), (ii), and (iii) and (d)(4) of this section. However, the identity of sources who were given implied promises of confidentiality in inquiries conducted before September 27, 1975, also may be protected from disclosure.
(2) Ensure promises of confidentiality are not automatically given but are used sparingly. Establish appropriate procedures and identify fully categories of individuals who may make such promises. Promises of confidentiality shall be made only when they are essential to obtain the information sought (see 5 CFR part 736).
(c) Access to records for which DOD-wide exemptions are claimed. Deny the individual access only to those portions of the records for which the claimed exemption applies.
(d) DoD-wide exemptions. The following exemptions are applicable to all components of the Department of Defense for the following system(s) of records:
(1) System identifier and name: DUSDI 01-DoD “Department of Defense (DoD) Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center (DITMAC) and DoD Component Insider Threat Records System.” Exemption: This system of records is exempted from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3) and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G)(H) and (I), (5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) (2) and (k)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(2) Records are only exempt from pertinent provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a to the extent that such provisions have been identified and an exemption claimed for the record and the purposes underlying the exemption for the record pertain to the record.
(3) Exemption from the particular subsections is justified for the following reasons:
(i) Subsection (c)(3). To provide the subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in this system could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence investigation, and thereby seriously impede law enforcement or counterintelligence efforts by permitting the record subject and other persons to whom he might disclose the records to avoid criminal Start Printed Page 31563penalties, civil remedies, or counterintelligence measures. Access to the accounting of disclosures could also interfere with a civil or administrative action or investigation which may impede in those actions or investigations. Access also could reveal the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations.
(ii) Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).
(iii) Subsection (d)(1). Disclosure of records in the system could reveal the identity of confidential sources and result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of others. Disclosure may also reveal information relating to actual or potential criminal investigations. Disclosure of classified national security information would cause damage to the national security of the United States. Disclosure could also interfere with a civil or administrative action or investigation; reveal the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations; and reveal the confidentiality and integrity of Federal testing materials and evaluation materials used for military promotions when furnished by a confidential source.
(iv) Subsection (d)(2). Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing criminal or civil law enforcement proceedings and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(v) Subsections (d)(3) and (4). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
(vi) Subsection (e)(1). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement and counterintelligence, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
(vii) Subsection (e)(2). To collect information from the subject individual could serve notice that he or she is the subject of a criminal investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to such investigations.
(viii) Subsection (e)(3). To inform individuals as required by this subsection could reveal the existence of a criminal investigation and compromise investigative efforts.
(ix) Subsection (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I). These subsections are inapplicable to the extent exemption is claimed from (d)(1) and (2).
(x) Subsection (e)(5). It is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete, but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads.
(xi) Subsection (e)(8). To serve notice could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts.
(xii) Subsection (g). This subsection is inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
(4) In addition, in the course of carrying out analysis for insider threats, exempt records from other systems of records may in turn become part of the case records maintained in this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those other systems of records are maintained into this system, the DoD claims the same exemptions for the records from those other systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part.
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Dated: May 13, 2016.
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2016-11702 Filed 5-18-16; 8:45 am]
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